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Preface
One of the startling  empirical  insights from  the growing body 
of research on  the workings of  the EU judicial  system  is  that 
the European Commission  almost always wins. This finding 
is remarkably  robust – every  empirical  study  I am  aware of 
that deals with  success and failure in  proceedings before the 
European Court of Justice has so far  replicated this result. 
Whether  the Commission  litigates itself or lodges an ‘obser-
vation‘ (a  legal  brief  outlining its position) in a case brought 
by  a different party, the Court follows the Commission’s 
opinion in  the vast majority  of  cases. Since empirical  data  on 
judicial  behaviour  at the Court of Justice is sparse – judges 
do not publish votes or  record dissents – the source of this 
‘special  rapport’ is difficult  to establish. But whatever  the 
reason  may be, it seemed to me that this crucial  ‘asset’ would 
have to have some bearing on the Commission’s  overall 
stance in  the EU’s policy-making process. Since the Court 
has been  the author  of  so many ‘history-making’ decisions 
shaping  the content of  EU policies, being a frequent and fre-
quently successful  litigator should provide the Commission 
with  an  alternative means of achieving policy  objectives, at 
least when  all else fails. Hence, this book looks at  how the 
Commission makes use of its ‘special  rapport’ with  the Court 
of Justice and what factors influence its  use of court proceed-
ings vis-à-vis its  alternatives in  shaping EU policy. In pursu-
ing these questions, I am  hoping not only  to learn  more 
about the interaction of different modes of  EU policy-
making, but also to contribute to a  body of research that 
takes a less ‘court-centric’ approach to ‘law and politics’ in 
the EU. Like all  courts, the European  Court of Justice needs 
to be ‘activated’ by  litigants pursuing their  interests  couched 
in  legal  terms. Learning more about the motives of  litigants, 
their alternatives to litigation, and their reasons for choosing 
this course of action  should contribute to a  better  under-
standing of the political relevance of the legal system. 
Looking back at the long process of which  this publication  is 
a preliminary  culmination, I realise that I am  indebted to 
many  sources of  inspiration and support, only some of which 
I can actually  name. First of all  I would like to thank my the-
sis supervisor, Professor  Wolfgang Wessels, who both sup-
ported my  fixation on  the Commission and the Court and 
urged me to maintain a broader interest in  EU politics. I 
would further  like to thank Professor André Kaiser, whose 
seminar  on  constitutional  courts in  established democracies 
provided the nucleus of my idea for  this study, and Professor 
Ingo Rohlfing  for making  me much  more self-conscious 
about methodology. Between 2010 and 2011, I had the good 
fortune to be able to spend some time as visiting  graduate 
student at  the University of  Chicago, where I learned a great 
deal  about the state of  research  on ‘law and politics’. I am 
greatly indebted to Professor  Gerald Rosenberg, first for giv-
ing me this opportunity, and second for  making me think 
much more broadly  about the role of courts in  society. I 
would also like to thank Professor  Susanne Schmidt for her 
support of my work, which  borrows many  insights from  hers. 
Anette Fasang  patiently answered my  many  questions about 
the appropriate use of statistics, and I am very  grateful  for 
her  help. Naturally, she bears no responsibility  for the re-
maining defects. 
My deepest gratitude goes to Franzi  Bedorf, who not only 
read the entire manuscript, but  endured my increasingly  er-
ratic schedule and supported me at every  step. Thank you so 
much for being part of my life.
Finally, I dedicate this  book to my parents, Gabriele and 






When Duke Wilhelm  IV of Bavaria decreed a purity  law for 
beer on April  23, 1516, he had in  mind a late medieval 
equivalent of consumer protection. Knowledge about the bio-
logical  details of the fermentation process was not widely 
available, and many contemporary beers must have tasted 
quite foul, particularly during the summer, when high tem-
peratures frequently caused brews to go off. Since beer was 
still  preferable to unsanitary  fresh  water, and its production 
lucrative business, brewers frequently made use of all  sorts of 
questionable and not rarely toxic additives  to cover  up the 
off-tastes of their  products. The more fanciful  of  these in-
cluded fly  agaric mushrooms, ivy, chalk, soot, snake juice and 
oxen bile (cf. Thomas 2006: 32; Dornbusch 2011: 104-105). 
To reign in such  creativity, Wilhelm IV’s decree restricted the 
ingredients allowed in  the brewing process to barley, hops 
and water.1 
Originally only  a  Bavarian  statute, it  was not until  four cen-
turies later  that the German Reichstag established the purity 
law as a  nation-wide rule, in 1906, much to the detriment of 
some northern  German  brewing traditions that had included 
various herbs and spices to vary  the flavour of their  product 
(cf. Thomas 2006: 32). The term  ‘Reinheitsgebot’, as the law 
is known today, was coined shortly  thereafter, in  the wake of 
the foundation  of  the first German republic in 1919. Bavarian 
delegates used the term  in  their  insistence that the Bavarian 
law remain  the law of all  of Germany, in which they  suc-
1  Yeast was not included in the original list since its properties were un-
known at the time. The use of malted wheat for wheat beers was reserved for 
families of the nobility, and subsequently became a very lucrative niche 
(Dornbusch and Oliver 2011: 829).
ceeded – the newly  assembled Reichstag  retained the prior 
‘Biersteuergesetz’ codifying the purity  law. By  the time it 
celebrated its  450 year  anniversary, the purity  law was con-
sidered the world’s oldest continuously  existing  food quality 
standard (cf. Dornbusch and Heyse 2011: 692). 
Sometime in  late 1981, a German distributor announced to 
the French brewery  Brasserie du  Pêcheur, based in Schil-
tigheim in  Alsace, that it  would cease to carry  its products. 
German authorities had repeatedly removed Brasserie du 
Pêcheur beers  from  retail  shelves, on  the grounds that the 
Brasserie’s use of  additives in the brewing process ran afoul 
of Germany’s most recent codification  of  the purity  law, the 
revised Biersteuergesetz of 1952, which  allowed for bottom 
fermenting beers such as the Brasserie’s  only  the use of 
malted barley, hops, yeast and water. Products that con-
tained other ingredients  could not be sold in Germany  as 
‘beer’. Excluded from  the lucrative German  beer market, the 
Brasserie du Pêcheur complained to the European Commis-
sion. In  restricting its  market to beers brewed according to 
the purity  laws, it argued, Germany  was infringing the Euro-
pean  Community’s free market principles, in particular  Arti-
cle 30 of the EEC Treaty, which forbade quantitative restric-
tions to trade, and all  measures  having equivalent effect (cf. 
Clark 1988: 769-770).
The removal of such barriers to trade had been  a  priority  of 
the Commission  for  quite some time. Its  principal  approach 
to this issue throughout the 1960s  and 1970s  had been  to 
propose legislation introducing common product standards 
that would preclude member  states from applying their  own 
rules  to imported products. This  process was cumbersome, 
due on  one hand to the complicated nature of detailed stan-
dards and the constant need to update rules to technological 
progress, and on  the other to decision-making  rules that gave 
every  member state a veto over individual  pieces  of legisla-
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tion. Product standards can serve ambiguous purposes; they 
are obviously  necessary  to protect consumers and the envi-
ronment, but they can also be a  subtle form  of protectionism, 
especially  where a  certain standard is basically  a  codification 
of prevalent practices in  one country, drawn up by  the lead-
ing domestic producers. It is not entirely  surprising that 
member state governments were reluctant  to relinquish  such 
standards, especially  where they affected important domestic 
industries. 
Among the pieces of legislation  proposed by  the Commission 
in  the field of  product standards had been one concerning 
the characteristics of beer produced within the Community 
(OJ 1972, No. C 105/17). It suggested that European stan-
dards on the content of  beers follow the example of  French 
laws, which  allowed the use of up to 30 percent of raw mate-
rials other  than malted barley  or wheat for the production of 
fermentable wort.2 That  piece of  legislation, and subsequent 
amendments, went nowhere in  the Council, owing mainly  to 
resistance by  the German government (cf. Schweitzer and 
Streinz 1984: 42). 
By  the time the Brasserie du  Pêcheur lodged its complaint, 
the Commission had announced a change of  strategy. Rather 
than introduce more legislation, the Commission would rely 
on existing laws on the free movement of goods, as it itself 
interpreted them, and bring  enforcement actions before the 
Court of  Justice where such  laws were infringed by  member 
states. The Court of Justice’s recent case law had proven fa-
vourable to this approach, with  a long series of cases, most 
notably Dassonville  (Case 8/74, ECR 1974: 838) and Cassis 
de  Dijon (Case 120/78, ECR 1979: 650),3 restricting  member 
state discretion  to autonomously  regulate trade. Prior to the 
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2 Cf. “Eurobrew”, The Economist, 29 December 1973, Survey, p. 10.
3 Cf. chapter 5. 
beer purity law case, the Commission had taken the Italian 
government to court for restricting  the designation ‘aceto’ 
(vinegar) to products derived from wine (Case 2193/80, ECR 
1981: 3019). The Court supported the Commission’s position 
that this was an  illegal  restriction  to trade, as products made 
from  other raw materials, like apple must or malt, could 
freely  be marketed as ‘vinegar’ in  other member  states. The 
analogy to beer is  obvious, but the German  beer case was 
special, as it  affected both  the largest  member state and one 
of its  most coveted products, protected by a  rule that dated 
back almost half a  millennium. The German  beer market in 
the 1980s was second only to the US in  both production and 
revenue, and Germans consumed an  annual  average of  about 
150 litres per head (240 litres in  Bavaria), by  far the highest 
rate of  consumption  in the EEC (cf. Schweitzer and Streinz 
1984: 47).4  In  fact, the German  government claimed that 
beer was the single most consumed foodstuff in  Germany, 
and its protection  warranted particular  measures (Case 178/
84, ECR  1987: 1236-1237, German edition). The German 
laws, which effectively functioned as  an import ban  on  non-
Reinheitsgebot beers, helped secure domestic producers a 
market share of  about 99 percent (cf. Kohler  1987: 13; Pal-
trow 1987). 
Following  its revised strategy, the Commission took no heed 
of German protestations and initiated an infringement pro-
cedure against Germany  with  a formal letter to the German 
government in  February 1982. Since no agreement could be 
reached in  the early  stages of  the procedure, the Commission 
referred the case to the Court of  Justice in  July  1984. (Inci-
dentally, the Commission  opened parallel proceedings 
against Greece, the only  other  European  country with  a  pu-
rity law for beer, the Greek king  Otto, who decreed it  during 
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4 Cf. also “Bier - hierzulande mehr als ein Getränk”, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 2 February 1986, p. B5. 
his reign  from  1832-1862, having  been  of Bavarian  origin.)5 
The Commission argued that the German  laws distorted 
trade in two ways. First, by banning the import of non-
Reinheitsgebot beers, it protected its domestic market from 
foreign  competition. Second, by exempting from the Rein-
heitsgebot beers brewed in  Germany exclusively  for  export, it 
simultaneously allowed German  brewers to compete on  the 
world market. By virtue of  this ostensibly  protectionist regu-
lation, German  exports of beer exceeded imports by  a  factor 
of four to one (Case 178/84, ECR 1987: 1234, German  edi-
tion).  Moreover, the Commission argued that the import ban 
on non-Reinheitsgebot beers could not be justified on 
grounds of consumer protection. Even where the prohibited 
raw materials  and additives  commonly  used in foreign beers 
may  constitute health risks, these same substances could le-
gally  be used in the production  of other foodstuffs in  Ger-
many, most notably  in wine (Case 178/84, ECR 1987: 1236, 
German edition).6  In  the Commission’s view, there was 
therefore no reason  that  beer  that could be legally be in  other 
member states should not also be sold in Germany.
In  its reply, the German government argued that in the ab-
sence of harmonizing legislation, member states retain the 
right to autonomously regulate their  domestic markets. As 
long as this was so, different national  regulations  of necessity 
lead to trade barriers, but these could only  be addressed by 
Community legislation  (Case 178/84, ECR 1987: 1235, Ger-
man  edition). Following the Commission’s opinion would 
moreover lead to a  dangerous increase in the consumption  of 
additives, as every state would have to adapt its legislation to 
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5 Greek beers not being known for their excellence, some observers view this 
as evidence falsifying the assumption that a purity law is a sufficient condi-
tion for high quality beers. A trip to Belgium may also convince that neither 
is it a necessary one. 
6  The German Association of Consumer Organizations quipped that ''The 
only ingredient in domestic and foreign beer that has so far been proven to 
be potentially damaging is alcohol'' (Quoted in Markham 1987: A7). 
the position of the most lenient member state (Case 178/84, 
ECR 1987: 1240, German edition). Finally, it argued that the 
concept of ‘beer’ was “inseparably  linked” to the Reinheitsge-
bot in the mind of  he German consumer, so that for the sake 
of consumer protection  any product differently produced 
should not carry that designation (Case 178/84, ECR  1987: 
1270). 
The Court did not accept the German  government’s argu-
ments. To the latter, it replied that consumer concepts of 
products evolve over  time and that  such  an evolution  must 
not be precluded by  marketing regulations. Quoting an  ear-
lier  judgement, the judges stated that  “the legislation of a 
Member State must not 'crystallize given  consumer habits so 
as to consolidate an  advantage acquired by  national indus-
tries concerned to comply with  them'” (Case 178/84, ECR 
1987: 1270-1271). Rather than a  ban on  imports, a simple 
labeling requirement would sufficiently serve the purpose of 
consumer  protection  in  this regard. Moreover, the Court did 
not follow the German  government’s interpretation of the 
discretion available to national  governments in  regulating 
domestic markets where there was no common  Community 
legislation. While it agreed that, in  the absence of harmoniza-
tion, member states retained some regulatory powers, these, 
it said, may  not be used to pursue unjustified goals, or, where 
goals such as public health  and consumer protection are jus-
tified, result in  measures that go beyond what is necessary to 
attain  these goals. Consequently, it concluded that “in so far 
as the German rules on  additives in beer entail  a  general  ban 
on additives, their  application to beers imported from  other 
Member States is contrary  to the requirements of  Commu-
nity law as  laid down in  the case-law of the Court, since that 
prohibition is contrary to the principle of proportionality” 
(Case 178/84, ECR 1987: 1276). 
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Another precedence was  set, and the Commission could 
claim an essential  vindication  of its new, judicial, strategy  to 
remove barriers to trade within  the Community, following 
the principle that a product lawfully produced and marketed 
in  one member state should equally be marketable in  all 
other member states. After its initial  legislative strategy  had 
failed, the Commission  initiated judicial proceedings, seizing 
upon  legal innovations, and succeeded in establishing a  prin-
ciple that allowed it forthwith  to minimize its legislative ac-
tivity  to cover only minimum  standards  that member  states 
could more easily agree on. 
This Commission strategy, this interplay  between legislative 
politics and the judicial  sphere is  what this  book is about. 
What I attempt is  to provide a more inclusive picture of how 
the European Commission acts within  the policy process, a 
picture that spans various modes of  producing policy and 
indicates which  factors account for the choice of strategy. In 
short, I want to systematically  explore a  connection  between 
judicial  and legislative politics that has as yet not been exten-
sively addressed (cf. Schmidt 2011a: 43; Schmidt 2011b: 37).
1.1 Judicial politics in the European Union
The proximity of law and politics in  the European  Union, as 
demonstrated by the Reinheitsgebot case, has certainly  not 
escaped the attention of observers  from the social  sciences, 
although they have been late in  catching on to the connec-
tion. The central  legal principles had all  been  long estab-
lished when political  scientists began  debating  the role of  the 
European Court of Justice in  EU politics. Early  debates cen-
tred around the question if the Court independently  set poli-
cies, or  whether it was influenced significantly  by the prefer-
ences of  the largest member states (cf. Burley  1993; Burley 
and Mattli  1993; Garrett 1995; Mattli  and Slaughter  1995; 
Alter  1998; Garrett, Kelemen et al. 1998; Mattli  and Slaugh-
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ter 1998; Stone Sweet and Brunell  1998). A  satisfying empiri-
cal  answer to this question  proved elusive, not least because 
data on  judicial  decision-making  in  the Court of Justice was 
lacking  (cf. Scharpf  2011: 229). The judges do not publish 
their ‘votes’, and there are no dissents  or concurring opin-
ions. Although  for this reason the question  was never conclu-
sively  settled, some central  insights emerged. For  one, the 
Court appears to act strategically. The more member states 
argue for a specific norm, the less  likely the Court is to strike 
it down, although  the Court shows no preference for  the posi-
tion  of  large over  small states (cf. Conant 2007: 51). On the 
other hand, the most successful  litigant before the Court is 
not a member state, but the European  Commission; it wins 
the overwhelming majority  of the cases it argues (cf. Conant 
2007: 53). 
The new found attention to the judicial  sphere of  European 
Union  politics spawned a  whole range of  research  questions 
that went beyond the sole issue of the Court’s independence, 
and sought to locate the legal  system in the broader political 
context. Gradually, the focus  shifted away from the Court of 
Justice as the focal  institution  to the wider  legal environ-
ment, including the role of  national  courts in  the evolution  of 
EU politics  (cf. Slaughter, Stone Sweet et al. 1998), and the 
position of individual litigants  and the goals  they  wish to 
pursue through  litigation. A  significant part of the latter lit-
erature looks  at the way the European legal system  empow-
ers individuals to challenge the domestic status quo (cf. Alter 
and Vargas 2000; Cichowski  2006; Kelemen 2006). Daniel 
Kelemen’s recent book-length  study of  the evolving  legal  in-
frastructure in  the European  Union points  to an  increasingly 
adversarial  system  of confrontation  between regulators and 
the regulated claiming  rights derived from the EU legal  sys-
tem, a process that he considers  akin  to American forms of 
regulatory  politics and dispute resolution, away  from  more 
inclusive corporatist structures  formerly prevalent through-
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out Europe (Kelemen 2011: 4-7). Many  such studies are 
keenly  aware that this empowerment does not affect all  ac-
tors equally, but favours strong organised interests  over  indi-
viduals who either cannot muster the resources  to initiate the 
legal  process or  are unaware of their rights (cf. Alter and 
Vargas 2000; Börzel  2006). In particular, actors who fre-
quently engage in litigation, so called ‘repeat players’ (cf. 
Galanter 1974), enjoy specific advantages in the long run, 
being able to ‘play for the rules’: they can  discount the costs 
of individual judgements against future rewards where they 
succeed in establishing legal  principles that enhance their 
overall  position. The European Commission is  surely the sin-
gle most frequent litigator  before the Court of Justice, and 
the prototypical repeat player on the European legal stage. 
Comparatively  few works have sought to combine a focus on 
judicial  politics with policies pursued in  other  spheres. An 
early  example of  such an approach is  Karen  Alter and Sophie 
Meunier  Aitsahalia’s article on the impact  of  the Court’s  im-
portant ruling in   the Cassis de Dijon case, which  laid out  the 
groundwork for the principle of  ‘mutual  recognition’ (Alter 
and Meunier Aitsahalia  1994). They investigate how the 
Court’s judgement, by  altering the status quo with  regard to 
permissible trade barriers, provided novel  opportunities for 
various individual and institutional  actors to pursue their 
preferences in  national  and European fora. In particular, 
they demonstrate how the Commission seized upon the 
newly  formulated doctrine and used it  as a basis for  a  new 
approach  to remove intra-European  trade barriers. While 
Alter  and Meunier bridge the gap between  the judicial 
branch and other spheres  of  action, theirs is foremost a  study 
of how organisations such as the Commission react to Court 
rulings they can  use to their  advantage. Judicial  processes, 
however, can be strategically induced. Individuals  can chal-
lenge national  norms in national courts, and the Commission 
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can  litigate against member  states before the Court of  Jus-
tice, all in order to influence policy. 
The Commission’s  use of  the infringement procedure has 
been closely scrutinised in  studies focussing on the national 
implementation of EU legislative acts (cf. Mendrinou  1996; 
Börzel 2001; Panke 2009; Börzel, Hofmann et al. 2012). As a 
result, there is a  rich  body  of insights about what factors  in-
fluence the distribution  of infringement proceedings across 
member states. Prominent among  these are national  gov-
ernments’ administrative capacity and political clout (cf. 
Börzel, Hofmann et  al. 2010: 1381). However, these studies 
rarely  address  the policy consequences that judicial  proceed-
ings entail. In  focussing on national  compliance, they  de-
emphasise the conflicts over  policy content that are fought 
out before the Court of  Justice and their implications for  fu-
ture policy-making. 
The way  the Commission can  employ  its  enforcement powers 
to influence legislative processes  has been  explored in the 
works of Susanne Schmidt. She demonstrates the intercon-
nectedness between litigation and legislation by focussing  on 
the Commission’s ability  to strategically  alter the status quo 
of legislative procedures through  enforcement actions before 
the Court of  Justice. In particular, she outlines two courses of 
action the Commission  takes in order to apply  pressure on 
Council  positions. One targets the status quo of legislation  as 
a whole, by  threatening judicial  procedures with  an  outcome 
potentially disliked by  all  Council  members. The other strat-
egy  consists  of targeting individual  member  states, particu-
larly  those pivotal in majority  voting. Based on  these in-
sights, Fritz Scharpf feels  confident to declare that “the 
Commission is able to use infringement and annulment pro-
ceedings in  order to place specific issues on  the Court’s 
agenda, and there is no question that it is able to use its 
power strategically in  order to influence the outcome of legis-
lative processes in the Council” (Scharpf 2011: 229-230).
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My study takes these insights as a starting point to system-
atically  assess how the Commission  makes use of its access to 
legislation  and litigation  in  order  to advance its policy  inter-
ests. My  contribution  is twofold. On the one hand, I aim to 
analyse what variables influence the Commission’s decision 
to resort to infringement proceedings when  pursuing policy. 
I start from the assumption that the Commission is  more 
likely  to pursue a  judicial  strategy  when  the obstacles to suc-
cessful  legislation  are high. I test this proposition  with  the 
help of a dataset that combines information on legislative 
processes,  infringement proceedings and the political posi-
tions of the actors involved. On the other  hand, I expand this 
approach  beyond the focus on  infringement proceedings  to 
the Commission’s use of litigation  in  general  in  two longitu-
dinal  case studies. While Susanne Schmidt argues that in-
fringement proceedings are “the most decisive means for  the 
interaction  of  judicial and legislative politics” (cf. Schmidt 
2011a: 50), I aim to show that other forms of litigation, in 
particular the Commission’s  intervention in preliminary  ref-
erence procedures, also present viable channels  of combining 
the two modes of  policy-making.  In essence, I incorporate a 
judicial  politics  approach  in an overall  analysis  of policy-
making in an attempt to achieve a  more comprehensive pic-
ture of how the Commission influences policy  development 
in the European Union.  
1.2 The structure of my study
I structure my study  in the following way. Chapter 2 provides 
an overview of theoretical  approaches to the Commission’s 
position in  the policy-making process of the European  Un-
ion. The question of  how much  the Commission matters has 
traditionally  formed one of the focal  points of theorising the 
dynamics of European integration. I trace the ebb and flow of 
scientific attention to this topic, which  has been closely 
linked to actual successes and failures of the European politi-
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cal  system, and outline the central  tenets of  the opposing 
camps. I describe how in  more recent time the focus of theo-
retical  approaches has moved away  from dynamic accounts 
of the integration process to a more cross-sectional, com-
parative outlook on the constraints of policy-making. Rather 
than aligning squarely  with  the traditional  factions  of neo-
functionalism and intergovernmentalism, these newer  ap-
proaches analyse the factors  and circumstances that allow 
the Commission to influence policy  content in some in-
stances, and prevent it from doing so in  others. I highlight 
two approaches, the ‘agenda-setting’ literature and the 
‘principal-agent’ approach, as particularly  conducive to a 
more detailed understanding of the Commission’s position in 
European politics. Chapter 2 moreover reviews theoretical 
assumptions and empirical  findings concerning  the Commis-
sion’s ‘actorness’. I start by  outlining  the ‘traditional’ aca-
demic assumptions on the type of  preferences  the Commis-
sion  pursues. Until quite recently, the Commission was regu-
larly  treated as  a preference outlier, usually  with an  ‘extreme’ 
disposition towards ‘more integration’, however defined. 
Some explanatory approaches draw on  ‘bureaucratic politics’, 
positing  that the Commission’s preferences  are a  conse-
quence of organisational  self-interest. I contrast these as-
sumption with  more recent empirical  data  on  internal  pref-
erence distributions and decision-making dynamics. These 
newer accounts  challenge the assumptions that the Commis-
sion  necessarily  pursues ‘more extreme’ preferences than  the 
member states, and that it can  be treated as a  unitary actor. 
Rather, such  studies demonstrate distinct clusters of  prefer-
ences across  services, and point to procedural  structures that 
systematically favour certain  internal  departments, in  par-
ticular  the respective lead Directorate General  (DG) and the 
Secretariat General. I conclude by  outlining which  of these 
insights can  fruitfully  inform  my  approach  to Commission 
strategy choice. 
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Chapter 3 outlines the Commission’s position in the inter-
institutional policy-making process. I distinguish  between 
three different modes of policy-making that  share the pro-
duction  of  legal norms as output (cf. Scharpf 2006): an inter-
governmental mode, characterised by bargaining between 
member state governments, a ‘joint-decision’ mode, charac-
terised by the Commission’s monopoly  of  initiative in legisla-
tion, and a  ‘supranational-hierarchical  mode’, characterised 
by  the Commission’s ability to influence policy without the 
involvement of  the legislative institutions, by  executive ac-
tion  and initiating court proceedings. Each of  these modes 
affords the Commission different degrees of influence over 
policy production, and I discuss the various constraints on 
Commission policy-making strategies in  some detail. On  one 
end of the scale, the Commission’s ability  to influence out-
comes is  weakest in  situations  of intergovernmental  bargain-
ing. On the other end, its  policy-making ability is greatest in 
those areas where it has been delegated extensive executive 
authority. This is primarily  so in  the field of competition pol-
icy, including the contentious areas of state-aid and public 
utilities. While the Commission  has the ability  to act unilat-
erally, its  authority  is  at the same time closely circumscribed 
to a  limited policy field. The Commission’s ability to influ-
ence the policy process is broadest in legislation  and litiga-
tion  – the content of legislative initiatives and court cases 
being barely limited in scope. I conclude the chapter  by justi-
fying my  choice to concentrate on  the latter strategies for  the 
remainder of my study. 
The following three chapters constitute the empirical  part of 
this study. I proceed by  developing  a  series of propositions 
which  I first test statistically (chapter 4), and then  follow up 
with  two longitudinal  case studies (chapters 5 and 6). This 
mixed method design is akin to a “nested analysis”  (cf. Lie-
berman 2005; Rohlfing  2008), although I do not  claim to 
follow the model rigorously. My strategy  is to start with strict 
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assumptions derived from  previous works, and then, based 
on the results of  the statistical  test, use case studies to add 
complexity  and derive additional  insights. The case studies 
therefore have both a hypothesis-testing and a hypothesis-
generating aspect. They  provide additional  empirical  mate-
rial  to test prior  assumptions  against observed reality, and 
their results serve to further refine the theory  (cf. Levy 2008: 
5). 
Chapter 4 concentrates  on the Commission’s  use of  in-
fringement proceedings as a  policy tool. I develop assump-
tions about the Commission’s default strategy  in  policy-
making and formulate a series of hypotheses about the fac-
tors that are likely to influence the Commission’s subsequent 
strategy choice. In particular, I propose that the Commission 
is more likely to resort to infringement proceedings when the 
likelihood of initiating successful  legislation is low. This is 
the case where voting rules  in  the Council  stipulate unanim-
ity, and where the European Parliament has veto powers. 
Obstacles to legislation  should also rise, the larger the ideo-
logical  difference between  the Commission  and the Council 
and the Commission and the EP, respectively, and in  situa-
tions where there is considerable disagreement within the 
Council. I also include a  control variable that  measures the 
degree of ‘market orientation’ of a policy area. This allows 
me, to some degree, to respond to the frequently  voiced 
proposition that judicial politics in  the EU has a distinctly 
market-making bias (cf. Scharpf 2006: 854). It moreover 
enables me to draw some, albeit limited, conclusions about 
possible internal  differences in  strategy  choice between 
Commission portfolios generally held to pursue a form of  
interventionist ‘regulatory  capitalism’ and more market ori-
ented portfolios (cf. Hartlapp and Lorenz 2012: 11). I then 
proceed to test these propositions employing  a dataset I have 
constructed from  data based on  three different sources. One 
is a dataset on  legislative procedures, compiled by Thomas 
König, Brooke Luetgert and Tanja  Dannwolf (König, Luetgert 
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et al. 2006). I combine this dataset with information  on  in-
fringement proceedings referred to the Court by the Com-
mission, based on  data compiled by  Alec Stone Sweet and 
Thomas Brunell  (Stone Sweet and Brunell  2007). Addition-
ally, I use data  on  the ideological positions of the Commis-
sion, the Council  and the European Parliament, as compiled 
by  Andreas Warntjen, Simon Hix and Christophe Crombez 
(Warntjen, Hix  et al. 2008). I designed my  dataset so that the 
dependent variable is the ratio of  litigation  to legislation in  a 
particular policy  area across time. The dearth  of  available 
data over longer  time spans caused me to restrict this analy-
sis to the time period from 1984 to 1998.
Chapters 5 and 6 take up the results of the statistical test in 
two longitudinal  qualitative case studies, concentrating  on 
the Commission’s efforts to remove barriers  to trade in goods 
within  the Community  (chapter  5) and the Commission’s 
support of the free movement of  persons (chapter  6). These 
case studies expand the scope of  the analysis to include the 
Commission’s intervention in  preliminary  reference proce-
dures. Covering a  broad time period, I trace the process (cf. 
George and Bennett  2005: 205) of Commission  policy  initia-
tives in  the two fields  from the early  1960s to (roughly) the 
present day. From this  series of “causal process observa-
tions” (Collier, Brady et al. 2010: 184) – as a form of  “theo-
retically  oriented narrative”  (cf. George and Bennett 2005: 
205) – I attempt to uncover ‘causal  mechanisms’ that link 
legislative barriers to the Commission’s  preferred policies to 
an increased involvement of  the Commission in judicial  pro-
cedures. In  this manner, I am able to “examine empirically 
the alternative causal mechanisms associated with  observed 
patterns of covariation” (Levy 2008: 11). 
I chose the two ‘cases’ (free movement of goods and free 
movement of  persons) with  a  number of objectives in mind. 
First, it is never  particularly  easy  to define what constitutes  a 
distinct ‘case’ in policy studies. Isolating particular events 
from  their context in the policy  cycle necessarily  increases 
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the possibility of selection bias. Focusing on single legislative 
or judicial  events, such  as a particular piece of legislation or 
court case, usually provides  incentives to select  those that 
stand out in some way or the other, as most such  events (leg-
islation  or  litigation) are uneventful. The primary reason why 
some events  stand out is the presence of  conflict, and focus-
ing on those cases alone allows for no variance on one of  my 
central  explanatory  variables. Primarily  for this reason I 
chose a long time span for my studies, as this would enable 
me to observe a  whole sequence of events and introduce 
large within-case variance on the side of the independent 
variables I identified in chapter  4 (cf. Levy  2008: 10). Legis-
lative procedures change over time, and so does the ideologi-
cal  distance between the actors involved, of which  conflict is 
usually  the result. Also, observing  long time periods, particu-
larly  from an early  point in the development of  Community 
policies, allows me to identify potential  learning  effects. Con-
versely, the long time span prohibits a  greater attention  to 
detail. Second, I chose to conduct two case studies, covering 
two distinct policy fields in  order to add cross-case variation 
to the longitudinal comparison  (cf. Levy 2008: 10). Both 
cases differ with  regard to Commission’s mandate and the 
degree of conflict. After the Single European Act, moreover, 
the policy fields  are governed by  different legislative proce-
dures – trade in goods being subject to majority voting in the 
Council, whereas unanimity remained in  place for many 
pieces of legislation concerning  the free movement of  per-
sons. Both  cases also show a different affinity to market inte-
gration. Whereas the removal of  barriers  to trade in  goods is 
a distinctly  market-making enterprise, the Commission’s ef-
forts concerning  the free movement of persons follows a dif-
ferent trajectory. While, certainly, motivated initially by  a 
better allocation of  the factors of  production, establishing a 
right to free movement for  all  member state nationals was 
informed by the objective of giving  effect to the emerging 
principle of  Union  citizenship, a  principle that is not congru-
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ent with market-making activity and the logics of  market  
integration alone. In this way, I will  be able to test the causal 
linkage between judicial  activity and the degree of market-
orientation of a policy  field, adding onto the results of the 
statistical test. Finally, both  cases represent the core of the 
Commission’s activity. The free movement of goods and the 
free movement of persons  form part of  the fundamental 
‘market freedoms’ which the internal  market is based on. As 
such, they  are ‘crucial  cases’, constituting a  sizable portion of 
the Commission’s everyday  activities for  the period observed. 
If I want to test my assumptions about how I typically  expect 
the Commission  to behave, these are the subject areas I 
should look to.
Chapter 7, the final  chapter, discusses the results  of the case 
studies with  regard to the hypotheses  developed in  chapter  4. 
It outlines  some general  considerations regarding  the role of 
the preliminary reference procedure for  the Commission’s 
choice of strategy  and argues for  an  amendment to the origi-
nal  propositions. I conclude with some thoughts  about the 




Studying the European Commission
This chapter has  two objectives. The first part (2.1) outlines 
theoretical approaches  to the study  of the Commission. I 
sketch  the positions of the original  opposing  camps of neo-
functionalism and intergovernmentalism and trace their 
varying prominence over  time. I also include a  summary of 
the main characteristics of the ‘institutionalist’ turn in the 
study of European  Union politics, and conclude by  locating 
my  own  position  among the various approaches. The second 
part (2.2) looks more closely  at theoretical  assumptions 
about what motivates Commission action, and describes 
more recent empirical studies about internal  preference dis-
tributions  and decision-making dynamics within the Com-
mission. These new approaches cast some doubt on the pre-
viously rarely questioned assumption  that the Commission 
constitutes a unitary actor. I summarise the main findings of 
this research  and conclude by  outlining my  own assumptions 
about the ‘actorness’ of the Commission and the types of 
preferences it pursues. 
2.1 The European Commission in the study of Euro-
pean Union politics
The plethora of names  and attributes that have been assigned 
to the Commission  – ‘honest broker’, ‘engine of integration’, 
or ‘guardian of the treaties’, to name some of the most fre-
quently used – indicates the difficulty of neatly identifying its 
central  function in  the political  system of the European Un-
ion. Simultaneously its executive as well  as its  public admini-
stration, the Commission  engages in  all  phases of the EU pol-
icy cycle – from  initiation via negotiation and implementa-
tion  to monitoring (cf. Lindberg 1963: 71). As Neill  Nugent 
puts it: “The Commission is  centrally  involved in EU 
decision-making at all  levels  and on  all  fronts” (Nugent  2010: 
105), or, to use the title of one of  his books on the subject, the 
Commission finds itself  “at the heart of the Union”  (Nugent 
1997b). 
At the same time, its  actual  means of autonomously asserting 
influence are rather  limited. Its central  decision-making 
body, the College of Commissioners, is appointed by member 
state governments, who at least theoretically  have every in-
centive to nominate candidates they  believe will  not stray  too 
far from  their  interests. Its actions, particularly  in the proc-
ess of implementing EU policies, are subject to close over-
sight procedures on the part of  national  governments. Most 
implementation, moreover, is not done in  Brussels, but car-
ried out by member  state administrations, who have fairly 
wide leeway  to shirk from their  duties. They are able to do 
this not least because the Commission does not have the re-
sources to monitor implementation ‘on the ground’, but re-
lies  instead on member  state sources for information and 
manpower. Always in danger  of being stretched thin by its 
multitude of obligations, “if the Commission  is  to play a role 
it must make creative use of the resources it  has  for influenc-
ing behavior of the governments”  (Lindberg and Scheingold 
1970: 93). What, then, is  the impact of  Commission  actions 
on European Union policy? 
The European Commission’s ability to influence policy  out-
comes in the European  Union  has traditionally formed one of 
the central  points of contention  in theories of  European Un-
ion politics. How much  does the Commission matter? Does it 
have an  independent effect on policy  outcomes (cf. Pollack 
2003: 4)? The classical  ‘grand theories’ of European  integra-
tion  reached opposite answers to this  question. On  the one 
hand, ‘neo-functionalism’, as promulgated by  Ernst Haas, 
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Leon Lindberg  and others, centrally  underscored the role of 
‘supranational’ institutions, such as the Commission, in  ad-
vancing the process of European integration. Integration, 
Haas argued, could be measured by reference to the preva-
lence of certain types  of compromise in  international  nego-
tiations, of which he identified three. The first  of  these con-
stitutes an agreement on the basis  of a ‘minimum common 
denominator’, where the degree of integration  never pro-
ceeds past the reservations of the least cooperative bargain-
ing partner (Haas 1961: 367). Second, agreements by “split-
ting the difference”  allow for an  outcome that lies  somewhere 
between the final bargaining  positions of  the partners, aided 
by  the “mediatory  services of a Secretariat-General  or  an ad 
hoc international expert study group” (Haas 1961: 367, origi-
nal  emphasis). The third type of compromise, finally, where 
agreement would “upgrade the common interest“ of  the par-
ties, “takes us  closest to the peaceful change procedures typi-
cal  of a political community  with  its full  legislative and judi-
cial  jurisdictions, lacking in  international  relations” (Haas 
1961: 368). Parties would succeed in “redefining  their con-
flict”, maximising  the ‘spill-over’ effect of  international  deci-
sions. This solution, however, would only  be achieved 
through  the competent  arbitration  by  an  “institutionalized 
mediator” (Haas 1961: 368) such as the Commission (cf. also 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen  1991: 6). Leon  Lindberg took up this 
line of  thought, arguing that such a  solution  “depends on  the 
participation of institutions or individuals with  an  autono-
mous role that permits them to participate in  actually defin-
ing the terms of  the agreement”  (Lindberg  1963: 12). He fur-
ther suggested that “the central  institutions of  the EEC, by 
isolating issues  and identifying common  interests, may play a 
crucial  role here in ‘precipitating unity’” (Lindberg 1963: 8). 
As an  arbiter  of the ‘common interest’, as opposed to narrow 
national  interests, he saw the Commission  in  a central posi-
tion  to facilitate compromise and encourage further integra-
tion: “The Commission enjoys some unique advantages by 
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virtue of  its  ability  to embody  the authority  of  a Community 
consensus” (Lindberg 1963: 284). “Moreover, it  has proved 
far easier  for Member States to give in to the Commission 
than it would have been for  the Germans to give in  to the 
French or  vice versa; in other words, in  justifying their ac-
tions, both to themselves  and to their respective govern-
ments, Ministers have been  able to defend major  concessions 
on the ground that they  were made in the interest of  the 
Community” (Lindberg 1963: 286). Precisely because the 
member states relied on the Commission to enable consen-
sus was it so difficult for them to resist the proposals made 
by  the Commission, the argument went. The Commission’s 
independent influence on  the outcome of  policy-bargains was 
therefore seen  as an  essential condition  for political  integra-
tion per se. 
While the original  neo-functionalists saw the European 
Commission essentially  as  an  “honest broker” (Lindberg and 
Scheingold 1970: 94), they nonetheless acknowledged that it 
would simultaneously  strive to expand its own position  of 
authority. More than just facilitating  agreements, the Com-
mission  was expected to become a central  agent of spill-
over7: “the initial task and grant of power to the central  insti-
tutions creates a situation  or series of situations that can be 
dealt with only  by further expanding  the task and the grant of 
power” (Lindberg 1963: 10). The Commission “has vigorously 
defended its  own role as  spokesman for  Community  inter-
ests, and has sought to expand this role in its  specific pro-
posals”  (Lindberg 1963: 284). Although he was skeptical 
about the High  Authority’s ambition to lead the process of  
integration in the 1950’s, Haas nonetheless asserted that 
“spill-over  can be accelerated in the face of divisions  of opin-
ion among the governments and in the absence of an articu-
late consensus  toward unity  as an  end in  itself. All  that is 
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7 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen later introduced the term ‘cultivated spill-over’ 
to describe Commission involvement in the process of European integration 
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991: 6).
needed is the effective demonstration  by  a resourceful  su-
pranational  executive that the ends already  agreed upon 
cannot be attained without further  united steps” (Haas 1958: 
483-484, original emphasis). 
Stanley  Hoffmann’s ‘Intergovernmentalism’ on the other 
hand denied an  independent causal  role of  supranational  
institutions and emphasised the dominance of national gov-
ernment preferences in  determining the outcomes of Euro-
pean  politics. His “logic of  diversity [...] sets limits to the de-
gree to which  the ‘spill-over’ process can limit  the freedom  of 
action of the governments” (Hoffmann  1966: 882). European 
integration would be restricted to areas of  ‘low politics’, such 
as economic and social  policies  (the "area  of  welfare", Hoff-
mann  1966: 882), but political integration  (in the sense of 
the ‘high politics’ of  foreign  affairs and defense) would re-
main  elusive due to the fundamental differences in member 
state interests with  regard to the global  situation  – the Cold 
War, American influence in  Europe and the threat  of Soviet 
invasion: “In areas of  key  importance to the national  interest, 
nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncer-
tainty, of national  self  reliance”  (Hoffmann  1966: 882). 
While economic and social integration  also bears  the poten-
tial to limit government’s leeway  in conducting foreign pol-
icy, Hoffmann predicted that member states would resist 
such  tendencies even if this produced short term  costs for 
certain  parts of their constituencies (Hoffmann  1966: 884). 
The European  Commission, in this  view, is  powerless  in the 
face of national  government opposition: Facing the govern-
ments of France and Germany, “the supranational civil  ser-
vants, for  all their skill  and legal  powers, are a bit  like 
Jonases trying to turn whales into jellyfish”  (Hoffmann  1966: 
884). Summing up his position, Hoffmann  stated that “If we 
look at the institutions of the Common Market as an  incipi-
ent political  system  for Europe, we find that its authority re-
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mains limited, its structure weak, its popular base restricted 
and distant” (Hoffmann 1966: 885).  
Both of  these approaches have over the years been  signifi-
cantly  refined and expanded, but  the central disagreement as 
to the influence of European  institutions remained (cf. Eil-
strup Sangiovanni 2006: 3). The period following the publi-
cation of Hoffmann’s article, however, seemed to vindicate 
his viewpoint. Academic interest  in  the development of the 
European Communities  and the actions of its  institutions 
waned in the 1970s and early 1980s, a  period that despite 
some institutional  and policy innovation was generally char-
acterised as a  European “dark ages”, or  time of  “Eurosclero-
sis”  (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991a: 8). The region’s eco-
nomic and political  stagnation and its failure to adequately 
respond to the oil  crisis  of 1973 led Ernst Haas to speculate 
about the apparent obsolescence of  regional  integration  the-
ory, admitting that “Regional  integration in  Western Europe 
has disappointed everybody: there is no federation, the 
nation-state behaves  as if it  were both  obstinate and obso-
lete, and what once appeared to be a distinctive ‘suprana-
tional’ style now looks more like a huge international  bu-
reaucratic appendage to an  intergovernmental conference in 
permanent session”  (Haas 1975: 6). As  late as 1982, political 
developments gave Stanley  Hoffmann cause to repeat and 
reinforce his  argument about the ineffectiveness of EU insti-
tutions and the prevalence of nation  states as the decisive (if 
embattled) units in  the international  system, asserting that 
the EEC’s  “‘Federal’ institutions have weak powers, and their 
main  organs often  paralyze one another; these troubles, in 
turn, have depressing effects on  the other components of the 
emerging  or  expected ‘central’ political  system – community-
wide interest groups or party alignments” (Hoffmann  1982: 
31). They  are weak, he says, “because they lack autonomy 
(from the member  states) and because their capacity  to act is 
small”  (Hoffmann 1982: 32). One year later, Paul  Taylor 
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wrote of  the limits of  European integration, underscoring 
that the “member  states have not been  absorbed into a new 
Euro-federation, nor have they  become the vassals of  a  su-
pranational  Commission” (Taylor  1983: 60). He argued that 
in  the course of  the 1970s, the establishment of  the Council 
presidency  and the European Council  as central  institutions 
of the Community  had significantly reduced the powers of 
the Commission  to exert an independent influence on Euro-
pean  policy. Moreover, “As the level  of  tension  between  gov-
ernments in the Council  and their committees  increased and 
the expectations of  governments of getting what they  wanted 
declined, so it became increasingly difficult and, indeed, fu-
tile for the Commission to spell  out detailed European solu-
tions” (Taylor 1983: 82). He concluded that “There seemed 
little prospect in  the early  Eighties of any strengthening of 
the Communities’ institutions, and if anything, it  seemed 
likely  that they  would be further weakened: the Communities 
were in a period of  entrenched intergovernmentalism” (Tay-
lor 1983: 83). Finally, writing in  1984, Stephen  George, while 
shying away  from  broader  predictions, asserted that “the 
prospects for  the creation of more common  policies are not 
good”  (George 1985: vii). He, too, doubted the ability of the 
Commission to assume a  strong leadership role, pointing to 
its declining room for maneuver through  the establishment 
of the Committee of Permanent Representatives  (CORE-
PER), the Management Committee procedure (what was to 
develop into the system of ‘Comitology’), the inception of  the 
European Council, and an  increasing ‘bureaucratization’ of 
the Commission, reducing  its  sense of  identity  and commit-
ment (George 1985: 12-14). 
The in some ways unexpected signing  of the Single European 
Act (SEA), however, challenged these assumptions and pre-
cipitated a  profoundly renewed interest in  European institu-
tions. Academically, the apparent success of the SEA  and the 
Single European Market programme led to a  spate of publi-
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cations about the dynamism  of  the “new”  Community  (cf. 
Taylor 1989; Keohane and Hoffmann 1991b; Tranholm-
Mikkelsen  1991; Sbragia 1992) and heralded a revival  of  at-
tention to ‘supranationalism’ and central  tenets of neofunc-
tionalism. By contrast, the fact that no scientific theory  had 
predicted this  institutional  change led some observers  to look 
for  other theoretical  approaches to explain  this development: 
“In  view of our  failure to predict developments  using  older 
theories, perhaps a new interpretation  of joint European de-
cisonmaking should be invented, discarding loaded terms 
such  as ‘supranationalism’ and ‘spillover’, and drawing  in-
stead on contemporary theories of strategic choice in  collec-
tive situations, or recent attempts to understand institutional 
innovation” (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991a: 9). 
The new proponents  of a  revived neofunctionalism  engaged 
in  detailed studies of  the progress of the Single European 
Market programme and frequently concluded that the Com-
mission  must be seen as a  driving factor bringing about pro-
found policy change that could not be explained by  reference 
to intergovernmental bargaining alone (cf. Tallberg 2006: 
196). This line of work has produced a wealth of  case studies 
outlining the influence of Commission ‘policy entrepreneur-
ship’ on developments in  individual  policy areas. In  one of 
the first studies of this  kind, Wayne Sandholtz and John 
Zysman concluded that the leadership of the Commission 
was decisive in bringing  about the Single European Market 
programme. In  their  words, “the renewed drive for market 
unification can be explained only  if  theory takes  into account 
the policy  leadership of the Commission“ (Sandholtz and 
Zysman 1989: 96). In a similar  vein, Laura Cram  described 
the Commission as a  “purposeful opportunist”  in  bringing 
about social  policy legislation  (Cram 1993: 143), while Sonia 
Mazey  highlighted the entrepreneurial role of the Commis-
sion  in  fostering policy  networks in support of equality of  
opportunity  for  men  and women at a  time of  strong govern-
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ment opposition  (Mazey  1995). Other  studies reached similar 
conclusions  about the efficacy of  Commission action  in  re-
gional policy (Hooghe and Keating 1994: 387-388) and IT 
policy (Cram 1994: 201-207). 
The renewed interest  in  the Commission  also brought with  it 
a  number  of studies focusing on the internal  functioning of 
the Commission and its Directorates General, attitudes of  its 
staff and administrative culture (cf. Ludlow 1991; Cram 1994; 
Cini 1996; Nugent 1997a). Often  without direct reference to 
neofunctionalism, their optimistic view of  the Commission’s 
position in  the policy-making process leads Jonas Tallberg to 
characterise them  as “closet neofunctionalists” (Tallberg 
2006: 197). 
At the same time, the renewed importance of European poli-
tics attracted a range of scholars with  a background in com-
parative politics. While these approaches have not gone en-
t i r e l y  b e y o n d t h e c l a s s i c a l  s u p r a n a t i o n a l i s t -
intergovernmentalist divide, their origin in the study of  ‘tra-
ditional’ political systems led them to focus on  the European 
Union  as a polity, producing  a  distinct “allocation of values” 
(Easton 1953: 129), rather than  as a  process of political  inte-
gration (cf. Rosamond 2006: 14). This focus allowed research 
to concentrate on  the factors  influencing policy  output, and 
less on factors influencing the design  of  the European insti-
tutional  framework. Prominent among these approaches 
have been those that adopt a  theoretical  framework drawn 
from  rational  choice institutionalist accounts of legislative, 
executive and judicial  politics. Originating mainly  from  the 
study of congressional  politics  in the United States, rational 
choice institutionalism  posited that the institutional  frame-
work of political action has a  distinct effect on political  out-
comes. The rational choice  part of rational  choice institu-
tionalism  connotes a set of prior assumptions: that a) collec-
tive outcomes can be explained by references to the actions 
of individuals  (‘methodological individualism’); and that b) 
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individuals are self-interested and seek to maximise their 
preference for  certain  states of  the world (‘utility maximisia-
tion’) (cf. Pollack 2006: 32). The institutionalism part posits 
that individual actors face constraints in their  attempts to 
achieve outcomes – not only  due to multiple actors trying  to 
achieve conflicting  ends, but also by  the need to adhere to 
certain  formal  or  informal norms – and that taking  account 
of these constraints (the “rules of the game”, North 1990: 3) 
would be necessary to explain  outcomes (cf. Pollack 
2006:32-33). In a nutshell, rational  choice institutionalism 
not only postulated that ‘institutions matter’, but provided a 
set of hypotheses about how these institutions would matter 
in  relation to policy  outcomes. Similar  accounts of the effects 
of, say, the European  Commission’s exclusive right of initia-
tive on  the outcome of bargaining  between  member  state 
governments have certainly existed previously, but rational 
choice institutionalism provided a  coherent theoretical 
framework for the analysis of the institutional interplay. Spe-
cifically, these efforts  allowed to specify  the conditions under 
which  different institutions wield different forms of influ-
ence. 
For the case of  the Commission, research  within the rational 
choice institutionalist  framework has primarily  introduced 
two approaches to the question  of how much influence the 
Commission has over policy  production in  the European  Un-
ion. The first, originating in the literature on legislative poli-
tics, highlights the function  of the Commission  as an 
‘agenda-setter’ (cf. Romer and Rosenthal 1978): by virtue of 
its monopoly  on  legislative initiatives the Commission has 
the opportunity to ‘set’ the legislative agenda (cf. Pollack 
2006: 38). In  theory, this position would allow the Commis-
sion  to emphasise certain policy fields  while withholding leg-
islation  from  others – in  practice, this process is much  more 
cooperative and the Commission  is sensitive to requests from 
the European  Council, the Council and the European  Parlia-
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ment. More importantly, when formulating an initiative, the 
Commission can  take account of  possible ‘minimum winning 
coalitions’ within the Council  and the European Parliament 
and move the outcome close to its own policy preferences 
within  the ‘solution  space’. Its power to do so depends pri-
marily  on the legislative procedure determining majority  re-
quirements and possible ‘veto players’ (cf. Tsebelis 2002). I 
will  give a  more detailed account of the Commission’s agenda 
setting powers in chapter 3. 
The second prominent approach to the study of  the Commis-
sion  within  the rational choice institutionalist framework is 
the so called ‘principal-agent’ model. Largely derived from 
organisational  theory and the theory  of the firm (cf. Coase 
1937), it posits  that  when exchanges  between actors under 
market conditions are no longer  economical due to high 
transaction costs, actors will  prefer  forms of  hierarchical  in-
tegration (cf. Williamson 2000: 602-604). Within the hierar-
chy, the ‘principal’ (the owner, shareholder, or sovereign) 
assigns competences to an  ‘agent’ who will  conduct tasks on 
her  or his behalf. This ‘delegation  contract’ delimits the 
boundaries of agent competences and defines certain 
mechanisms of oversight. The principal-agent  model  derives 
its explanatory  value from  its  analysis  of  possible conflict. 
Since all  actors have potentially  divergent preferences (‘util-
ity functions’), it is likely  that principal  and agent do not 
share goals. The agent has incentives to use his discretion  to 
‘shirk’ from  his assigned duties and pursue his  own prefer-
ences instead. He is  able to do this on account of his informa-
tional  advantage vis-à-vis the principal: While the principal 
will  want to exercise narrow oversight, the act  of delegation 
ceases  to be functional  if the agent can  no longer  pursue his 
or her  tasks independent of the principal. If the act of  delega-
tion  is based on concerns about ‘credible commitment’, 
commitment to an  agreement among the principals would no 
longer be credible if the agent cannot independently  police 
implementation. If  delegation is a result  of concerns about 
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efficiency, the costs of policing  may rise above costs saved by 
the act of  delegation  in the first place, in  which  case the prin-
cipal might as well exercise the tasks her  or himself  (cf. Tall-
berg  2002: 25-29). Delegation contracts  therefore bear the 
possibility of ‘agency  drift’, where agents  succeed in  pursuing 
preferences that differ from  that of the principal. In  essence, 
this term  encapsulates  the notion  of  ‘supranational  entrepre-
neurship’ that  is central to most neo-functionalists notions of 
a “cultivated spillover” (Tranholm-Mikkelsen  1991: 6). 
Agents such  as the Commission  can use their delegated pow-
ers to pursue their  own policy preferences or achieve an  even 
greater accumulation of  competences at the European Union 
level (cf. Tallberg 2002: 34-35). Since member state govern-
ments as  the ‘high contracting  parties’ are usually  treated as 
a collective principal,  intergovernmentalists on  the other 
hand point  to the diverse oversight mechanisms at their  dis-
posal which  may  effectively prohibit such  agency  drift (cf. 
Garrett 1992: 552). Principal-agent analysis is therefore not 
predisposed to any  particular answer to the question of  who 
ultimately  controls outcomes (cf. Tallberg  2002: 34). Such 
studies of European politics  typically  analyse the amount of 
discretion for, e.g., independent Commission action con-
tained in  the delegation contract – the European Treaties 
and relevant acts  of secondary legislation  – and predict 
which  institutional  constellation is  more conducive to agency 
drift than others (cf. Pollack 2006: 39-40).   
While rational  choice institutionalism  is commonly regarded 
as the dominant institutionalist approach  in the study  of the 
Commission as  the European executive (cf. Tallberg  2006: 
198), some authors prefer  to base such  research  on a  more 
‘sociological’ account of institutional constraints on human 
behaviour. As an alternative institutionalist  approach, socio-
logical  institutionalism (most closely  associated with  James 
G. March  and Johan  P. Olsen) shares with rational  choice 
institutionalism  the assumption  that ‘institutions matter’ in 
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shaping  human  interaction. Where it deviates from  rational 
choice institutionalism  is in its  underlying  assumptions 
about what motivates human behaviour. In  particular, it fa-
vours the concept of  a ‘logic of  appropriateness’ as the moti-
vating factor for human action  rather than the ‘logic of  con-
sequentiality’, which  describes the goal  seeking (or utility 
maximising) behaviour assumed by rational  choice institu-
tionalism. According to March and Olsen, “the processes of 
reasoning are not primarily  connected to the anticipation  of 
future consequences as they  are in  most  contemporary  con-
ceptions of  rationality” (March  and Olsen 2006: 690). The 
logic of  appropriateness stresses that humans adhere to rules 
not because they see them strategically as a means to an  end, 
but rather because they hold them  to be ‘good’ or  ‘right’ in  a 
normative sense: “Rules are followed because they  are seen 
as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to 
fulfill  the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a 
membership in a political  community  or group, and the 
ethos, practices, and expectations of  its institutions. Embed-
ded in  a social  collectivity, they  do what they see as appropri-
ate for  themselves  in  a specific type of situation”  (March and 
Olsen 2006: 689). 
For the most part, this  conception has been  interpreted as a 
challenge to rational  choice institutionalism (cf. Tallberg 
2006: 200). As outlined above, sociological  institutionalists 
do reject the rationalist assumption of goal seeking as  the 
exclusive motivation for  human behaviour. However, neither 
do they  claim that the logic of appropriateness is  the only 
logic of  human action (cf. March  and Olsen 2006: 702), but 
stress that it is  a  dimension  of  human  motivation that is si-
multaneously  important and scientifically  overlooked. Two 
approaches are conceivable to reconcile the two positions. 
One useful  solution would be to understand considerations 
of appropriateness as constraints  on human  action, while 
maintaining the assumption that  human  behaviour is essen-
tially goal  driven. This is to assume a  hierarchy between dif-
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ferent logics of action, where the logic of consequentiality 
operates at a more basic level  of human motivation than  the 
logic of appropriateness (cf. March and Olsen  2006: 703). In 
other words, goal  seeking is  constrained by norms that may 
include internalised, ‘culturally  learned’, ideas about appro-
priate behaviour. March  and Olsen suggest a  more ‘egalitar-
ian’ approach. They differentiate logics of action according to 
their “prescriptive  clarity”, where “a  clear logic will  domi-
nate a less clear  logic” (March and Olsen  2006: 703, original 
emphasis). Codes of appropriate behaviour, as  well  as indi-
vidual preferences and strategic alternatives may  be more or 
less apparent and therefore constitute more or less stringent 
behavioural motivations. The expectation is that when indi-
vidual preferences for  outcomes are weak or  the alternative 
courses of  action not well  understood, rule following is likely 
more prevalent. Conversely, where rules of appropriate be-
haviour are not clearly  defined or widely  shared, goal  seeking 
may  become the dominant behavioural logic. The observable 
implications  of both solutions should be quite similar. In  this 
fashion, strict assumptions of goal-seeking rationality  can be 
relaxed without jettisoning their analytical merits.
I locate my  study in  the institutionalist tradition. In  chapter  3 
I will  draw more heavily  on  an ‘agenda-setting’ approach, 
and my  analysis is broadly compatible with  the principal 
agent vocabulary, although I do not explicitly  use the con-
cept. I start with  no preconceived disposition  toward ‘supra-
nationalism’ or ‘intergovernmentalism’ – although their fun-
damental  imprint on  the study of European politics  makes it 
close to impossible to steer  clear  of this debate. Also, my 
choice of topic predisposes me to assume that the Commis-
sion  is worthwhile investigating; I start from the assumption 
that the Commission is not entirely irrelevant. The task is 
less to prove who is  right or wrong  about the role of  the 
European Commission in European integration, but rather to 
determine the conditions under which the Commission can 
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wield influence over  policy  outcomes, and the factors which 
determine its strategy to do so (cf. Schmidt 1998: 23). 
2.2 Who is ‘the Commission’ and what does it want?
The Commission  is a large institution  employing  about 
33,000 staff, mainly based in Brussels, headed by 27  Com-
missioners  who are supported by Cabinets  comprising  six or 
seven close aides, and lead an administration  subdivided into 
more than  40 Directorates General  (DGs) and across-the 
board services. Each  Commissioner holds a  distinct policy 
portfolio, but these portfolios do not necessarily  match up 
neatly with  the corresponding DGs (cf. Chalmers, Davies et 
al. 2010: 57). Speaking  of actions  by ‘the Commission’ there-
fore constitutes a  crude simplification. Such  a reference can 
mean  anything from  the organisation  as a whole (as in  ‘the 
Commission is  based in Brussels’), to a decision by the Col-
lege of Commissioners, the Commission’s  central  decision-
making body  (as in  ‘the Commission  decided to initiate in-
fringement proceedings against Germany for  its  insistence 
on beer purity  laws’), or an action  by a single Directorate 
General  (as in, ‘the Commission is  investigating the merger 
between Honeywell  and General  Electric’) (cf. Cram  1994: 
198; Cini 1996: 101; Nugent 1997a: 1). This linguistic prob-
lem  is exacerbated by  the ‘principle of  collegiality’ (cf. 
Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 55), which holds the Commis-
sion  collectively  responsible for all  decisions and requires  all 
Commission members to publicly  support decisions even 
where they have been outvoted. 
The described linguistic simplification  harbours the danger 
of glossing  over significant variables explaining Commission 
action. In particular, in treating the Commission as a  single, 
coherent actor, it  directs  attention away from  possible con-
flict  within the Commission. Until  quite recently, very  little 
empirical  material was available about decision-making 
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processes within the Commission hierarchy.8 For a  long time, 
literature on the European Commission  has held, somewhat 
unquestioningly, that the Commission  as  a  single entity pur-
sues objectives that are distinctly  different from  those of the 
member states. More recently, a  new body  of research  has 
put this  long  standing  assumption into question and invested 
considerable effort in  unveiling internal  preference distribu-
tions and decision-making dynamics. In  the following over-
view of the literature on Commission preferences, I will  start 
at a general  level of abstraction, and then proceed to cover 
newer insights into where such preferences come from and 
how they are aggregated.
The traditional view: What motivates the Commission?
If I start from  the assumption that the Commission  possesses 
‘actorness’, what does this actor  strive for? There are two ref-
erence points to answering this question: one is based on the 
literature on European integration, which  has always held 
very  specific assumptions about the preferences of  the Com-
mission  in  the integration  process; the other starts from the 
observation that  the Commission could be fruitfully  concep-
tualised as a  form  of government bureaucracy  and therefore 
looks to general theories of  bureaucratic politics to derive 
assumptions about its preferences. 
To start with  the latter, public choice models of bureaucracy 
typically assume public officials to be self-interested utility-
maximisers (cf. Hix 2005: 28). While there are multiple con-
ceptions about what exactly  bureaucrats maximise, a number 
of such  objectives are frequently invoked. Broadly speaking, 
such  approaches  assume that bureaucracies  are “constantly 
seeking to increase their size, staffs, financing, or  scope of 
operations” (Dunleavy 1991: 147). Among  these objectives, 
William Niskanen has prominently proposed ‘budget maxi-
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mising’ to be prevalent (Niskanen  1971). In this view, larger 
budgets are key in  allowing bureaus to secure their  survival, 
expand staff numbers, increase salaries, or generally  gain 
prestige (cf. Dunleavy  1991: 155; Hix and Høyland 2010: 24). 
Competition for  limited available resources lead public offi-
cials to overstate their institution’s budgetary  needs and 
oversupply  agency  output (by  spending  beyond immediate 
necessity) to underscore the inadequacy of their  budget and 
secure future payment (cf. Hix and Høyland 2010: 24; Peters 
2010: 13-14). Other  accounts of bureaucratic behaviour de-
emphasise the centrality  of budget maximising  and instead 
highlight bureaucrats’ interest in  policy  influence and the 
absence of direct supervision, especially  among more senior 
officials: “Rather than maximizing budgets, then, senior bu-
reaucrats (particularly in regulatory  agencies) will  seek to 
maximise their independence from  control  and their oppor-
tunities to determine policy outcomes” (Hix 2005: 28). Even 
when the strict assumptions of utility  maximisation are re-
laxed it is commonly  accepted that bureaucrats pursue policy 
oriented interests, “having both expert knowledge and some 
interest in  the expansion of  their agencies“  (Peters 2010: 
199). The extent to which a  bureaucracy engages in policy 
advocacy is thought to be a function of  its relative independ-
ence from  government control  (cf. Peters 2010: 199). Ex-
pressed in the terminology  of  the principal-agent approach, 
all  these views share the assumption  that bureaucracies as 
agents face incentives to pursue aims that do not correspond 
to that of the principal(s). 
 
Looking at the European integration literature, the Commis-
sion  has traditionally  –almost unquestioningly  – been held 
to favour  policies  that represent a ‘European’ perspective and 
increase the competences  of  EU institutions  (cf. Tallberg 
2002: 44-45; Hooghe 2012b: 87-88). This  view may  be in-
formed by the Treaty  mandate, which  stipulates that “The 
Commission shall  promote the general  interest of the Union 
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and take appropriate initiatives to that end” (article 17(1) 
TEU). Variants  of this view range from  the comparatively 
tame characterisation  as the “conscience of the Community” 
(Cini  1996: 16), safeguarding  collective EU interests against 
self-interested national  governments, to the more forceful 
proclamation that “The members  of the Commission  are firm 
advocates of a maximum  economic and political  integration, 
as well as of the principle of delegating national powers  to 
the Community institutions”  (Lindberg 1963: 67). In  the 
manner of the latter, Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, in 
their 1989 article that revived a neofunctionalist line of  ar-
gumentation, plainly summarise that “The Commission itself 
is an entrenched, self-interested advocate of  further integra-
tion [...]” (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989: 108).
These accounts of  ‘integrationist’ preferences of  the Commis-
sion  do not conflict  with  the assumptions proposed by the 
public choice literature on bureaucratic politics. To support 
an ongoing transfer of  competences to European institutions 
in  most circumstances means increased Commission  compe-
tences, greater policy autonomy and less  supervision. Al-
though  a view of Commission  officials as  single-minded 
budget maximisers will  hardly find corroborating empirical 
evidence, increasing  the workload of  the Commission  could 
in  turn form  the basis for demands for  greater staff numbers 
and greater financial resources. 
A more nuanced picture: recent empirical research
Since the ‘second wave’ of interest in the European Commis-
sion  there has been a   growing number  of  empirical  studies 
about the preferences of individual  Commission officials that 
provide a  much  more nuanced picture of  what ‘the Commis-
sion’ as a whole may strive for (cf. e.g. Hooghe 2000; Hooghe 
2005; Egeberg 2006; Wonka 2008; Kassim, Peterson et al. 
2013). In particular, these studies  demonstrate an internal 
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heterogeneity of  motivations that underscore the difficulty of 
assigning distinct actorness to a complex  organisation. The 
most  recent and most  ambitious of these efforts to date, 
“Commission in  Question  (EUCIQ)”, undertakes a  large scale 
attitudinal  survey  of  Commission officials (n=1901) (Kassim, 
Peterson et al. 2013). The project  finds  that while the com-
monly  assumed ‘supranationalist’ preference (embracing the 
policy advocacy of  the Commission) is indeed prevalent, 
large minorities  of  the respondents adhere to role concep-
tions closer to ‘intergovernmentalist’ attitudes (downplaying 
the policy advocacy of the Commission  and promoting defer-
ence to the Council) and something that Liesbet Hooghe 
terms an “institutional  pragmatism”, presenting a ‘third way’ 
“which  conceives the Commission  and Member States as  in-
terlocking and complementary institutions” (Hooghe 2012b: 
91).
The distribution  of these preferences is not random across 
Commission officials. The EUCIQ project identifies a number 
of patterns. For example, ‘supranationalist’ preferences are 
more prevalent among  senior  officials and those coming 
from  ‘older’ member states (although the two often overlap), 
in  particular  from states that are either smaller, catholic, fed-
erally  organised, or inefficiently  governed (cf. Hooghe 2012a: 
9-10). Preferences also cluster across DGs, but  less pro-
nouncedly  so. Liesbet Hooghe reports that ‘institutional 
pragmatists’ are more prevalent in DGs “with  technical  con-
tent”  (Hooghe 2012a: 11), although her distinction between 
‘technical’ and ‘political’ DGs  may be questionable.9  Moreo-
ver, personal  characteristics  such as  prior  experience in  na-
tional  administrations (which favours ‘intergovernmentalist’ 
attitudes), the stated motivation  for joining  the Commission 
(commitment to ‘Europe’ unsurprisingly  favouring  a ‘supra-
nationalist’ attitude), and gender  (women  being less likely  to 
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express ‘supranationalist’ attitudes) have a  statistically sig-
nificant impact on preferences (cf. Hooghe 2012a: 11-12). 
Apart  from the supranational-intergovernmental  dimension, 
EUCIQ also includes questions about Commission  officials’ 
political  positions on a left-right  scale. Here, nationality 
seems to have a significant impact. Officials  from the ‘new’ 
member states in  particular  tend to be more ‘pro-market’ in 
an economic sense and ‘conservative’ in  a socio-cultural  di-
mension (cf. Hooghe 2012a: 15). Hooghe also finds  clusters 
across DGs, with  officials with  more ‘interventionist’ portfo-
lios expressing less market-friendly attitudes  than officials in 
market-oriented DGs: “On  economic ideology, DG location  is 
a surer predictor  than nationality”  (Hooghe 2012a: 18). 
Whether  this is due to self-selection or socialisation  is impos-
sible to tell from the data (cf. Hooghe 2012a: 15). 
Finally, the two preference dimensions (supranational-
intergovernmental  and left-right) combined accurately pre-
dict Commission  officials’ preferred allocation of  compe-
tences  between  the EU and the member  states, differentiated 
by  policy area. This finding, to some extend, casts doubt on 
accounts  of the Commission as  a ‘bureau-maximiser’: 
“Commission officials’ attitudes on  policy scope in general, 
and on  the kind of  policies that should be centralized are 
guided by  ideology and EU governance views rather than by 
career interests” (Hooghe 2012a: 21).
While EUCIQ provides a very  detailed snapshot of  the Com-
mission  at the time of the survey  in  2008, Mariam  Hartlapp 
and Yann Lorenz have compiled a  longitudinal  dataset com-
prising information  on nationality, party-political and pro-
fessional  background on all  Commissioners and Directors 
General  from  the first EEC Commission to the Barroso 
Commission that completed its term in  2010 (Hartlapp and 
Lorenz 2012). In  a first descriptive overview of the data, 
Hartlapp and Lorenz discern patterns of nationality and 
party-political  affiliation  in relation  to particular policy port-
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folios that corroborate some of EUCIQ’s findings. In par-
ticular, they, too, find portfolios relating to more ‘interven-
tionist’ policies  to be dominated by  officials  with social-
democratic party backgrounds, while liberal  and conservative 
officials tend to cluster in market-related portfolios. They 
also indicate that individual  member states at times express 
preferences for certain portfolios, although  such preferences 
have no basis in  the relevance of these portfolios at the na-
tional  level  (cf. Hartlapp and Lorenz 2012: 32). However, 
Hartlapp and Lorenz do not  offer  propositions as to how 
these patterns may be connected to Commission  action. 
Overall, they  find no periods of party-political  dominance 
that could be linked to particular  policy  initiatives (cf. Hart-
lapp and Lorenz 2012: 31). Moreover, a  longitudinal  analysis 
of the varying influence of individual  portfolios on Commis-
sion  action  is hindered by the fact that both  content and 
number of  these portfolios have significantly  changed over 
time (cf. Hartlapp and Lorenz 2012: 17). 
Apart  from  these empirical  analyses of preference distribu-
tions, there is  now also a growing body  of empirical work on 
internal  dynamics in  Commission decision-making, focusing 
on potential conflict among the top tier of Commission  offi-
cials. Arndt Wonka, for example, focuses on political  dynam-
ics within the College of Commissioners as the Commission’s 
central  decision-making body. He proposes  four possible ra-
tionales for  individual Commissioners’ behaviour: a  “national 
party” scenario, where the Commissioner  acts according  to 
the preferences of  her or his national  party, which  can  in turn 
be influenced by considerations of domestic party  competi-
tion; a  “transnational  party”  scenario, where the Commis-
sioner is  informed by broader ideological positions reflected 
in  the preferences of trans-national  party  families; a  “na-
tional  agent” scenario, where the Commissioner acts accord-
ing to cross-party  domestic interests of  his home country; 
and finally a  “portfolio” scenario, in which the Commissioner 
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seeks to advance the policies  delegated to him (cf. Wonka 
2008: 1148-1151). Although  Wonka  admits that some of  the 
proposed scenarios might be difficult to distinguish empiri-
cally, the evidence he finds in two case studies concerning 
the “REACH”  and “Takeover”  directives  points to a domi-
nance of the “national agent”  and the “portfolio” scenarios 
(cf. Wonka 2008: 1158). He finds  no evidence for partisan 
dynamics. This insight is consistent  with  the results of  Mor-
ton  Egeberg’s 2006 study  of  Commissioners’ decision behav-
iour in  a range of  policy  types, as reported by officials located 
in  the Commission’s Secretariat General, who sat in on  de-
bates in the College. Egeberg finds that in  both  sectoral poli-
cies and budgetary matters the “portfolio role”  is the most 
frequently  reported behavioural  pattern. The “country role”, 
his equivalent to Wonka’s “national agent” scenario, is also 
reported, but less frequently  so, while partisan affiliation  is 
very rarely invoked (cf. Egeberg 2006: 11). 
Robert Thomson conducts a further test on the importance 
of officials’ personal  characteristics  in  Commission decision-
making. His  2008 study connects Commissioners’ national-
ity and party affiliation with  their  legislative behaviour, in-
vestigating more closely  the “the conditions under which  the 
commission’s  positions on legislative proposals agree with 
those of different member states” (Thomson 2008: 170). He 
finds that the average distance between the policy  position of 
a member state and that of  the Commission  is smaller if the 
Commissioner responsible for the legislative proposal  is  a 
national  of that member  state – but only  if  the voting rule in 
the Council  allows for a qualitative majority. Under  unanim-
ity, no such  effect is evident. This finding remains robust re-
gardless of the Commissioner’s party  political  affiliation  – 
the responsible Commissioner being  a member  of  the home 
state’s governing party does not affect the proximity of that 
member state’s position to that of the Commission. The re-
sults of  Thomson’s  study  dovetail  with  previous insights in-
sofar as they emphasise that nationality has an influence on 
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decision-making in  the Commission, and that  party  affilia-
tion  is marginal  (cf. Thomson  2008: 188). They also under-
score that voting rules in  the Council have an  effect on  the 
content of  the Commission’s legislative proposal. This is 
valuable evidence suggesting that the Commission is  a stra-
tegic actor, taking account of the preferences  of  other  actors 
involved in the inter-institutional decision-making  process 
and the institutional rules of the game. 
A  central  problem  in  analysing decision-making  dynamics  in 
the College, much  like the obstacles to the study  of judicial 
behaviour in  the Court of Justice, is the dearth of empirical 
material  about the positions taken  by  individual  Commis-
sioners, as neither debates or votes are recorded (cf. Wonka 
2008: 1152).  Egeberg speculates that with  the growing  size 
of the College, there appears to be a greater proclivity  to-
wards non-interference with  other  Commissioners’ projects, 
and that “bilateral  relations between the President and the 
particularly affected commissioner(s) might come to partly 
replace collective decision-making”  (Egeberg 2012: 945). 
This in  turn lends credence to the implications of Thomson’s 
study, in that the position of the responsible Commissioner 
has an  important influence on  the Commission’s overall posi-
tion. 
Miriam Hartlapp, Julia  Metz and Christian Rauh provide 
some further support for this supposition. Their analysis of 
the administrative set-up of the Commission indicates  that 
procedural structures systematically privilege the lead de-
partment in  the formulation of a  legislative proposal (cf. 
Hartlapp, Metz et al. 2010: 13). They  also point to the in-
creasingly  important role of the Secretariat General  (under 
the political  leadership of the Commission  president) in des-
ignating the lead department and coordinating legislative 
proposals: “the SG [Secretariat General] is in a distinguished 
position in  setting policy priorities on the internal  agenda 
and influencing how much  say a policy portfolio has in a  cer-
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tain legislative drafting” (Hartlapp, Metz et al. 2010: 14). 
Based on these insights, they propose that “the overall  legis-
lative output of  the Commission  may  be skewed towards 
those DGs that act more frequently  as the lead department 
than others” (Hartlapp, Metz et al. 2010: 17). Hartlapp, Metz 
and Rauh moreover find evidence that there is significant 
sectoral  variance as to which  proposals are subject to nego-
tiations in the College. The assumption is  that proposals that 
are negotiated in  College meetings are less likely  to represent 
the lead department’s position  than  those decided at a  previ-
ous stage (cf. Hartlapp, Metz et al. 2010: 22). However, they 
do not test the implications of their findings against actual 
legislative proposals. 
All  in all, this new research agenda has produced a rich body 
of material  on  the factors influencing  Commission  policy po-
sitions. I would sum up the central points as follows:
Judging  from  EUCIQ’s extensive survey  of Commission offi-
cials, it seems reasonable to assume a predominant tendency 
within  the Commission  to support policy  advocacy. 36.6% of 
the respondents embraced a ‘supranationalist’ attitude that 
largely  conforms to a  ‘traditional’ understanding  of Commis-
sion  priorities. Another  28.9% were labeled as  “institutional 
pragmatists” (Hooghe 2012b: 92). While this attitude is more 
respectful  of  the interlocking  authority  of  both  Commission 
and Council, it is nonetheless clearly  in favour  of  policy  im-
plementation over management. In  fact, its prime distinction 
is a  clear rejection  of sharing  powers  of  initiative with  the 
European Parliament – a  position that most ‘supranational-
ists’ support (Hooghe 2012b: 93-97). This indicates that 
about two out of three Commission  officials support Com-
mission  policy  advocacy. Coupled with  the lack of evidence 
for  an  across-the-board bureau-maximising attitude, it 
seems reasonable to assume on  this  basis that Commission 
officials on  average pursue distinct policies. Policy prefer-
ences on an economic left-right scale moreover cluster with 
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portfolios. ‘Interventionist’ DGs lean towards the social-
democratic spectrum, whereas market-oriented DGs lean 
towards the liberal/conservative side. Nationality  seems to 
have an influence on policy positions, too. Internal  proce-
dures for policy formulation  and decision-making, moreover, 
appear to favour the positions of  the lead department, as 
long as proposals are not subject  to intense negotiation  in the 
College. Finally, there is evidence that the Commission  acts 
as a strategic goal  seeker in inter-institutional  processes, as 
Thomson’s study has shown the Commission’s position to 
vary with voting rules in the Council.  
These insights inform my  own conception of the Commission 
to a  large degree. In  chapter  4 I will develop a  proposition 
about the effects of  portfolio characteristics on strategy 
choice, which I will also test in my case studies (chapter 5 
and 6). However, the described lack of  readily  available em-
pirical data  on  internal  positions within the Commission  pre-
cludes me from pursuing  this question in greater detail. For 
the most part, I will  therefore maintain  the simplifying  as-
sumption of  the Commission as a largely unitary actor, inso-
far as I assume that once a position  has been  internally 
agreed upon, the Commission  will  pursue it employing the 
most  promising strategy  available. Formally, whenever  I 
speak of  Commission action as an  aggregate, as  the appro-
priate unit of  analysis I am actually  referring to the majority 
of Commissioners taking a decision in the College.
The following chapter describes the Commission’s  position  in 
inter-institutional policy-making processes and compares the 
relative merits of its strategic options.
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Chapter 3 
The European Commission in the policy-
making process
In  the previous chapter I outlined the theoretical  approach  to 
my  study  of  the Commission and my assumptions about its 
‘actorness’ and preferences. In  this chapter, I will  look more 
concretely at the position of  the Commission in the political 
system  of the European  Union. I will  outline the central 
characteristics  of Commission policy-making strategies in 
three policy modes. I argue that the outcome of these strate-
gies is  functionally equivalent, but they place varying  con-
straints on the Commission’s  influence over outcomes. I will 
conclude with a comparison  of the Commission’s position  in 
various modes of policy-making and argue that the Commis-
sion’s ability  to influence the policy-making  process is broad-
est in  legislation  and litigation. The detailed comparison be-
tween the two strategies will  allow me to formulate a  series of 
hypotheses about the factors  influencing the Commission’s 
choice of strategy in the following chapter.
3.1 Modes of policy-making
Assuming  that  the Commission pursues distinct policy  pref-
erences strategically, its ability  to assert an  influence on pol-
icy outcomes  is dependent on the institutional  constraints of 
policy-making in the EU. These constraints in  turn depend 
on the other actors present in  the policy-making process, and 
the legally prescribed decision-making procedures. In the 
social  science literature on  EU politics, such  distinct bundles 
of procedures are described as ‘policy modes’ or ‘modes of 
policy-making’.10  Research has identified a number of such 
modes at  the European level, each of which offers the Com-
mission  varying degrees of influence over policy  output, but 
there is generally no agreement on any particular typology. 
Helen  Wallace, for example, proposes a  typology consisting 
of five policy  modes. The first three, the “classical  Commu-
nity method” (as  employed in the original  Common Agricul-
tural Policy), the “EU regulatory  mode” (as employed for 
most  internal  market regulation) and the “EU distributional 
mode”  (as employed in  distributive policies such  as cohesion, 
structural  funds, and research  and development) all  entail a 
significant amount of delegation  of policy-making  compe-
tences  to the Commission, but vary  according to the depth of 
these competences and the involvement of  other  actors, in 
particular member state governments and the European Par-
liament, but also sub-national (or  “infranational”) regional 
actors  in  the case of cohesion  policy. The other  two policy 
modes in this typology, “policy  coordination” and “intensive 
transgovernmentalism”, assign only a  minor role to the 
Commission, either  in  setting benchmarks and facilitating 
dialogue and policy  learning among national  governments in 
the coordinating mode, or as a  relative bystander in  “trans-
governmental” bargaining  in  foreign  policy  and earlier  forms 
of cooperation in  monetary  policy  and justice and home af-
fairs (cf. Wallace 2010: 92-93). 
Fritz Scharpf has suggested an alternative typology. Revisit-
ing his influential  article about the European ‘joint decision 
trap‘, Scharpf calls to attention three different modes of 
policy-making that he sees as central  to European Union 
politics (Scharpf 2006). 
1. The “intergovernmental  mode” of policy-making lies  at  the 
heart of Scharpf’s  ‘joint decision trap’. This mode is preva-
lent in  all  those circumstances where decision-making 
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10  Jonas Tallberg also uses the term ‘process of rule-creation’ (Tallberg 
2000: 848). The term ‘mode of governance’ has largely been used in relation 
to the so-called ‘new modes of governance’. 
takes place between  constituent governments deciding 
unanimously  on outcomes. (In  this regard it is akin  to 
Wallace’s “intensive transgovernmentalism”.) The Euro-
pean  Commission’s  role in facilitating consensus in  this 
mode is strictly  limited, as  it lacks resources  to “design  and 
pursue bargaining  strategies”  (Scharpf 1988: 255), primar-
ily  against the European  Council, but also against  the 
Council  in areas  like Justice and Home Affairs before the 
Treaty  of Lisbon  or the Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy. Scharpf’s  ‘trap’ describes the situation where the con-
tinuation  of existing  common  policies under changed con-
ditions leads to sub-obtimal  outcomes, while the institu-
tional  framework forecloses exit and the decision mode 
precludes policy  change as long  as a single member prefers 
the status quo (Scharpf 1988: 257). Lacking powerful 
mechanisms of  consensus  formation, Scharpf predicts  a 
“systematic deterioration  of the ‘goodness of fit’ between 
public policy and the relevant policy environment” 
(Scharpf 1988: 257). 
2. The “joint decision-mode” of policy-making, according to 
this typology, is employed in  most  legislative acts at the 
EU level. It provides a  central position  for the Commission 
in  facilitating policy  solutions through  its  monopoly  on 
legislative initiatives  (Scharpf  2006: 849). This mode best 
corresponds to the first three modes  described by Wallace, 
in  particular  to the form of co-decision that is now en-
shrined as the ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’. The fact 
that the Commission  has the sole authority  to introduce a 
legislative proposal  (in  other words, ‘set an agenda’) 
greatly reduces the complexity  of bargaining between 27 
constituent governments  and the European  Parliament. 
Provided there is a potential  overlap of preferences among 
the veto players, the Commission  wields extensive power 
over the eventual outcome as it can  choose among the pos-
sible solutions that which is closest to its own preferences. 
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3. The “supranational-hierarchical mode” of policy-making, 
absent in Wallace’s  typology, describes all  those acts “in 
which  the Commission, the European  Court of  Justice or 
the European Central  Bank are able to exercise policy-
making functions without any  involvement of politically 
accountable actors in the Council  or  the European  Parlia-
ment” (Scharpf 2006: 851).  With  regard to the Commis-
sion, this  mode involves those areas of competition policy 
where the Commission  has been delegated competences to 
issue autonomous legal  acts, or situations in which  the 
Commission makes use of its function as  ‘guardian of the 
treaties’ to take a member state to court for an  alleged in-
fringement of  European law. This  policy mode permits an 
exit from the ‘joint-decision trap’ as a  single actor  (or a 
small  number of  actors) can produce policy  change with-
out becoming  involved in  complex  bargaining procedures. 
At the same time, policies produced in this mode are ex-
tremely  difficult to alter (becoming ‘locked in’), as  legisla-
tive override is exceedingly  difficult to negotiate (cf. 
Scharpf 2006: 852-3).
Commonality: legal norm as output
All  in  all, these different policy  modes offer  the Commission 
different channels  of influence over policy  outcomes. Figure 
3.1 outlines the various strategies through which the Com-
mission  can  influence the production  of legal  norms. This 
overview is certainly not exhaustive of  all  modes  of policy-
making the Commission  is involved in. In particular, I do not 
cover  Commission involvement in  so called ‘new modes of 
governance’, essentially  captured by  Wallace’s “policy  coor-
dination” mode, emphasising soft-law mechanisms of ‘nam-
ing and shaming’, information  exchange and common learn-
ing (cf. Bartolini  2011: 5), often  epitomised by the ‘Open 
Method of Coordination’ as introduced by  the ‘Lisbon Strat-
egy’ in 2000 and subject to a  whole separate body of litera-
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ture. I essentially  focus  on such  modes of  policy-making that 
result in legally enforceable norms. I find this  focus justified, 
as “Law is one of the central  products  of  politics and the prize 
over which  many  political  struggles are waged”  (Whittington, 
Kelemen et al. 2008: 3).  Law, moreover, is  the principal 
output of  the European Union: “Law has always been  a basic 
instrument and a central  symbol of European integration“ 
(Snyder 1993: 19).11 
Figure 3.1 Commission strategies in three modes of policy-
making
The following section  demonstrates in  more detail  that the 
outcome of each  of  the depicted strategies is indeed a legal 
norm. I will  also defend the argument that no matter the 
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11 It might be more accurate to refer to “law production” (cf. Tsebelis 1999), 
rather than “policy-making”, but the term is not very widely used. Moreover, 
“law-production” would include constitutional law-making, i.e. the process 
of treaty revision, which I do not cover. I choose to focus solely on policy-
making, that is, that part of “law production” that has a distinct policy con-
tent.
concrete strategy, the outcome is functionally equivalent. 
This is easier to demonstrate for legislative and executive 
policy-making, but holds for judicial policy-making as well.
There is no need to explain that law is the central  outcome of 
legislation  (which, after all, is  Latin  for  ‘law-making’). But 
legislation  is  only a subset of  all  possible acts resulting in le-
gal  norms, and, in  a formal  sense, does not even constitute 
the majority  of all  legal  acts issued by Union  institutions.12 
The Treaty  of Lisbon  attempts to clarify  the nature of differ-
ent legal acts  by  introducing  a novel typology, intended as a 
hierarchy of norms (cf. Craig  and de Búrca 2011: 108). Art, 
289(3) TFEU now defines legislation, or a ‘legislative act’, in 
formal  terms as a  legal  act adopted by  a  ‘legislative proce-
dure’ (be it the ordinary legislative procedure or a  special  
legislative procedure). All  other acts are by  definition  ‘non-
legislative’. Secondary  legal  acts  based on  legislation will  now 
be termed either  ‘delegated acts’ or ‘implementing acts’, sub-
ject to an ill-defined distinction that will  be difficult to im-
plement in  practice (cf. Craig  and de Búrca 2011: 117). Such 
secondary  legal  acts will  be executive acts carried out by the 
Commission (art. 290 and 291 TFEU).
Other  EU agencies and bodies  with executive tasks also issue 
legal  norms, but theses are not explicitly  captured by the new 
typology. The revised article 263 TFEU on  judicial  review of 
EU acts explicitly includes  acts  of “bodies, offices or agencies 
of the Union  intended to produce legal  effects vis-à-vis third 
parties” as  amenable to legal  challenge before the Court  of 
Justice. The fourth  paragraph  of this article moreover intro-
duces the category of “regulatory  acts”  in  regard to which the 
rules  of standing have been  relaxed for natural  and legal  per-
sons. It is  unclear  what constitutes a regulatory  act and what 
its relation is to legislative, delegated and implementing acts 
(cf. Craig and de Búrca 2011: 508). Other legal  acts, such as 
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12  Autonomous legal acts by the Commission, which will no longer be for-
mally referred to as legislation, consistently outnumber legislative acts by a 
factor higher than 2:1 (cf. König, Dannwolf et al. 2012: 25). 
those issued by the European  Central  Bank, or  by  the Council 
in  the context of  foreign policy, also do not fit the new typol-
ogy, leading  Paul  Craig  and Gráinne de Búrca  to conclude 
that “the hierarchy of legal  acts composed of theses catego-
ries does not capture the totality  of the ways in which  legal 
norms are made in the post-Lisbon world” (Craig  and de 
Búrca 2011: 118). 
The legal  nature of decisions taken  by the European  Council 
is something  of  a  grey  area (cf. Werts 2008: 28-29). The Lis-
bon Treaty’s caveat that the European Council  “shall  not ex-
ercise legislative functions”  (art. 15(1) TEU) does not pre-
clude it from issuing  acts of  legal relevance, or even  legal  acts 
(since Treaty defines legislative acts as those legal  acts 
“adopted by  a  legislative procedure”). Many  procedures with 
legal  effect require a European Council decision even where 
the formal  legal act is carried out by a  different institution 
(see for example the procedure to suspend the membership 
of a member state in “serious and persistent breach” of Un-
ion values, art. 7 TEU). Its position as final  arbiter  of conflict 
in  the Treaties’ ‘emergency brake’ procedures moreover di-
rectly  infuses the European  Council into the legislative proc-
ess, even  though  it does not take a final  decision on the draft 
(cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 78). A direct legal  effect of 
European Council  acts is most visible in  the area of ‘constitu-
tional’ politics, in  particular  the simplified procedure for 
Treaty  revision (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 76). While 
European Council  decisions “amending all  or  part  of the pro-
visions of  Part Three [internal policies] of  the Treaty  on the 
Functioning  of the European Union”  are still  subject to na-
tional  ratification (art. 48(6) TEU), the so-called ‘passerelle’ 
clause allows the European Council to unilaterally  amend 
voting  procedures from  unanimity  to qualitative majority, 
and legislative procedures from special to ordinary, as long 
as no national parliament objects (art. 48(7) TEU). 
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The inclusion of the European Council  in the list of Union 
institutions (art. 13 TEU) entails the possibility  of  a judicial 
review of European Council  acts, and article 263(1) TFEU 
quite explicitly grants powers of review to the European 
Court of Justice where European  Council  acts are “intended 
to produce legal  effects vis-à-vis third parties”.  In  principle, 
this could empower  individuals  to challenge parts of Presi-
dency Conclusions (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 414). 
The same applies to a  failure of the European  Council  to act 
where such an  obligation  exists  (art. 265 TFEU). While this 
certainly  constitutes an  innovation, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the innovation lies not in the admission of  the le-
gal  nature of European Council  acts, but the existence of  le-
gal remedies. 
While the outcome of litigation  is obviously  of  legal nature, 
arguing that judicial  processes are functionally akin  to legis-
lation  is not as straightforward and may require more per-
suasion. Traditionally, the spheres of legislation  and adjudi-
cation have been treated as analytically distinct. Lawyers in 
particular have been reluctant to concede that judges  ‘make 
law’ rather than  merely  apply  it. To the contrary, I argue that 
the production  of binding  norms is  central  to both processes. 
Research  on ‘judicial  politics’ in many contexts has high-
lighted the wider policy impact of  court decisions, even as 
they are seemingly  addressed to the parties in court only  (cf. 
Chayes 1976: 1281). Much of the literature on  ‘law and poli-
tics’ implicitly  assumes the two to be more or  less the same, 
or similar processes to a common end. In this vein, Stuart 
Scheingold proposes that there is “no bright line” between 
law and politics – the two being  inextricably  linked to one 
another (Scheingold 2008: 740). I will  not have to go so far 
as to speak of the law-politics distinction  as  “a  kind of his-
torical curiosity”, as  Scheingold does (Scheingold 2008: 
740), or  as Harold Spaeth, who describes the insistence on  a 
conceptual  distinction between  judging  and policy-making  as 
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a “morass of  legalistic doublespeak” (Spaeth 2008: 753). But, 
disregarding  this rhetorical barrage, I find the underlying 
argument essentially  sound and use it as important starting 
point for  my study. As  Spaeth  agues, “the assertion  that judg-
ing is  different from  the free choices  of congresspersons or 
administrators is simply  false”  (Spaeth  2008: 753). All  politi-
cal  actors  act under constraints imposed by law and concepts 
of legality  (Shapiro 2008: 770-771). What constitutes the 
boundaries of  this  legality  is frequently contested and is itself 
decided through legally  prescribed means. In this  argument, 
judges are in  fact the least constrained actors as it  is their 
prerogative to define what is legal and what is not. Judges, 
according to Spaeth, “cloak the reality of  choice with  the 
rhetoric of  analogical  legal  phraseology. [...] The ultimate 
choice, then, becomes no more than the choice of  words” 
(Spaeth 2008: 753-754). While this again is strong rhetoric, 
Martin  Shapiro formulates a  similar  idea somewhat less 
harshly: “[Courts] implement a lot of law, and in the course 
of doing so, they  make a  lot of law” (Shapiro 2008: 769). Or, 
in  the more nuanced words of Stuart Scheingold, “The appli-
cation of rules is  difficult  to distinguish  in  practice from the 
making of rules. Each  exception  can be viewed either as an 
application  or a  deviation depending on one’s  perspective” 
(Scheingold 1974: 31). Judges face weak constraints on 
decision-making by  the requirement to reach jurispruden-
tially defensible decisions (legal reasoning can  support a  va-
riety of  different outcomes – after all  both  sides to the court 
case at hand couch  their  conflicting arguments in  legal 
terms). However, judges have been empirically  shown to be 
constrained by strategic concerns for  the wider  institutional 
environment (cf. i.a. Epstein  and Knight 1998) and the par-
ticular  characteristics of the parties  before them (cf. i.a. Gal-
anter 1974). Without launching unnecessarily deep into the 
question of judicial  behaviour, the main  argument here is 
that the actions  of judges are conceptually  difficult to differ-
entiate from policy-making. In more technical terms, I argue 
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that the interpretation  of a legal norm  in court is in most 
cases equivalent to a  (quasi-legislative) recasting of said 
norm with  universal  impact and future relevance as  prece-
dent (cf. Dehousse and Weiler  1990: 246; Dehousse 1998: 
72; Shapiro and Stone Sweet 2002: 90; Vanberg 2005: 184). 
Having established the commonality  of the described modes 
of policy-making, I will  proceed by  providing a  detailed over-
view of the variation in  the Commission’s  influence over  out-
comes in the three modes. I exclude from  this overview 
budgetary  procedures and the management of EU finances, 
as well  as the negotiation of international  agreements. By 
and large, these procedures are special  cases of  the joint-
decision  mode that, while surely  essential to the day-to-day 
operations of the EU and highly  policy-relevant, would 
somewhat complicate a concise overview.
3.2 The Commission and the intergovernmental 
mode
The intergovernmental  mode of  policy-making  is prevalent in 
those areas outside the internal market that have been 
gradually added to the list of Union  competences over  time. 
This has been most prominently  so in foreign policy  and jus-
tice and home affairs, although the latter  has been  increas-
ingly  subject  to the ‘Community method’ since the entry into 
force of the Treaty  of  Amsterdam. Cooperation in  these areas 
had developed outside the formal Treaty  framework – or, as 
in  the case of the Schengen  agreements, outside the EU con-
text altogether  – with initially very little formal Commission 
involvement. It moreover applies  to bargaining in the Euro-
pean  Council, which  is not confined to any particular  policy 
area. 
Although formally  without any  legislative authority, the 
European Council  has successively  assumed a central “pre-
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legislative function” (Wessels  2008: 165) in the policy-
making process, essentially  acting as  an  important informal 
agenda  setter  and the Union’s primary forum  for crisis  re-
sponse. Now included formally in the list of Union institu-
tions (art. 13 TEU), the Treaty  assigns the European Council 
the tasks of providing the Union  “with  the necessary impetus 
for  its development”  and defining its “general political  direc-
tion  and priorities”  (art. 15  TEU). Beyond the mere wording 
of the legal text, the European  Council  represents the Union’s 
“focus of authority  at the highest political  level”  (Craig  and de 
Búrca 2011: 48), and access to this institution  is therefore a 
valuable political asset. The Commission  is the only EU insti-
tution that is formally involved in European Council  negotia-
tions, the president of the Commission  being  a (non-voting, 
art. 235(1) TFEU) member. Apart from such  participation  in 
negotiations, however, the Commission  has very  limited abil-
ity to influence European Council decisions. Without formal 
veto-power, the other European  Council members have little 
incentive to accommodate its views. Its action  in  this regard 
is primarily  preparatory and rhetorical. European Council 
meetings are formally prepared by  the General Affairs Coun-
cil, “in liaison with the President of the European  Council 
and the Commission”  (art. 16(6) TEU). More precisely, arti-
cle 3 of the European Council’s rules  of procedure stipulate 
that the president of the European Council, in  cooperation 
with  the rotating  Council  presidency and the Commission 
president, present a  draft  agenda  to the General Affairs 
Council  four weeks before the scheduled European Council 
meeting. This same group of persons prepare draft  guidelines 
for  European Council  conclusions, draft conclusions and 
draft decisions of the European  Council, “which  shall  be dis-
cussed in  the General  Affairs Council”  (OJ 2009, No. L 315/
52). However, the provisional  agenda, to be adopted by the 
European Council  itself at the beginning  of  its  meeting, is 
drawn up by the president of  the European Council  alone (OJ 
2009, No. L 315/53). In any  formal sense, the Commission 
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therefore holds  very  limited agenda setting powers over 
European Council  decisions. Nonetheless, Paul  Craig and 
Gráinne de Búrca hold that “The European  Council  has been 
the institutional mechanism whereby the Commission can 
secure broad agreement from  Member  States for  major ini-
tiatives  [...], and many European Council  initiatives are the 
result of Commission  suggestions fed into the agenda pre-
pared by the GAC [General  Affairs Council]” (Craig and de 
Búrca 2011: 49).13 Given  that the Commission is responsible 
for  the Union’s multi-annual  legislative programming, it 
faces strong incentives to match  its priorities to those of the 
European Council: “Winning  the European Council’s ap-
proval for  the general direction of  policy  in  a  particular area 
facilitates the Commission’s task when fashioning  more spe-
cific legislation to put that policy into effect” (Craig  2010: 
107). 
There is as yet preciously little research about the Commis-
sion’s ability to ‘enlist’ the European Council  and to use the 
support of the heads of  state or  government as a lever in  sub-
sequent legislative negotiations with the Council. Isolated 
accounts  of such  a link dot the literature on policy-making, 
particularly with regard to the development of the single 
market programme during the 1980s (cf. Armstrong and 
Bulmer  1997: 18-19; Craig  2002: 37), but there are so far no 
systematic studies  on the factors influencing the success of 
such  a  strategy.14 This question  could present an  interesting 
framework for a test of  competing  rational  choice and socio-
logical  institutionalist approaches – the former proposing 
congruence of preference or  pressure from other  venues as 
explanatory variables for Commission success, the latter the 
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13  Similarly, Paul Craig asserts elsewhere that “The Commission has fre-
quently fed policy initiatives that it wishes to advance to the European 
Council, and gained its imprimatur” (Craig 2011b: 222).
14 The situation is somewhat different with regard to the Commission’s in-
fluence on Treaty change, although this discussion is still largely mired in a 
dichotomous, either-or type of argument between intergovernmentalists and 
supranationalists.  
dynamics of  negotiation, issue framing and rhetorical en-
trapment. It will  also be interesting to see if the establish-
ment of  the permanent president of the European  Council 
has an effect on the Commission’s ability  to ‘upload’ policy 
initiatives onto the European Council’s agenda. The fact  that 
he or she is  appointed for  a  period of up to five years allows 
for  a  greater planning perspective than  previous presidents 
of this institution  and may serve to undermine the institu-
tional  advantages previously  held only by the Commission 
(cf. Craig 2010: 105). 
The Commission’s  position in those areas of foreign policy 
and justice and home affairs that still  retain some of their 
former (second and third) ‘pillar’ features is somewhat akin 
to its relation vis-á-vis the European Council. The Treaty  of 
Lisbon has incorporated most parts of  justice and home af-
fairs into the joint-decision  mode of policy-making (with 
slight exceptions in the case of criminal law and policy coop-
eration), but  little has changed from the pre-Lisbon era with 
regard to Commission competence in the policy-making  fea-
tures of  foreign and security policy. Both  policy  areas are 
characterised by  a plethora of preparatory  committees, semi-
autonomous agencies and intergovernmental  fora  in- and 
outside of  the Treaty structure (cf. Giegerich  and Wallace 
2010: 441-444; Lavenex 2010: 466-468). While the Treaty of 
Lisbon has formally abolished the former  pillar structure, 
article 24(1) TEU states  that the Union’s Common Foreign 
and Security  Policy  is governed by “specific rules and proce-
dures”  that differ  from other  policy areas. The Commission’s 
role in this area “is  defined by the Treaties”, i.e. it has no 
across-the-board competences and remains marginally in-
volved in decision-making procedures (cf. Craig and de 
Búrca 2011: 327). The main decision-making  bodies in this 
field are the European Council  and the Council, the former 
determining objectives and general guidelines, while the lat-
ter defines  and implements concrete decisions (art. 26 TEU). 
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The Commission, through the Union’s High  Representative 
for  Foreign  Affairs and Security  Policy, who is a vice presi-
dent of  the Commission and replaces the former external  
relations  Commissioner, shares  formal agenda  setting  pow-
ers with the member states (art. 31  TEU). Its main  avenues of 
influence, however, are through  its access to the European 
Council  and through  cross-issue linkages that tie foreign pol-
icy to policy  areas such  as trade and development policy, in 
which  the Commission has greater policy-making  abilities 
(cf. Giegerich and Wallace 2010: 442). 
Prior  to the Lisbon Treaty, this situation was similar in  the 
field of police and judicial  cooperation in criminal matters, 
that part  of justice and home affairs that constituted the Un-
ion’s ‘third pillar’. Since December  2009, little remains  of  the 
intergovernmental  mode in  this policy  field, with the excep-
tion  of the right of initiative in police and judicial coopera-
tion  in  criminal  matters, where the Commission  shares its 
usual  monopoly  with “a  quarter of the member  states” (art. 
76 TFEU). Apart from  this deviation, however, the ordinary 
legislative procedure (with ‘emergency brakes’) now applies 
to much of this field as well. 
Summary
The preceding overview has demonstrated the limited means 
for  the Commission to influence the content of policy set in 
the intergovernmental mode. Although the relevant  litera-
ture does indicate some instances of the Commission’s suc-
cess in using this policy mode to its advantage, there is little 
to suggest that this is  systematically  so. Its formal  agenda 
setting power is weak and frequently  shared with other ac-
tors, and little is known  about its ability  to use informal 
means of influence.
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3.3 The Commission and the joint-decision mode
One of  the central  functions of the Commission in  the politi-
cal  system  of the EU is initiating  legislation. In  the majority 
of policy areas within EU competences (and all those rele-
vant to this  study), the Commission has a monopoly on legis-
lative proposals (cf. Diedrichs and Wessels  2006: 222). For-
mally, a refusal  of the Commission to issue a legislative pro-
posal would preclude the EU’s legislative bodies from  becom-
ing active. In  practice, the Commission typically responds to 
other institutions’ requests for  legislative proposals (cf. Die-
drichs and Wessels 2006: 221). Barring unexpected events or 
crises, the Commission follows a  medium  term  legislative 
programme that it publishes at the beginning of its term  of 
office. Whereas these programmes are formulated at a  highly 
general  level  of abstraction, outlining broad policy priorities, 
it issues more concrete Annual  Policy Strategies  specifying 
the legislative agenda for  the following year. This  serves as a 
basis for  inter-institutional debate, as the result of which  the 
Commission publishes a detailed annual  Work Programme, 
listing specific decisions and legislative proposals the Com-
mission  intends to pursue (cf. Craig  and de Búrca 2011: 145). 
The concrete origins of policy  priorities and initiatives are 
not always  easy  to identify. At all  stages throughout the 
preparation and formulation of  policy  initiatives the Com-
mission  closely cooperates with  other actors in the political 
system  of the EU, including both  formal  institutions like the 
Parliament, the Council  and the European  Council, and eco-
nomic and social interest groups providing expertise and 
seeking influence over the policy  agenda. In many  instances, 
detailed requests for policy initiatives are formulated by the 
European Council  in  its  Presidency  Conclusions, especially 
when responding to unexpected events  and crises. The Coun-
cil operates numerous expert groups exercising  exploratory 
functions in  parallel  to similar groups under Commission 
supervision (cf. Diedrichs and Wessels 2006: 223). The 
Treaty  of Lisbon  introduces the possibility  of  a citizen’s ini-
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tiative (art. 11(4) TEU), albeit with significant  constraints. 
Part of the legislative agenda  is moreover made up by  man-
datory  revisions of existing  legislation. In effect, Commission 
data suggests  that  less than 10 percent of  all  legislative pro-
posals emanate from genuine Commission initiative (cf. Die-
drichs and Wessels 2006: 223). The reliability  of  such data  is 
unclear, as the Commission  has strategic incentives to down-
play  its entrepreneurial role in order to safeguard its percep-
tion  as an ‘honest broker’. Nonetheless, it is  obvious that pol-
icy initiatives  originate in  multiple fora and take account of  a 
multitude of interests. However, despite this multitude of 
channels, the concrete formulation  of specific legislative pro-
posals leaves plenty  of space for inter-institutional  contesta-
tion.
The formulation of  an individual legislative proposal is typi-
cally assigned to the sectoral DG that  is most closely aligned 
with  the matter  at hand. The DG in turn designates a ‘rap-
porteur’ as lead author who formulates a draft, consulting, 
where applicable, with  other DGs if cross-cutting  issues are 
involved (and they  often are). Whereas this horizontal coor-
dination of  legislative proposals has long been  practiced in  a 
rather haphazard fashion, recent reforms of the process 
within  the Commission  have introduced mandatory  cross-
sectional coordination  in  many areas, with the Secretariat 
General  in the enforcing position  (cf. Hartlapp 2011: 187). 
Other  DGs then have the opportunity  to demand changes to 
the draft or  to express their  opposition  to the proposal. All 
proposals  moreover have to pass the muster of  the Commis-
sion’s Legal  Service, which  assesses each  draft’s vulnerability 
to legal challenge. Following this technical  stage, the pro-
posal is passed upwards to the political level  of the Commis-
sioners and their cabinets, where it proceeds through  the 
weekly meetings of the responsible members of  the Cabinets, 
the Heads of Cabinet, and, finally, the College of Commis-
sioners, which  ultimately decides  by a  majority of its  mem-
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bers. In practice, most decisions in the College are reached 
by  consensus. While the College has to formally  endorse all 
legislative proposals, agreement is  in  most cases  reached at 
an earlier stage in the process. Since 1994, only  between 13 
and 18 percent of proposals were discussed in the College (cf. 
Hartlapp 2011: 187). 
Besides mandating  increased horizontal  coordination be-
tween DGs, recent reforms have introduced a number  of 
measures to this process  to increase the quality  of  Commis-
sion  proposals as part of  its ‘better  regulation’ approach. An 
important innovation  has been  the introduction  of manda-
tory  ‘impact assessment’, which outlines the likely impact of 
the proposed piece of  legislation with regard to environ-
mental, economic and social  matters. As these procedures 
are coordinated by  the Secretariat General, the reforms have 
reinforced its position  as an  important actor in the formula-
tion  of  legislative initiatives (cf. Hartlapp, Metz et al. 2010: 
13-14).
Literature analyzing  the Commission’s position in  legislative 
processes has focused on its  power to set  the agenda. While, 
as I have shown above, many of the EU’s policy  priorities 
originate from  other sources, the legislative process grants 
the Commission  significant room for maneuver  in formulat-
ing the precise content of legislation. The Commission’s mo-
nopoly on  legislative initiatives is crucial: “When  the setter 
has monopoly power, voters are forced to choose between the 
setter's proposal  and the status quo or fall-back position” 
(Romer and Rosenthal  1978: 27-28). The extent of the Com-
mission’s ability to influence legislative outcomes is depend-
ent on  two factors in particular: the distribution of  prefer-
ences (vis-à-vis the status quo) among the actors involved, 
and the legislative procedures prescribed by  the Treaties. The 
impact of  these factors on  the Commission’s agenda setting 
position is  best  demonstrated by  a starkly simplified model 
of the legislative process (figure 3.2; cf. Tsebelis and Garrett 
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2000: 15; Hix and Høyland 2010: 70). Consider a  policy area 
located on an economic left-right dimension (say, regulation 
of chemicals, or the access of  migrant  workers to social  secu-
rity benefits). The points on  the scale represent the ideal 
points for new legislation  (assumed to be exogenously given) 
of each of the actors involved. This model  assumes an envi-
ronment of perfect information, meaning  that all  actors 
know the preferences of the other  actors  involved as well  as 
the location of the status  quo (cf. Romer  and Rosenthal 1978: 
28).15  The position  of the Council  is  disaggregated into the 
individual  positions  of its members  (for ease of presentation, 
reduced to seven  members with equal  voting rights: M1-M7). 
SQ represents the status quo. All  actors prefer new legisla-
tion  to the status quo, but differ as to the extent of desired 
reform.16  It is the sole prerogative of the Commission  to in-
troduce a  piece of  legislation. It is in  its interest  to place it 
strategically  so that  the outcome will  be as close to its ideal 
point as  possible. Given  the depicted constellation of  prefer-
ences, its  ability  to do so depends on the legislative proce-
dure specifying veto players and voting thresholds. 
In  its earliest form, legislation was passed without  substan-
tial involvement of the European  Parliament. Procedural 
rules  merely  required consultation, giving the EP nothing but 
the power  to delay legislation (and only so after  the Euro-
pean  Court of Justice decided that legislation  would be inva-
lid unless the EP  had given its opinion, Case 179/80, ECR 
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15 This of course is a very unrealistic assumption. Under perfect information, 
all actors would anticipate the other actors’ actions – legislative proposals 
would always represent the single possible outcome of the process and 
would be adopted at first reading.
16 Other demonstrations often represent the Commission and the European 
Parliament as preference outliers, typically because the dominant policy 
dimension is assumed to be ‘more integration’ or less. When looking at day-
to-day politics, however, more traditional left-right dimensions appear more 
relevant and it is reasonable to assume that Commission and EP pursue 
more centrist and potentially conflicting goals (cf. the ‘regulation scenario’ 
in Tsebelis and Garrett 2000: 30-31). 
1982: 3623). If Treaty rules  stipulate the Council to decide 
unanimously, the Commission could expect the passage of a 
proposal  at point U, the most ‘progressive’ point (in relation 
to the status  quo) that the most ‘conservative’ veto player, 
M1, would accept vis-à-vis the status quo (cf. Hix  and Høy-
land 2010: 70).17 
Figure 3.2 Agenda setting in EU legislation
If Treaty rules  stipulate a  vote by qualitative majority  (here 
simply  defined as 5 out of 7), the Council  still  has the possi-
bility  to alter the Commission  proposal, but only  unani-
mously so. In  this case the Commission  could expect the pas-
sage of  a proposal  at point  Q, given that the pivotal  member 
of the Council  for a qualitative majority vote, M3, would ac-
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17 Such spatial models of policy-making typically assume ‘circular’  (‘Euclid-
ean’) preferences, meaning that M1 is indifferent to which direction the 
status quo deviates from its ideal point, as long as policy change does not 
move it further away. This, also, is not always a realistic assumption. 
cept any  point between Q and U, which would be the out-
come of a  unanimous vote (cf. Tsebelis and Garrett 2000: 
18). 
Things again change when the EP becomes more than just a 
bystander  in  legislative proceedings. The first procedure to 
allow for  more EP involvement was the so-called cooperation 
procedure which  was introduced with the Single European 
Act and used for most legislation relating  to the Single Mar-
ket programme. Here, the Parliament still  did not constitute 
a veto player  in  the process, but could impose costs on  the 
Council  when  ignoring  its opposition (George Tsebelis there-
fore talks of the EP as  a  "conditional agenda setter" under 
cooperation, cf. Tsebelis 1994). Most importantly, if the EP 
disagreed with  the Commission  proposal, the Council  could 
only override this opposition by a unanimous vote, depriving 
the Commission  of much of  its agenda setting power. In or-
der  not to trigger  such EP opposition, the Commission  could 
then introduce a proposal  at point  CP, as this is  the most 
‘progressive’ point the EP (or rather, the median voter  in  the 
EP) would accept over  U, the default outcome of a unani-
mous vote. 
The Single European Act  also introduced the assent (now 
referred to as consent) procedure, which  was less  frequently 
used but elevated the Parliament to a  veto player  position. 
The procedure is similar to the cooperation procedure except 
that the EP  now has  the power  to reject the Commission pro-
posal without the possibility  of a  Council  override.18  Moreo-
ver, the Council  cannot alter  the proposal  once adopted by 
the Parliament (cf. Hix  2010: 70-71). Here, the Commission 
could expect the passage of a  proposal  at point A, as this  is 
the most ‘progressive’ point the EP will  accept over the status 
quo that will also be supported by a  qualitative majority in 
the Council. 
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18  In many instances, predominantly in areas outside the internal market, 
the assent procedure does not give the Commission a monopoly of legislative 
initiative, in which case the present model is not applicable. 
The European  Parliament moved towards becoming an equal 
legislator  with  the introduction  of the co-decision  procedure 
in  the Treaty  of Maastricht. Here, if  disagreement between 
the Council  and the EP  about a Commission  proposal per-
sisted beyond the second reading, a  conciliation  committee 
consisting  of  an  equal number of members of  the Council 
and the Parliament would convene to reach  a  solution. Under 
the Maastricht rules, in the event of no agreement in  con-
ciliation, the Council  could still  unilaterally  present, by quali-
tative majority, a final  proposal  that the EP could either 
adopt or reject by an  absolute majority (which, due to high 
absenteeism in the Parliament, amounts to a significant su-
permajority, cf. Tsebelis and Garrett 2000: 29). In  effect, at 
this stage of the procedure the initial  Commission  proposal 
had become irrelevant  and the ‘endgame’ consisted of  the 
Council  acting as agenda setter  and the EP acting  as veto 
player (cf. Tsebelis and Garrett 2000: 23; Hix  and Høyland 
2010: 72). Stripped of its agenda  setting power, a rational, 
strategic and omniscient Commission  could therefore only 
expect a proposal  to be accepted in  the vicinity of  M3, which 
is the point that  the Council  as agenda setter, voting by quali-
tative majority, and the EP  would agree on  without Commis-
sion involvement. 
The Treaty  of  Amsterdam revised the co-decision procedure 
to eliminate the final stage, partly  due to the fact that the EP 
had adopted a strategy  of systematically refusing all subse-
quent Council  proposals if the conciliation  committee had 
not reached a  common position, regardless  of policy content 
(cf. Tsebelis  and Garrett 2000: 24). Both  Council  and EP 
now vote on  the text produced by the conciliation committee. 
If the committee fails  to produce a  text, the legislation fails. 
The Treaty  of  Lisbon has  codified this procedure as the Un-
ion’s ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’ (art. 294 TFEU).19 Un-
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19  The Lisbon Treaty slightly but not insignificantly changed this procedure 
by lowering the voting threshold in the Parliament for adopting the outcome 
of the conciliation committee from an absolute to a simple majority.
der  this procedure, the Commission can expect a proposal  to 
pass at a point somewhere between   the pivotal  member of 
the Council  (M3) and the EP, depending on the bargaining 
dynamics between the EP and Council  delegations. Since the 
Commission is present as an arbitrator in  the conciliation 
process, it is reasonable to expect an outcome somewhere in 
the centre (cf. Diedrichs  and Wessels 2006: 227). While the 
EP  has now emerged as a truly co-equal  legislator, and the 
Conciliation  Committee as the final  agenda setter, the Com-
mission’s ability  to influence policy content remains signifi-
cantly curtailed (cf. Tsebelis and Garrett 2000: 23-24). 
The model  obviously  excludes large chunks of  the empirical 
reality of EU legislative decision-making in  general, and by 
choice does not  capture the full  complexity  of agenda  setting 
in  particular. Beyond formal  powers to introduce a  specific 
piece of  legislation, ‘political  entrepreneurship’ involves a 
much more informal  rallying  of  support behind a  particular 
initiative – including questions of issue framing, focal points 
and advocacy  coalitions – that can be exercised by  actors not 
formally present in the decision-making  process (cf. Pollack 
2003: 50-51). When  it comes to the Commission, the model 
omits  informal  processes of consensus building that take 
place outside the legally  mandated procedure, such as the 
trilogues between  the Commission, the Council  and the Par-
liament to secure an early  adoption of  legislative proposals 
(cf. Diedrichs and Wessels 2006: 227; Chalmers, Davies  et al. 
2010: 108-109; Hix  and Høyland 2010: 73), or the protracted 
power-games and inter-institutional  conflicts  surrounding 
the choice of  legal basis  for a  legislative act (where, again, the 
Commission enjoys certain agenda setting powers) (cf. Brad-
ley  2011). However, reducing empirical  complexity is the 
principal  advantage of the agenda  setter model, assuming 
that all other  factors do not vary  systematically  with the final 
outcome. As such, it is able to demonstrate the systematic 
constraints on the Commission’s influence on policy out-
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comes in legislative procedures. The simplified model  pre-
dicts  substantial  variation in the Commission’s ability  to ex-
ert such influence. In  the constellation  depicted above, the 
outcome ranges from close to the status quo (U) to close to 
the Commission’s ‘progressive’ preferences (Q). Naturally, all 
of these predicted outcomes depend on  the accuracy of the 
constellation of  actor  preferences, which  has to be empiri-
cally established. 
Empirical  applications have at least corroborated the under-
lying  assumptions about the individual actors’ ability  to in-
fluence the outcomes. Thus, the move from consultation to 
cooperation  and codecision  has indeed led to a growing  im-
portance of EP positions in EU legislation  (cf. Steunenberg 
and Selck 2006: 81). Simultaneously, studies have pointed to 
a gradual weakening  of  the Commission’s influence (cf. 
Shackleton  2000: 336; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000: 34; Pol-
lack 2003: 228; Young 2010: 60).
Summary
To summarise, it is important to keep in mind that “the 
proximate causes of agreement and disagreement are specific 
constellations of actor preferences” (Scharpf 2011: 223). If 
there is  no ‘win-set’ among  the veto-players, the Commission 
will  not be able to propose successful  legislation at all. If it 
prefers the status  quo to the possible outcomes of legislation, 
it might attempt to stall  the process even  when  it is asked to 
produce a  proposal. But while the potential  outcome of legis-
lation  changes with  the distribution of ideal  points among 
the central  actors, the degree of influence of the Commission 
over the outcome remains  constant within the respective 
decision-making procedures. This capacity  is, all  else equal, 
greatest in policy areas  where majority voting applies, since it 
is more costly for the Council  to amend a Commission pro-
posal than  to adopt it  (cf. Lindberg 1963: 32; Schmidt 2000: 
38). Rather than having  to account for the preferences of  the 
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most status quo oriented members in  the Council, the Com-
mission  merely  has to respect the preferences of the pivotal 
members (cf. Tsebelis and Garrett  2001: 374). While the ex-
pansion of qualified majority  voting thus increased the lee-
way for the Commission in  initiating potentially  successful 
legislation, the concomitant  expansion of  the involvement of 
the European  Parliament in  legislation  has rendered this 
procedure more complicated and curtailed its agenda  setting 
powers to some degree (cf. Tsebelis and Garrett  2001: 374). 
The introduction of co-decision further amplified this trend 
(Tsebelis, Jensen et al. 2001). 
3.4 The Commission and the supranational-
hierarchical mode
The defining  characteristic of  the supranational-hierarchical 
mode is  the fact that policy  can be made without the in-
volvement of  the EU’s  legislative bodies – the Council  and 
the European  Parliament (cf. Scharpf  2006: 851). The Com-
mission  has access to several  strategies within this mode 
which  can  be described as judicial  and executive in character. 
Among the judicial  strategies, the Commission can initiate 
infringement proceedings against a member  state for failing 
to conform  with legal  obligations, or initiate action for  an-
nulment or  failure to act against  other Union institutions 
where they  have acted outside their  competences, neglected 
procedural obligations or  failed to act where they  would have 
been legally  obliged to.20 Moreover, the Commission has the 
ability  to intervene in judicial  proceedings that have been 
referred from national  courts  to the Court of  Justice by lodg-
ing an ‘observation’ – a  brief  outlining  its  position on the 
case at  hand. While such observations can prove important 
tools to influence legal  developments, the Commission has 
no control over the timing of such cases or their  occurrence 
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20 Actions for annulment and failure to act can also be brought against the 
Commission, but this is not of interest in this context. 
in  the first place. Finally, the Commission has  executive 
policy-making authority  in the field of  competition policy, 
and in areas where Council  and EP confer such  powers  via 
secondary legislation.
Infringement proceedings
The traditional  view of the Commission as the ‘guardian of 
the Treaties’ sees the Commission  watching over policy  im-
plementation in  the member states, intervening where it sees 
deficiencies or  outright defects and initiating judicial  pro-
ceedings where the defendant member state does not take 
action to remove the aberration  (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 
2010: 318). The relevant rules for this ‘infringement proce-
dure’, as laid down in  article 258 TFEU, stipulate close inter-
action in  multiple formal  and informal  stages between the 
Commission and the member state accused of the infringe-
ment, with the ruling by the Court as a form  of  ‘last resort’ 
(cf. Craig and de Búrca 2011: 414). 
There are two central channels through which the Commis-
sion  can  become aware of alleged infringements: proceedings 
are either  initiated on  account of monitoring activities by  the 
Commission itself, or  on account of complaints by  citizens, 
MEPs or  the European Ombudsman, through either  a spe-
cialised complaint procedure (cf. COM 2002/141) or relayed 
from  the European  Parliament’s Petitions Committee. In 
light of the Commission’s limited resources, the latter proce-
dure is  an invaluable tool  for the detection of  possible cases 
for  litigation  (cf. Smith 2010: 97; Craig  and de Búrca 2011: 
410). Although the proportion of complaints as a basis for  
infringement procedures varies (Harlow and Rawlings 2006: 
465; cf. Smith 2010: 8), when disregarding the numerous 
cases that are routinely  initiated purely  on account of a  fail-
ure by a  member  state to notify the transposition  of a  direc-
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tive21, the importance of individual complaints in non-trivial 
cases cannot be overstated (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 
333). Until  quite recently, the Commission did not system-
atically  differentiate between cases  pursued on  its  own initia-
tive or following a  third party complaint. This changed with 
the Commission Communication  “A Europe of  Results – Ap-
plying Community Law” (COM 2007/502), which  introduced 
a reform  of its enforcement strategy  following  complaints 
from  both  the European Ombudsman and the European Par-
liament about its  inconsistent handling of individual  com-
plaints (cf. Prete and Smulders 2010: 57). According to this 
new procedure, currently  tested as a pilot scheme in  eighteen 
member states (COM 2011/588: 8), individual  complaints 
are subject to a mechanism of mediation between  the com-
plainant and the alleged perpetrator, under  the supervision 
of the Commission.22  Only  if no solution  is reached in this 
form  of dispute resolution  will  the Commission initiate the 
infringement procedure proper.
Formally, the subject of an infringement procedure is the 
failure of a “member state” to fulfill  an  obligation  under the 
Treaties (art. 258-260 TFEU). In practice, the Commission 
brings such  actions against the central  government, even 
where the infringement originates in a law or administrative 
practice carried out by a public institution  that is formally 
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21  The Commission supervises a notification database as a monitoring tool 
and has routinely pursued infringement proceedings in cases of non-
notification since 1989 (cf. Craig and de Búrca 2011: 418). In 2010, non-
notification cases accounted for 22% of all open infringement procedures 
(COM 2011/588: 3). 
22  In its first evaluation of the pilot scheme (Cf. COM 2010/70), as well as 
the most recent Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law 
(COM 2011/588), the Commission indicated that it plans to use this system 
more generally for the informal stage of investigations before the issue of the 
letter of formal notice, even where the origin is its own initiative. It has in 
part commenced to to do so, with the unfortunate side effect that statistics 
on infringement cases are no longer comparable to previous years (cf. Smith 
2010: 154).
independent of  that government, such  as sub-national  units 
or the legal  system (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 327). In 
general, the Commission can  only  prosecute an infringement 
if a  national law conflicts  with EU law or an  administrative 
practice constitutes a  general  and consistent breach  of obli-
gations. That is, specific cases of individual  infringements are 
generally  not subject to enforcement actions, but there are 
significant exceptions to this  rule, specifically where there 
are civil  liberties  at issue (as  for example in the case of  depor-
tations) or significant economic resources (as  in the case of 
public tenders) (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 319). The 
Commission can  bring  cases even  where the defendant 
member state has  remedied the infringement after  the expi-
ration  of the deadline set by  the Commission (cf. Craig and 
de Búrca 2011: 422), or  where the practical  impact of  the in-
fringement is negligible (cf. Prete and Smulders 2010: 17). 
The first (exploratory) stage in  the infringement procedure is 
an informal letter from the Commission to the member  state 
in  question, stating the details of the alleged infringement. 
The member  state then has the opportunity  to respond. 
Around 70% of all proceedings are concluded at this early 
stage (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 333). The remainder 
of unresolved disputes then progresses to the formal  ‘admin-
istrative’ stage, where the Commission  issues a ‘letter of for-
mal  notice’, containing  all  legal  complaints relevant to the 
member states’s breach of obligation (cf. Chalmers, Davies et 
al. 2010: 335). Another exchange of observations between 
the Commission  and the member  state government ensues 
and the procedure may again  be terminated upon  agreement. 
About 85% of infringement proceedings do not progress be-
yond this  stage (COM 2007/502: 5). If  the dispute still  exists, 
the Commission  then  issues a ‘reasoned opinion’, essentially 
a more detailed version  of the previous letter  (cf. Chalmers, 
Davies et al. 2010: 336). Should the member state – in  the 
Commission’s judgement – still  not comply with  the de-
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mands specified in the reasoned opinion, the Commission 
can  take the case before the Court of Justice. Less than 10% 
of all  proceedings reach this stage (COM 2007/502: 5). 
Chalmers, Davies et al. therefore describe the infringement 
procedure as essentially “an  administrative process, with ju-
dicial  proceedings predominantly acting as  a backdrop to 
structure the negotiations between  the Commission and the 
Member States” (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 339). The 
‘shadow of the law’ is  thus a significant lever in Commission 
bargaining  strategies, without posing a significant constraint 
on its discretion  (cf. Rawlings 2000: 10). In  case the Court of 
Justice holds  against the member  state, the state is  “required 
to take the necessary  measures to comply with  the judgement 
of the Court” (art. 260(1) TFEU). Until  the Treaty of Maas-
tricht, a failure of  a member  state to do so would have trig-
gered another  infringement procedure, potentially drawing 
the process  ad infinitum. In  a significant step to reinforce the 
enforcement of legal  obligations, the member states at Maas-
tricht decided to introduce potential  sanctions for  the failure 
to comply  with a  Court judgement, allowing the Court (based 
on a Commission  recommendation) to impose a  lump sum 
and/or  penalty  payment to be paid by  the member state 
should the Court, by  way  of a second infringement proce-
dure, find that the member state has failed to comply with 
the initial  judgement. The Treaty of Lisbon  in turn has  sig-
nificantly  truncated this double infringement procedure, re-
ducing the amount of stages in  the second proceedings (art. 
260(2) TFEU) and enabling the Commission  to specify  a 
lump sum and/or penalty  payment the first time around 
when the infringement in question  is a  failure by  a member 
state to notify  the transposition  of  a directive (art. 260(3) 
TFEU) (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 344). 
As can  be gleaned from this overview, the completion  of the 
infringement procedure in its  entirety  usually constitutes a 
time-consuming process, the average procedure taking  about 
four years  from  the first informal  letter to the referral  to the 
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Court, should the procedure go this far (COM 2007/502: 
5).23 This is substantial, especially  when  compared with the 
average length of the legislative process, which  Thomas 
König reports to have been  about 140 days in  the late 1990s 
(cf. König 2007: 427). The Commission’s  addition  of meas-
ures towards alternative dispute resolution in the case of  in-
dividual  complaints  will  do nothing  to speed it up and has 
been extensively  criticised as potentially  inducing “complaint 
fatigue” (cf. Smith 2010: 156), giving member states the op-
portunity  to draw out the process and causing  individual 
complainants  to simply  give up.24 While the Commission  jus-
tifies the pilot scheme as  introducing a  framework “operating 
at the point closest to the citizen” (COM 2007/502: 8), there 
may  be another reason for the introduction of this measure. 
The new procedure essentially  retains the advantages of the 
complaint procedure for the Commission (i.e., information 
about infringements it  might wish  to pursue) while reducing 
pressure to litigate where it does not prefer to do so (cf. 
Rawlings 2000: 5; Smith  2010: 157). This in  effect expands 
the Commission’s already  extensive leeway in deciding  which 
cases to pursue. The Commission  has successfully defended 
this discretion in  the face of various legal  challenges.25  The 
Court of Justice has repeatedly  supported the Commission’s 
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23  Since many cases are concluded before this stage, the Commission states 
the average duration of an infringement procedure as 26 months (COM 
2007/502: 5). Note that this does not include the duration of the potential 
Court case.
24 Melanie Smith’s book on the centralised enforcement of EU law is fiercely 
critical of the Commission’s use of discretion in infringement proceedings 
following individual complaints, holding the Commission to account on its 
own standards of ‘good governance’ that, in her argument, are hardly met in 
practice (cf. Smith 2010: 115).
25  As a response to criticism by the European Ombudsman about its han-
dling of individual complaints, the Commission has issued a number of ad-
ministrative guidelines (cf. COM 2002/141). These do not impinge on its 
discretion, but allow for somewhat greater transparency and mandate a 
response to the individual complainant, including a notification when the 
Commission decides not to pursue a complaint (cf. Harlow and Rawlings 
2006: 466-468).
position that  it is  under  no obligation to pursue an  infringe-
ment, even where a member state’s breach of  obligations 
may  be obvious, and retains the right to terminate the proce-
dure at any  point regardless of  the member state’s compli-
ance with  its demands (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 341-
342; Craig and de Búrca  2011: 415). There are therefore no 
legal  administrative boundaries to the Commission’s ability 
to employ  the infringement procedure strategically (cf. Sny-
der  1993: 30; Smith  2010: 47; Craig and de Búrca 2011: 415). 
Unbound by  legal constraints, it is free to take into account 
all  kinds of  considerations when enforcing the implementa-
tion  of  Union  law: “In the context of the balance of powers 
between the institutions laid down  in the Treaty, it  is not  for 
the Court to consider  what  objectives are pursued in an  ac-
tion  brought under Article 169 of the Treaty [now art. 258 
TFEU]” (Case 416/85, ECR  1988: 3151). This  includes a se-
lective focus on particular policy areas or political  priorities 
(cf. Smith 2010: 115).  
In  parallel  to the defense of  its discretion which  cases to pur-
sue, the Commission is equally reluctant to reveal much  in-
formation about its internal  procedures regarding infringe-
ment cases. Internal  handbooks and codes of  conduct are not 
publicly available, not even, apparently, to the European Par-
liament (cf. Smith  2010: 147). Both the Secretariat  General 
and the Legal  Service have units  dedicated to the application 
of EU law and infringements. Otherwise, there appears to be 
considerable variation  across DGs in  the handling of in-
fringement cases. Judging  from organisational  charts and 
directories, some DGs have specialised units  dedicated to 
this purpose (DGs Agriculture, Competition, Enterprise, 
Transport, Environment, Taxation, Budget, and Education 
and Culture) while others spread this task across units (DG 
Internal  Market for example has several infringement coor-
dinators). 
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From the point of  initiation, the progress of individual  cases 
was until quite recently  subject to quarterly  reports compiled 
by  the Secretariat General, which in  turn formed the basis of 
quarterly  discussions by the College in specialised infringe-
ment meetings, with  significant influence of the Commis-
sion’s Legal Service, who retained a  coherent picture of  all 
cases under review (cf. Smith  2010: 99).  The only  notable 
exception  to this procedure were state aid cases, which  were 
fast-tracked through the regular meetings of the Commis-
sioners (cf. Smith 2010: 100). A  decision  by the College is 
necessary  in all  stages  of  the procedure, deciding by the usual 
majority  of its members. Since the late 1990s the Commis-
sion  has streamlined internal  procedures regarding  in-
fringements, reducing considerably the time lag  in  internal 
coordination  and between Commission  decisions and their 
communication to member states, and consequently the 
length of the procedure in  its  entirety. In  2008, the Commis-
sion  moreover increased the frequency of College meetings 
devoted to infringement cases. These now take place on a 
monthly basis (cf. Smith  2010: 100-104). In addition, the 
Commission now holds biannual “coherence review meet-
ings” which, chaired by  the Legal  Service, provide an  over-
view about the progress of all  pending cases (cf. Prete and 
Smulders 2010: 58). Once a case reaches the Court of Justice, 
the Commission’s position  is represented by the Legal Serv-
ice. 
 
While only  a small  minority of all  infringement proceedings 
actually  reach  the Court of  Justice, the number of cases  de-
cided by the Court under this procedure is nonetheless not 
trivial, and their  substance is  not restricted to technical  ques-
tions of policy  implementation. Where infringements con-
cern undisputed aspects of EU policies, or  implementation 
problems of  an  uncontroversial  nature, procedures will  be 
settled at an early stage. The fact that a case progresses to the 
judicial  stage indicates a substantial  amount of conflict (cf. 
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Rawlings 2000: 10). Far  from merely  technical, infringement 
cases can  therefore constitute “a  power struggle between  the 
Commission and a powerful  Member  State over  Treaty com-
petences or  other  disagreement over  interpretation that ef-
fectively  demands a  judicial  resolution” (Harlow and Rawl-
ings 2006: 453). Many of the substantive questions  decided 
by  the Court are in fact about the proper  interpretation of 
policy as set in either  secondary  law as legislation  or the pri-
mary  Treaty  basis, and they can yield wide-ranging  implica-
tions: “In this context, it should not come as a surprise that 
the Commission  has, at times, used infringement proceed-
ings as one of  the means to encourage and stimulate a pro-
gressive evolution  of Community  laws and policies in certain 
areas” (cf. Prete and Smulders 2010: 14). The Commission 
itself has not been shy about admitting  this strategy: “Article 
169 of  the EEC Treaty  [governing enforcement action] is now 
an instrument for  the achievement of  a  policy, and not solely 
an essential legal instrument”  (OJ 1988, No. C 310/6).
Action for annulment and failure to act
The corollary  to infringement proceedings, where the Com-
mission  prosecutes member states  for  failure to meet legal 
obligations, are proceedings aimed at reviewing the legality 
of acts (or  non-action) of EU institutions. The corresponding 
procedures are described in  articles 263 TFEU and 265 
TFEU, and referred to as  ‘actions for  annulment’ and ‘actions 
for  failure to act’ respectively. The Commission is listed as a 
privileged applicant in  both procedures, meaning that it can 
bring  cases against other EU institutions  even where its  own 
privileges are not at issue (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 
413-414; Craig and de Búrca 2011: 490). Reviewable in an-
nulment proceedings are all legal  acts  of the Council, the 
Commission, and the European  Central  Bank as well  as those 
acts of the European  Council, the European Parliament and 
other EU bodies, offices or agencies  “intended to produce 
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legal  effects  vis-à-vis third parties”  (art. 263(1) TFEU).26 In  a 
similar  fashion, actions for failure to act review the legality  of 
the non-action  of  EU institutions where such action had been 
legally  mandated. Annulment cases can  be lodged with  the 
Court immediately, whereas an  action for  failure to act re-
quires the applicant to call  upon  the defendant to act. Only  if 
the defendant fails to do so within  a two month period can 
the matter be referred to the Court (art. 265(2) TFEU). 
While procedures for  annulment and failure to act constitute 
a significant part of the Court of Justice’s overall caseload, 
only a fraction  of these are initiated by the Commission. The 
most  common  of  such cases  are conflicts about the proper 
legal  basis for acts of secondary law. Where there is room for 
discretion, the Commission  frequently chooses as legal basis 
for  its own acts, or pieces of  legislation it initiates, those 
permitting for the greatest Commission  influence over the 
outcome. In most cases the conflict is with  the Council, 
where the Commission proposes a procedure requiring quali-
tative majority  voting, whereas the Council  prefers unanim-
ity. The Commission also brings actions for annulment where 
it finds that its legislative proposals have been  amended con-
trary  to its  preferences, or where its prerogatives in  policy-
making procedures have otherwise been  impinged upon. An-
nulment procedures initiated by the Commission  regularly 
make up less than 2 percent of the Court’s caseload, and are 
therefore negligible as a general policy tool. 
Preliminary references
Infringement procedures  and actions for  annulment or fail-
ure to act together regularly make up more than half  of  the 
Court of Justice’s caseload at any given  time. The other  part, 
evidently  a significant number, are preliminary references 
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26 Judicial review of legal acts of the European Council, as well as the explicit 
mention of other EU bodies, offices and agencies, are an innovation intro-
duced with the Treaty of Lisbon. 
from  national  courts, asking  the Court of Justice for an inter-
pretation  of a  piece of EU law that it deems relevant to the 
case at hand. The Commission  invariably intervenes in such 
cases following a  procedure I will  describe below. Prelimi-
nary references originate where an individual  questions  the 
legality  of  an act of  a member  state institution in a  national 
court on  the grounds of a  possible conflict with  EU law, pri-
mary  or  secondary. Whereas the Court of Justice’s interpre-
tation is authoritative, national  courts are responsible for  the 
final  judgement. In  practice, the ruling  of  the Court of Justice 
is often so closely addressed to the case at hand that the re-
ferring court will  have little discretion (cf. Craig and de Búrca 
2011: 474). Nonetheless, the fact that it is the national court 
which  issues the final  ruling greatly  enhances its  impact, as 
institutions of the national political  system tend to be far 
more reluctant to ignore a ruling by a  national  court than a 
European one. 
The system of judicial  procedures provided for by  the Trea-
ties seems to suggest that infringement proceedings brought 
by  the Commission are designed to address general  and sys-
tematic breaches of  EU law, whereas the preliminary  ruling 
procedure opens a  path  for localised and specific grievances 
to be addressed by the Court of Justice in order to achieve 
individual  justice. As has been  shown  above, however, the 
Commission does not refrain from addressing individual 
cases of non-compliance, and with regard to preliminary  rul-
ings Paul Craig  and Gráinne de Búrca argue that: “Despite 
the attempts to maintain  a clear  distinction between  the out-
come of a preliminary ruling and an  enforcement action  [i.e. 
an infringement procedure], however, it is abundantly  evi-
dent that the ECJ in the context of its preliminary rulings 
interpretative jurisdiction often effectively declares that a 
Member State is  in breach  of  EU law, leaving little scope for a 
different conclusion  on the part of the referring  domestic 
court” (Craig  and de Búrca 2011: 414). In principle, prelimi-
nary rulings can also challenge the legality of an EU legal  act 
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upon  which  a  national implementing act is based. This  in 
effect presents an  opportunity  for judicial  review that  is oth-
erwise precluded by the restrictive rules of  standing  for natu-
ral  and legal  persons in annulment actions  (cf. Chalmers, 
Davies et al. 2010: 159). The majority of  preliminary refer-
ences, however, concern  the legality  of acts  at the member 
state level. 
Judgements  of  the Court of  Justice in  preliminary reference 
procedures have authoritative effect in  all  member  state legal 
orders, regardless of  the origin of the reference – indeed one 
of the rationales behind the procedure is the uniform  appli-
cation of EU law in national  courts (cf. Chalmers, Davies  et 
al. 2010: 160). Moreover, the ostensibly arcane subject mat-
ter of a particular case does  not preclude the Court from pro-
pounding far  reaching  legal principles. Thus, a dispute about 
a Dutch tariff  classification for urea-formaldehyde in  Van 
Gend en Loos (Case 26/62, ECR 19963: 1) led to the Court’s 
establishment of the direct effect of  EU law. Many  of  the 
Court of  Justice’s  seminal  rulings sprang from  preliminary 
references, first  and foremost Van Gend en Loos  and Costa v 
ENEL (Case 6/64, ECR 1964: 587), establishing the suprem-
acy  of  EU law over  national  law (cf. Craig and de Búrca  2011: 
442). 
The Commission’s role in preliminary reference procedures 
is more limited than in direct  actions (infringements, annul-
ments and actions for  failure to act). It  would however be a 
mistake to conclude that since it  is  not an  official  party  to the 
proceedings, it cannot have an impact. As in other proceed-
ings it is  not formally a  part of, article 23 of  the Statute of  the 
Court of Justice allows the Commission to lodge ‘observa-
tions’ in  preliminary reference procedures. The Commission 
is the only EU institution  that regularly  makes use of  this 
possibility. In  fact, it lodges observations  in  all preliminary 
reference procedures. Member states have the same preroga-
tive, but only intermittently do so, and mostly  when  refer-
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ences originate within  their own legal system. Where they  do, 
such  proceedings take on  the character of  a  dispute centered 
on an  interpretation of policy  that  goes far  beyond the indi-
vidual case at hand (cf. de la  Mare and Donnelly 2011: 380). 
Well argued observations can thus have an impact on the 
judgement, and since rulings have universal  effect and often 
contain far reaching  principles, can  exert a  valuable influence 
on policy  development. In  this vein, both the development of 
direct effect and supremacy of EU law had been  suggested to 
the Court  by Commission lawyers in the respective landmark 
cases (cf. Stein 1981: 24-26). Because of these characteristics, 
such  observations can fruitfully  be compared to ‘amicus cu-
riae’ briefs in the US-American  judicial  system (cf. Spriggs 
and Wahlbeck  1997; Nicholson and Collins 2007; Collins 
2008).
Very  little public information is available as  to the internal 
workings of the Commission  with  regard to the observations 
lodged in  preliminary reference procedures. From  what I 
could learn from an interview with  a Legal Service official 27, 
the formulation of an  intervention  takes place at a  low level 
within  the Commission hierarchy, with mainly  the responsi-
ble Directorate General (DG) and the Legal  Service involved. 
The Legal  Service acts as gatekeeper  in  this context. The 
Court forwards all new cases to the Legal Service, who in 
turn distributes them to the concerned DGs. The DG then 
formulates a legal  opinion  to be lodged before the Court by 
the Legal  Service. This opinion  is usually  drafted at a  low 
level by  the responsible official  assigned to the case, in some 
cases in  consultation with  the respective Head of  Unit. The 
political  level  within  the Commission  (Cabinets and Commis-
sioners) is not formally  involved in  this process. The opinion 
is returned to the Legal  Service, who exclusively handles all 
interaction  with  the Court. While this process mostly  in-
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volves little friction, it is  the Legal  Service who has the final 
say on  legal  interpretations, being able to override DG opin-
ions. This  is particularly relevant in  politically  sensitive 
cases, bearing in  mind that  the Legal Service is formally un-
der the leadership of the Commission president. 
Commission success before the Court
The ability of  the Commission  to influence policy-production 
through  the judicial  system  of course hinges on  its ability  to 
influence the outcomes of Court rulings. Empirical studies  on 
the outcome of proceedings before the Court of Justice have 
repeatedly demonstrated a high rate of success for  the Com-
mission  (cf. Conant 2007: 53). For the case of infringement 
proceedings, Schepel  and Blankenburg comment that “its 
success rate is so high  as to make the ECJ look like a kanga-
roo court  – being the baby in the pouch of the mother, it has 
to follow wherever the Commission  goes”  (Schepel  and 
Blankenburg 2001: 18). Corroborating  this bold statement, 
Tanja Börzel  finds  that between 1978 and 1999, the Commis-
sion  won 95% of  the infringement cases  that reached a ruling 
by  the Court (Börzel  2006: 133). This is certainly  due to the 
Commission’s discretion which cases to pursue, where un-
promising cases are settled before they  reach the Court (cf. 
Ehlermann 1981: 139).28 A  similar success rate, however, ap-
pears to hold for the outcomes  of rulings on  preliminary  ref-
erences (cf. Stone Sweet 2010: 21; Stone Sweet and Brunell 
2012: 212). The Court has been  found to follow the Commis-
sion’s legal  opinion in  a similarly  large majority  of  such cases 
in  constitutional politics (cf. Stein  1981: 25) and the policy 
fields  of  environmental protection (cf. Cichowski 1998: 397) 
and gender equality (cf. Cichowski 2004: 499).
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28  “Die Kommission greift im übrigen nur Fälle auf, in denen ihr das Risiko 
des Unterliegens vor dem Gerichtshof gering erscheint” (Ehlermann 1981: 
139).
This success  is not all  that easy  to explain. Most observers 
point to an  assumed congruity  of  preferences (ostensibly  for 
‘more integration’) between  the Commission and the Court. 
There have been  very  few empirical  tests of  this assumption. 
Unlike in  the judicial  system  of the United States, where an 
extensive literature on judicial  preferences exist, judges at 
the Court of  Justice, as I have mentioned, do not publish 
their ‘votes’, and there are no ‘dissenting  opinions’ to a 
judgement, making it very hard to gauge individual  judges’ 
policy preferences (cf. Stone Sweet 2010: 25; Kelemen and 
Schmidt 2012: 2). Michael  Malecki’s promising attempt to 
disaggregate the Court of Justice’s preferences  by  looking at 
individual  chamber decisions goes some ways  towards  solv-
ing this problem, but the dimension of preferences he analy-
ses is  not  independent of  the Commission. Rather, his point 
of reference is  the ‘pro-Commission’ orientation of the 
judges, used as a  proxy  for ‘pro-integration’. He, too, finds 
evidence that the Commission is much  more successful  than 
other actors before the Court, but the success rate differs 
with  chamber composition: “In  the data at  hand, the most 
‘anti-Commission’ judge signed his name to pro-Commission 
judgements 72 per cent of  the time”  (Malecki 2012: 60). 
While this yields somewhat more nuanced results  as to the 
preferences of  individual  judges, it still  does not tell us if de-
ciding for the Commission is evidence of shared preferences. 
Some explanations for the Commission’s success point to 
processes of socialisation, particularly  in  the early years of 
European integration, where the personnel  of European in-
stitutions  had been recruited from  a  small  elite pool  of indi-
viduals with many  common characteristics. As Antonin Co-
hen’s study of the social  background of European  judges and 
High Authority officials demonstrates, “the members of  the 
early  ECJ had a lot in  common with the members of the High 
Authority  of  the ECSC or the Commission  of  the EEC”  (Co-
hen  2008: 6). Antonio Trabucchi for example, Italian  judge 
from  1962-1972, had previously been director  of the High 
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Authority’s legal  service (cf. Cohen 2008: 7). Karen Alter, 
moreover, points to the establishment of ‘Euro-law’ associa-
tions in  the 1950s and 1960s that promoted a unified view of 
how European legal  integration should proceed, centered on 
the “commitment to the larger objective to European integra-
tion”  (Alter  2009: 66). These associations constituted a 
“largely  homogenous ‘policy community’” of legal  experts 
that were active both  in the Commission and at the Court of 
Justice (Alter 2009: 67-68). 
While these findings are certainly  intriguing for the early  pe-
riod of European integration, this  state of affairs  has seen 
considerable change over time. The increasing prominence of 
EU law in  legal training  has elevated EU lawyers from  the 
margins of the legal  profession; it is consequently  no longer 
accurate to talk of an isolated and like-minded group. Also, 
Cohen’s  study  indicates a countervailing tendency  in the re-
cruitment of  judges and Commission  officials in recent times. 
Whereas Commissioners increasingly  come from  a back-
ground in  high  profile politics, appointments  to the Court 
have increasingly gone to members of academia (cf. Cohen 
2008: 12). Moreover, the argument of ideological  congruity 
becomes even  less straightforward when looking at issues 
that do not fit neatly  in the ‘more or less integration’ spec-
trum. Much internal market regulation cannot easily  be sub-
sumed by  this dichotomy. The bias of many  related Court 
rulings is  towards facilitating internal market transactions 
(as in the case of the expanding logic of ‘mutual recognition’), 
not necessarily  towards  enhancing the powers of suprana-
tional  institutions. Finally, many issues of recent salience do 
not immediately  touch  upon market integration  per se, but 
involve much more nuanced issues of non-discrimination 
and individual rights, such  as the cases  concerning  EU citi-
zenship, gender equality and age discrimination  (cf. Scharpf 
2012: 131-133). 
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Another approach at explaining Commission success is to 
assume strategic behaviour on the part of the Court. In  align-
ing itself with the Commission  position, the Court may ex-
pect a  greater  acceptance and impact on the actual  imple-
mentation  of its  rulings on behalf of  member  state govern-
ments (cf. Stein  1981: 24). The reach of the Commission in 
this regard, however, is limited, and its enforcement powers 
in  turn hinge on its  ability  to resort to Court proceedings. 
This of course leads to a somewhat circular argument. 
With the limited means available to test the assumption of 
congruous preferences, the most promising explanation rests 
on insights derived from  the study  of  judicial  politics in the 
United States that do not take account of the concrete prefer-
ences of  actors involved (cf. Conant 2007: 53). This explana-
tion  focuses on the Commission’s  position  as the single most 
frequent litigator before the Court of  Justice, and the conse-
quent body of expertise the Commission  has amassed over 
time, coupled with  the resources the Commission has at its 
disposal in pursuing legal  action. The ‘Legal  Service’ as the 
Commission’s ‘law firm’ employs roughly 350 staff, many  of 
them legal  experts covering all  policy areas  within  the Com-
mission’s competences. Even where governments  dispose of 
a specialised legal  branch  (such as  the Austrian  ‘Ver-
fassungsdienst’), the Commission outnumbers (in  terms of 
personnel) the resources at the disposal of member states. 
Both expertise (as a function of  the frequency  of litigation) 
and resources have been shown  to be the prime predictors of 
success in court proceedings (cf. McGuire 1998: 522-523). 
Being a frequent and resourceful litigator with  comparatively 
little vested interest  in the immediate outcome of each indi-
vidual case bears another  advantage. Marc Galanter has de-
scribed such  entities as “repeat players” (cf. Galanter 1974: 
97) who enjoy considerable advantages over  those actors that 
rarely  interact with  the court system (so called “one-
shotters”). Repeat players can  pursue decidedly different le-
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gal  strategies than one-shotters: “Because his  stakes in  the 
immediate outcome are high  and because by definition  OS 
[one-shotter] is unconcerned with  the outcome of similar 
litigation in  the future, OS will  have little interest in that 
element of the outcome which  might influence the disposi-
tion  of the decision-maker next time around. For the RP [re-
peat player], on  the other hand, anything that  will favorably 
influence the outcomes of future cases  is a worthwhile result” 
(Galanter 1974: 100). Repeat players can invest their  re-
sources in long term  strategies  that “play for the rules” (Gal-
anter 1974: 103). Lawyers in  particular have been alert to the 
Commission’s potential  to pursue such ‘rule gain’: “By  virtue 
of its position and expertise it is  the ultimate ‘repeat player' 
in  Community litigation. Consequently, the Commission can 
use litigation  as an element in  developing longer-term strate-
gies. Instead of simply  winning individual cases, it is able to 
concentrate on establishing basic principles or  playing for 
the rules” (Snyder 1993: 30-31). Richard Rawlings pursues a 
similar  line of argumentation: “the Commission can seek, via 
‘test-casing’, to establish basic principles and ‘play  for  the 
rules’ ”  (Rawlings 2000: 10). Conversely, the Commission 
has the ability to stay clear of sensitive areas where it  sees 
little chance of achieving  its goals (cf. Rawlings  2000: 10). In 
the absence of  empirical  evidence on  preference congruity 
between the judges and the Commission, this explanation 
appears as the more parsimonious approach that allows me 
to treat decision-making among judges as a ‘black-box’. 
Summary
Given that the Commission enjoys a  very  high success rate no 
matter  the form of the procedure, judicial proceedings pre-
sent a viable channel for  the Commission  to influence policy. 
Since actions  for annulment or failure to act are only rarely 
pursued by  the Commission, its main judicial  strategies con-
sist  of  initiating infringement proceedings and lodging  ob-
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servations in  preliminary  references. The obvious disadvan-
tage of preliminary rulings as a policy tool  for the Commis-
sion  is its lack of  control  over  the process. The Commission 
has considerable discretion  which  cases to pursue in  in-
fringement proceedings and when, whereas it has no formal 
means of  influencing the timing and the content of prelimi-
nary references. The occurrence of such proceedings is sub-
stantially  affected by several  factors: individual  rights of 
standing for individuals  before national  courts, which  vary 
between member  states and subject  matters, the interests 
pursued by individual  litigants, and the willingness of na-
tional  judges to refer questions to the Court of  Justice. All  of 
these factors lie largely  outside the control  of the Commis-
sion.  
Executive policy-making powers
As opposed to judicial  strategies, the Commission’s  executive 
policy-making powers  allow it to autonomously  set policies 
in  certain  areas, without other  institutions as intermediaries. 
Member state governments, both  as High  Contracting Parties 
in  intergovernmental  conferences and as  members of the 
Council  have delegated a number of direct and sometimes 
unilateral  policy-making powers to the Commission in  sev-
eral closely circumscribed but significant policy areas. 
The Treaty text itself allows for some but very few primary 
law-making powers. For  instance, the Commission directly 
regulates the conditions under  which  migrant workers enjoy 
the right  “to remain  in  the territory of a  member state after 
having  been  employed in that state” (art. 45(3)(d) TFEU). 
The most extensive of  these competences have been dele-
gated in  the area  of  competition policy, where the Commis-
sion  is centrally responsible for  prosecuting  anti-competitive 
behaviour of cartels  and monopolies  (including  the special 
case of public utilities, or services of  general  economic inter-
est), authorising mergers and acquisitions of private compa-
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nies and regulating  state subsidies  (‘aid’) to industry. While 
the Treaty explicitly prescribes a strong role for  the Commis-
sion  in  the competition  policy regime (cf. Maher 2011: 724), 
its powers are mostly  assigned through  acts of secondary  law 
(with  only marginal  involvement of the European Parliament 
through  the consultation procedure), the earliest of which 
dates back to the early 1960s. 
As is  the case with  all  Commission  legal acts, decisions in  the 
realm  of competition are taken by the College of  Commis-
sioners, allowing  for a  certain  degree of  political  contestation 
(cf. Maher  2011: 728). The central  actors  within the Commis-
sion  hierarchy, however, are officials within the directorate 
general  responsible for  competition, although  there is fre-
quent demand for horizontal  coordination  with  other DGs, in 
particular those responsible for the internal  market  and in-
dustry (cf. Wilks  2010: 149). Commission  action in the com-
petition  field is based on  either  its own  investigations or 
third party intervention, such  as  complaints by individual 
competitors  or ‘confessions’ by  transgressors seeking to 
evade large penalties (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 924). 
The Commission  enjoys wide discretion as to which  cases  it 
pursues. Once a decision for action  has been reached, the 
individual  case is  mostly  in  the hands of the rapporteur  in 
the competition DG (cf. Wilk 2002: 148).  
Somewhat paradoxically, the Commission’s  capacity  for 
autonomous action  is greatest in  an area that is of central 
concern for member state governments: the regulation of 
anti-competitive behaviour of  public utilities, or services of 
general  economic interest. These are typically  either publicly 
owned monopolies, or privately  held undertakings that have 
been officially  granted monopolies, or  near  monopolies, in 
large ‘network’ industries such as telecommunication, postal 
services, energy or public transport. Here, article 106(3) 
TFEU stipulates that the Commission “shall, where neces-
sary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member 
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States”  to prevent or  rectify  unjustified distortions of market 
competition, granting it direct and unilateral  law-making 
powers (cf. Usher 2006: 114; Chalmers, Davies et  al. 2010: 
1022). The Commission  has only rarely  made use of  this pro-
vision, relying  instead on the initiation of  legislation under 
the internal market  clause (now employing the ordinary leg-
islative procedure, art. 114 TFEU), although its ability  to take 
recourse to unilateral action  has increased its bargaining po-
sition vis-à-vis its  interlocutors (Schmidt 1998: 301-332; cf. 
Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 1039; Maher 2011: 718-719). 
At the same time, its capacity for  autonomous action is com-
paratively  weak in relation  to the regulation of state aid. The 
procedure of finding  state aid incompatible with Treaty ob-
jectives is somewhat akin  to an abrogated infringement pro-
cedure. If  the Commission finds that subsidies granted to 
industry by a  member state distort competition  and are not 
justifiable by one of the exemptions listed in  the Treaty, it  
issues a decision stating the course of action to be taken  by 
the member state. Should the member state not comply, the 
Commission can  refer  the matter to the European Court of 
Justice directly, bypassing the procedures otherwise required 
for  prosecuting Treaty infringements  (art. 108(2) TFEU). The 
Court will  not engage in  a substantive review of the Commis-
sion’s decision  (i.e. judge whether the state aid in  question 
indeed runs counter to Treaty  obligations), but rather con-
centrate on procedural  issues of how the decision was 
reached and what information was taken  into account (cf. 
Craig and de Búrca 2011: 1085). However, the Council can 
unanimously  decide to find any  given measure compatible 
with  the Treaty, in  effect  overriding the Commission’s 
authority  to decide which  measures comply. Moreover, the 
Council  can  decide to add exemptions to those listed in arti-
cle 107 TFEU – by  qualitative majority when acting on  a pro-
posal of the Commission, unanimously  when altering that 
proposal. Up until  1999 all  Commission action  in  state aid 
cases was based on the primary Treaty articles. After that 
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point the procedure was based on secondary  law, mainly in 
an effort to codify existing case-law (cf. Grespan 2008: 553). 
The most prominent of the Commission’s  executive powers 
in  competition policy is with  regard to the anti-competitive 
behaviour of  private parties. Here, the Commission  has been 
delegated – by acts of secondary  law – extensive investigative 
authority, including so called ‘dawn raids’ – in situ  inspec-
tions seeking to reveal  information about alleged market-
distorting cartels or abuses of  dominant market positions. 
Once sufficient evidence of  an  infringement has  been ob-
tained, the Commission stages a hearing with  the accused 
party in  front of  a  Hearing Officer, who is himself  a  Commis-
sion  official  reporting  directly  to the Commissioner respon-
sible for competition policy (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 
931). Should the Commission  decide to pursue the infringe-
ment, the College will issue a decision at this point outlining 
the action to be taken  by the private party  to end the anti-
competitive practice in  question and, where appropriate, a 
penalty  in  the form of fines, or, more drastically, in the form 
of ‘structural  remedies’, including the break-up of companies 
into smaller sub-units (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 
932-933).29 This decision is subject to a special  form of the 
‘advisory  procedure’ in the EU’s system of  comitology  (more 
on that below), where the draft  decision  is reviewed by  an 
advisory committee consisting of members  of  national  com-
petition  authorities. The College is  required to take the ‘ut-
most  account’ of this review but is not legally  bound to follow 
its recommendations (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 931). 
As with  many aspects of the single market agenda, the Com-
mission’s formulation  and enforcement of  competition  policy 
has been  subject to significant change over time, despite rela-
tively  little change in  the Treaty  text (cf. Maher 2011: 725). 
The Commission only  started to intervene in  state regulation 
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29 This ‘nuclear option’ has in fact never been employed (cf. (cf. Wilks 2010: 
141). 
of the market (either  in form of monopolies granted to public 
utilities or direct aid to industry) in  the course of the Single 
European Market programme, when  the general  economic 
preferences of most actors where predisposed towards less 
state intervention – although  conflict doubtlessly ensued. 
Merger control moreover was only  introduced in 1989 by way 
of legislation, whereas the Commission’s powers to regulate 
cartels and monopolies at that stage had been in operation 
for  almost three decades. More recent reform, however, cur-
tails the Commission’s autonomy by  delegating more 
decision-making powers to national competition agencies  (cf. 
Hix and Høyland 2010: 198). 
In  addition to the competition regime, EU legislation  may 
confer upon the Commission  the “power  to adopt non-
legislative acts to supplement or amend certain  non-essential 
elements  of the legislative act” (art. 290(1) TFEU). While the 
Treaty  calls these acts “non-legislative”, they  are of  a clearly 
legal  nature. The delegation of decision-making  powers to 
the Commission by  way  of secondary law is widespread 
throughout all  policy  areas, particularly those involving  the 
distribution  of  funds (such as cohesion and research), as well 
as agriculture and fisheries (cf. Chalmers, Davies  et  al. 2010: 
59-60). In  this regard, the Commission regularly  issues  agri-
cultural quotas, dispenses money  to regions through  struc-
tural funds  and grants research funding to public and private 
institutions without formal  legislative involvement of  the 
Council  and the Parliament. As the Treaty  outlines, these 
delegated acts are confined to “non-essential” issues, al-
though of course this is hard to define in practice. 
All  of these delegated powers however  come “with  strings 
attached” (Pedler  and Bradley 2006: 240). The Commis-
sion’s discretion, and hence its  capacity  for  independent ac-
tion, is significantly curbed by  the procedures foreseen  in  the 
EU’s protracted system  of  oversight committees, referred to 
as ‘comitology’, and its  successor regime since the entry into 
The policy-making process 88
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Comitology  committees consist 
of delegates of all  member states (usually  government offi-
cials with  relevant technical  expertise), voting by qualified 
majority. They are chaired by a member of the Commission, 
usually  from the unit  most  closely  involved with  the relevant 
act. Developed outside the primary Treaty  basis, the comitol-
ogy system had long been exceedingly  complex, with  new 
procedures introduced on  an ad hoc basis (cf. Pedler and 
Bradley 2006: 241). Subsequent reforms had by 2006 
brought the number of alternative procedures down to four  – 
with  a major revision in  progress since the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Each procedure afforded the Commis-
sion  a varying degree of discretion in  adopting implementing 
decisions. 
The advisory  procedure granted the Commission  the widest 
autonomy  in  adopting implementing  decisions. While the 
Commission had to consult the committee in  question  (and 
give ‘utmost account’ to its  opinion), its  advice was not  bind-
ing and could in effect be ignored (cf. Pedler and Bradley 
2006: 243). In the management procedure, the committee 
retained a  form of veto over the measures proposed by  the 
Commission, in so far as it could decide to refer the matter to 
the Council, which may, by  qualitative majority, “take a  dif-
ferent decision” (Decision  1999/468, art. 4(4)). This form of 
oversight was heightened in  the regulatory procedure, where 
the committee had to agree to a  proposed measure before the 
measure could take effect. In case such  agreement was not 
reached, the matter was again referred to the Council, which 
could reach  a  different decision  by qualitative majority. (The 
Parliament also had an  opportunity to voice its  opposition to 
the draft to the Council.) If the Council  failed to reach  a deci-
sion, however, the proposed measure took effect – this provi-
sion  in effect rendered the regulatory somewhat akin  to the 
management procedure (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 
119). The European Parliament gained veto power  over 
Commission measures  in the infrequently used ‘regulatory 
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procedure with scrutiny’, where both  Parliament and the 
Council  (by qualitative majority) could oppose a  measure 
even where the committee had voiced its support. 
In  practice, very  few Commission proposals were vetoed by 
the committees, regardless of the procedure, suggesting  that 
the formal  rules did not greatly  influence the day-to-day 
working of the system, which has been characterised as 
highly  deliberative and consensual  (cf. Joerges and Neyer 
1997: 620). Nonetheless, and despite the fact that guidelines 
existed as to which  comitology  procedure was to be used in 
which  policy context, Commission, Council  and Parliament 
frequently  disagreed about the procedure to be used, each 
with  a clear bias  towards the procedure affording  it the 
greatest formal powers. This indicates that formal  rules are 
not irrelevant.
As described above, the Treaty on  the Functioning of the 
European Union introduces a novel hierarchy of  legal  acts, 
distinguishing between primary “legislative acts”  and secon-
dary  so-called “delegated” and “implementing” acts. These 
secondary  acts are subject to novel  oversight procedures, the 
contours  of which are only  beginning to take shape. In  the 
case of  delegated acts, article 290(2) TFEU stipulates that the 
European Parliament (alongside, but independent of the 
Council) will  have general powers of veto over  Commission 
measures, including the possibility  to revoke the act of dele-
gation  altogether. Implementing acts on  the other hand will 
continue to be subject to “mechanisms for  control by Mem-
ber States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing 
powers”  (art. 291(3) TFEU, my emphasis). This suggests that 
an adapted form  of comitology will  remain in  effect for  im-
plementing acts, but it is  unclear how far it will  apply  to dele-
gated acts (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 121-122; Craig 
and de Búrca 2011: 136). The absence of specialised oversight 
committees for delegated acts would likely strain both the 
Council’s and the Parliament’s ability to effectively exercise 
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scrutiny, whereas the installation  of such  committees would 
somewhat defeat the purpose of reform  (cf. Craig  2011a: 675; 
Craig and de Búrca  2011: 138-139). Moreover, while the 
Treaty  requires the nature of  the act to be stated in  its head-
ing, the authors refrain  from defining what differentiates the 
one from  the other. Since the applicable comitology proce-
dure is already a subject of contestation between the institu-
tions involved, it is reasonable to expect this distinction  to 
become another source of conflict (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 
2010: 100-101; Craig and de Búrca 2011: 117). The outlines of 
the new comitology system pursuant to article 291(3) have 
recently  been laid down in  regulation  182/2011. The most 
important innovation  is the elimination  of referral  to the 
Council. While the advisory procedure becomes the default 
procedure, committees  operating under the only  other  pro-
cedure, the examination procedure, will  in future have final 
veto power over  Commission  proposals, subject  to appeal  to 
a newly installed appeal committee. While this ostensibly 
simplifies  the protracted comitology  system, the existence of 
various qualifications and derogations leads some commen-
tators to question whether, apart from changing procedures, 
the new system in fact offers much  in  the way of  novelty (cf. 
Craig 2011a: 684).
Summary
Member state governments, through  both  primary and sec-
ondary law, have delegated to the Commission  wide ranging 
executive authority in  some select policy  areas. Most promi-
nent among these is competition policy, where the Commis-
sion  can  unilaterally  regulate the exercise of  monopoly  power 
by  public utilities, intervene in  cases concerning state subsi-
dies  to industry, and authorise or prevent mergers and ac-
quisitions of  private companies. The Council  and the Euro-
pean  Parliament can also delegate implementing powers  to 
the Commission by  means of legislation  in  a wide range of 
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policy fields. The exercise of such  powers by  the Commission, 
however, is usually  confined to ‘non-essential’ aspects of leg-
islation  and is subject to various oversight procedures on  the 
part of the Council and member state governments. 
3.5 Comparing the Commission’s position in the 
three policy modes
The literature focussing  on  the Commission’s position in 
European Union politics  has  created, with  varying emphasis, 
a  wealth  of  information about the workings of each  of  the 
described policy modes. What is lacking to some degree is a 
more circumspect perspective that encompasses the whole 
policy cycle, from the identification  of salient issue areas and 
the formulation  of  action  plans and the like, through  to legis-
lation, adjudication  and executive action. Methodologically, 
this would naturally be a  very  ambitious undertaking. The 
factors influencing the outcome along  the way are myriad, 
and the process is often circular. What I attempt to do is iso-
late an  aspect of the policy  cycle without regressing  to an 
analysis of single policy  modes. I focus on the interaction 
between two policy modes that I find to be most universally 
applicable for  the widest  range of policies – legislation and 
litigation. 
While there is a lot to learn about the intergovernmental 
mode, the Commission ability  to influence outcomes is 
strictly  limited. Conversely, the Commission’s capacity to 
autonomously set policy is certainly  greatest in  the areas 
where it  has  been  delegated extensive executive authority, 
but these areas are closely  circumscribed. Susanne Schmidt 
and Lisa Conant both  describe how the Commission  has been 
able to use its executive authority as  competition  ‘watchdog’ 
to work towards a  liberalisation  of the European telecommu-
nications and electricity  markets  (Schmidt 1998; Conant 
2002). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Commission 
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gradually asserted its ability to issue directives  abolishing 
state-owned or publicly supported monopolies in  these sec-
tors. Susanne Schmidt in particular argued that the Commis-
sion  was  able to exert pressure on  the Council  to pass liberal-
ising legislation  by threatening unilateral  action that would 
adversely  alter  the status quo of legislation (Schmidt 1998: 
323-329). Challenges to its  authority did not find the support 
of the European Court of  Justice (cf. Conant 2002: 103).  The 
wider policy  impact of this mode of policy-making is essen-
tially restricted to opening up markets  to competition  that 
had so far been dominated by state-run or quasi  state-owned 
public utilities. Large as the impact of that policy may be, 
particularly in the energy  and telecommunications sector, 
there is little the Commission  can do in  this fashion if the 
market in question is not dominated by  a single actor (or a 
small  conglomeration  of actors). Other  executive powers de-
rive from  secondary law and usually  deal with  implementing 
measures that leave little leeway in developing policy  more 
generally. 
In  pursuing  legislation  and litigation on the other hand, the 
Commission does not face these constraints. The content of 
legislative initiatives are limited only  by the principle of con-
ferral (art. 5(2) TEU) and the principle of  subsidiarity  (art. 
5(3) TEU), but these checks are modest. The European Trea-
ties contain  various far reaching ‘flexibility clauses’, in par-
ticular  article 352 TFEU, which allows for  legislation neces-
sary “to attain one of  the objectives set out in the Treaties”. 
This very generous phrasing sets few constraints on Union 
legislative competences  (cf. Craig  and de Búrca  2011: 90). 
Moreover, article 114 TFEU allows for  a broad scope in  har-
monizing member state laws where the subject matter per-
tains to the internal  market. Similarly, the Commission  can 
only litigate where there is  an  existing piece or  principle of 
European law that it can  base its claims on, but both  Treaties 
and secondary law provide a  wealth  of  possible grounds for 
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litigation, and the Court has certainly not shied away from 
endorsing novel principles that had theretofore nowhere 
been codified. 
In  this vein, I can formulate a  scope condition for  the subject 
of my  study. Specifically, I focus on actions by the European 
Commission that a) have a  policy content, b) result in norms 
that are enforceable within the legal  system of  the EU and c) 
are either  a legislative act within the meaning of article 
289(3) TFEU or  a  procedure before the European Court of 
Justice.
Based on these considerations, I will  present arguments as to 
the Commission’s default strategy, and propose a  number of 
specific hypotheses  about the factors influencing the Com-
mission’s subsequent choice of  strategy in the following 
chapter. Chapter 4, moreover, includes a  statistical  test of 
these propositions, while chapters 5  and 6 provide further 
empirical  material  in  the form of  two longitudinal  case stud-
ies. 
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Chapter 4 
Predicting strategy choice
The following  chapter proceeds in four steps. The first sec-
tion  presents arguments as to the Commission’s likely default 
strategy (4.1). Based on these assumptions, I develop a  series 
of hypotheses about the factors influencing  the Commission’s 
choice of strategy  between legislative initiatives and in-
fringement proceedings (4.2). I then present the data I use to 
statistically test these hypotheses and outline the central 
characteristics  of the dataset  (4.3). The final section  (4.4) 
discusses the results of the statistical  test and their  implica-
tions for the case studies presented in chapters 5 and 6. 
4.1 A default strategy 
Legislation  and litigation  are near universal  tools for produc-
ing EU policy. It is not surprising that the Commission jeal-
ously guards both its monopoly  on legislative initiatives and 
its discretion in  prosecuting  infringements (for  the latter: 
Smith  2008: 42-43). As I have shown, the Commission’s  po-
sition in legislation varies with legislative procedure, in  par-
ticular  with the applicable voting rule in  the Council  and the 
European Parliament’s variable veto powers. Within  the ju-
dicial  sphere, its ability to influence policy  development does 
not significantly  differ between the various procedures. 
However, the Commission  has no control  over  the occur-
rence of  preliminary references and can  only  dock  onto sub-
ject matters arising from domestic disputes. In comparison, 
its position in  infringement proceedings is independent of 
other actors.30  Much like its  monopoly of initiative, the 
Commission has extensive control  over  timing and content of 
cases it wishes to refer to the Court. 
Should we expect a  relationship between the Commission’s 
use of  legislative initiatives and infringement proceedings? 
Given its substantial  success rate before the Court of Justice, 
might it not be reasonable to expect the Commission to take 
resort to infringement proceedings  wherever it can, irrespec-
tive and independent of  its legislative activity? I argue that 
three considerations suggest that  this is not so. They touch 
on issues of  legal  certainty, the possibility  for  policy  innova-
tion, and standards of legitimacy. 
First, while the result of court cases  may be far  reaching, and 
while the Commission has a  good track record of convincing 
the Court of its position, the process is nonetheless subject to 
some uncertainty. Judicial  formalism  allows for no bargain-
ing between  the parties, and the result  is a tableau  of ‘take it 
or leave it’ measures with no room for  compromise. The risk 
of an  unfavourable outcome can therefore not be minimised. 
Moreover, case law for the most part constitutes an incre-
mental  piecemeal  process that “clearly gives actors limited 
guidance on existing  regulatory requirements” (Schmidt 
2011b: 43). “Case-law is  fragmentary, incomplete and ulti-
mately  unstable”  (Schmidt 2011a: 46). Court cases, moreo-
ver, are time-consuming. It can take years between  the 
Commission’s referral  of a case to the Court of Justice and 
the final  ruling. Finally, the impact of a court ruling can  be 
‘contained’ by member state governments  by  ignoring wider 
ramifications and restricting  the implications to the case at 
hand (cf. Conant 2002: 32). 
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30 The same holds true for actions for annulment and failure to act, but these 
procedures only make up a very small subset of judicial proceedings in the 
European Union. I will therefore not pursue them further.  
It can  also be argued that legislation is a more flexible tool 
for  policy  innovation than litigation. After  all, litigation  has 
to have a basis in  existing law, whereas legislation  can create 
laws in  areas that had priorly  not been regulated. This  argu-
ment should however not be overstated. The principle of con-
ferral restricts the EU institution’s ability to legislate beyond 
the competences delineated in  primary treaty law. At the 
same time, the Court has frequently  developed principles of 
EU law that had previously not been  codified. (The prohibi-
tion  against age discrimination  is  a recent prominent exam-
ple, as are of course the principles of supremacy and direct 
effect of EU law in the first place.) 
Finally, considerations of  legitimacy also restrict a  unilateral 
resort to court proceedings to influence policy. Strategic 
goal-seeking behaviour on  the part of  the Commission  is at 
least partially  constrained by  norms of appropriate behav-
iour, including  respect for  member state autonomy, subsidi-
arity  and the legitimacy  of decision-making.31  Relying on 
court rulings alone would inevitably lead to conflict with  the 
legislative institutions. In  the medium term, the Commission 
has an incentive to maintain  a  “good working relationship” 
(Nugent 2010: 132-133) with national  governments in  the 
Council  and the European  Parliament, since all  cooperation 
in the EU is reiterative.
Concluding from these considerations, it seems a  reasonable 
premise to assume that legislation is the default choice of 
strategy for the Commission. This notion of infringement 
proceedings as an ancillary to the legislative process  has  first 
been explored by Susanne Schmidt. In a  series of articles, 
Schmidt looked at the wider  consequences of the interplay 
between legislative and judicial  politics, drawing on  a  wide 
range of  empirical data  from internal  market policies. She 
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31  Such considerations are voiced, e.g., by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Director 
General of the Commission’s Legal Service from 1977-1987, and Director 
General of DG Competition from 1990-1995 (cf. Ehlermann 1981: 137-138). 
identified two essential  patterns of the Commission’s  resort 
to its  delegated powers and infringement proceedings  in or-
der  to apply  pressure on  Council positions vis-à-vis legisla-
tion. Central  to this approach is  the location  of  the status quo 
as a  default condition  of not passing legislation (cf. Schmidt 
2011a: 48). In  both  scenarios, the Commission  introduces a 
piece of legislation that goes beyond the preferences of the 
pivotal member of the Council. The first is a strategy she 
termed “lesser evil”, where the Commission threatens litiga-
tion  that would move the status quo to a position that would 
make a majority of Council  members worse off than the 
Commission’s proposed piece of legislation. She finds  in-
stances of this pattern  in the areas of  energy markets, merger 
control, road haulage and air  transport (cf. Schmidt 2011a: 
50-51).
The second pattern, termed “divide and conquer”, describes 
situations in  which  the Commission, making use of its dele-
gated powers in competition  policy  or threatening infringe-
ment proceedings, targets individual  member  states (those 
pivotal in majority voting), altering the default condition  for 
non-action of individual  member states  rather  than  the Un-
ion as a  whole. She identifies this strategy  in the liberalisa-
tion  of  ground-handling in  airports, gambling  and sports bet-
ting, and electricity  and gas markets (cf. Schmidt 2011a: 52-
53). 
The question  arises whether these patterns form part of a 
systematic strategy, or  represent isolated exceptions. Build-
ing on  the arguments developed by Schmidt, the remainder 
of this chapter develops a  set  of  hypotheses  about the Com-
mission’s use of  the infringement procedure and tests  these 
against data on  legislation  and litigation  in  the EU. This 
analysis does not take into account the Commission’s use of 
observations in preliminary  references. Although  the pre-
liminary  reference procedure may constitute a viable channel 
for  policy  production, the procedure does  not present a ‘stra-
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tegic’ alternative to legislative initiatives – the Commission 
has no control  over  their occurrence. While the Commission 
can  intervene in  such  procedures, it does  so unconditionally 
(it  intervenes in  all  cases before the Court).  The Commis-
sion’s use of observations in preliminary  references  as a de-
pendent variable therefore does not  lend itself  to statistical 
testing. 
4.2 Factors influencing the Commission’s choice of 
strategy
I assume that legislation  is likely  to be the default  choice of 
strategy for the Commission. Initiating infringement pro-
ceedings to influence policy  should therefore constitute an 
alternative strategy that  it employs when  the preferred 
course of  action is unpromising. The Commission’s resort to 
Court proceedings can therefore be seen as a  function of its 
ability  to successfully set the agenda  in  legislation. I assume 
that the higher the obstacles  to successful legislation, the 
more likely  the Commission is  to take resort to litigation in 
form  of infringement proceedings. As the literature on 
agenda  setting has  demonstrated, the extent of  these obsta-
cles are primarily  determined by  the voting rule in  the Coun-
cil and the involvement of  the European  Parliament in  the 
legislative process. I can therefore formulate two specific hy-
potheses:
H1: Increasing obstacles to a successful Council vote  (a 
move  from QMV to unanimity) favour the  choice of litiga-
tion over legislation.
H2: Adding the  European Parliament as  a veto player in 
legislation favours the choice of litigation over legislation. 
The principal  additional factor  influencing the likelihood of 
successful  legislation  is  of course the distribution of prefer-
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ences of  the actors involved vis-à-vis the status quo. I have 
included in  my  data information  about the difference in  po-
litical  positions between  the Commission on  the one hand 
and the European Parliament and the Council  on the other. 
An  adverse distribution of preferences  should hinder the 
adoption  of legislation. The following two hypotheses reflect 
this assumption.
H3: Greater political distance  between the  Commission and 
the Council favours the choice of litigation over legislation.
H4: Greater political distance  between the  Commission and 
the  European Parliament favours the  choice  of litigation 
over legislation.
Another good indicator  of  an adverse distribution  of prefer-
ences (at least for the members of the Council) is the pres-
ence of conflict in  Council  negotiations. Such conflict pro-
longs the legislative process and renders its outcome more 
uncertain. I therefore propose a fifth hypothesis:
H5: A greater degree  of conflict in the  Council favours the 
choice of litigation over legislation.
Another proposition  concerns the characteristics of the sub-
ject matter pursued by  the Commission. A  number of  contri-
butions about the trajectory  of legal  developments in  the EU 
stress  an underlying  asymmetry  that  favours  ‘market-
making’ over  ‘market-correcting’ measures (cf. Scharpf 
2006: 854). This is not primarily  ascribed to the policy pref-
erences of the actors involved in  legal  proceedings, but rather 
to an inherent ‘pro-market’ bias of European law. Following 
this reasoning, judicial  proceedings should promise greater 
success (and should consequently  be favoured by  the Com-
mission) if the issue in questions concerns a market-oriented 
policy rather than  an  interventionist policy, which  is  held to 
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be disadvantaged by European law. The following hypothesis 
provides a control for this assumption.
H6: The Commission is more  likely to favour litigation over 
legislation if the  subject matter pertains to a market-
oriented policy field.
Some specific characteristics of  the infringement procedure 
that I have discussed above point to certain  patterns in  their 
occurrence that I will  need to include controls  for. The most 
important of these is  the observation  that  not all  legislative 
instruments are equally  likely  to be the subject of an in-
fringement proceeding  – directives are clearly  overrepre-
sented. This has to do with the necessity for  national  trans-
position. Directives  formulate policy goals but  largely leave it 
up to member state governments to chose the appropriate 
mechanism to achieve these goals. Since the late 1970s, the 
Commission has consistently targeted cases of non-
transposition. Moreover, since such transpositions require 
national  implementing laws, the Commission can  more easily 
find fault with  such laws than in  the case of regulations, 
which  are directly  applicable and require no transposition. 
For this reason I include a controlling hypothesis:
H7: The  ratio of litigation to legislation should be  higher if 
the  subject matter is  dominated by directives as a legislative 
instrument, regardless of Commission policy intent. 
4.3 Data
In  order  to test these hypotheses  I draw on existing data col-
lected for  different purposes and aggregate them in a  new 
dataset. The three datasets I draw upon  include information 
on EU legislation (König, Luetgert et al. 2006), litigation 
(Stone Sweet and Brunell  2007), and the political  positions 
of the actors involved in these processes (Warntjen, Hix  et al. 
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2008). In  the following section, I will justify my choice of 
data source, describe the data  in some detail and discuss 
some of the problems that arose in the construction of  my 
combined dataset.
Legislation
The complexity  of legal  instruments  and decision-making 
procedures in  the EU seems to translate into a problem  in 
record keeping. In fact, no two descriptions of the legislative 
output of  the EU present the same figures, despite the fact 
that most recur to the same databases (cf. Stone Sweet 2004: 
58; König, Luetgert et al. 2006: 555). There are two central 
explanations for such  discrepancies. The first of  these in-
volves the definition  of  what actually  constitutes ‘legislative’ 
output. Up until  the recent Treaty  of Lisbon, there had been 
no legally defined hierarchy  of  legal  norms. As I have de-
scribed above, legislation, or a  ‘legislative act’, is now defined 
in  formal  terms as a  legal  act adopted by  a  legislative proce-
dure (art. 289(3) TFEU). All  other  acts are by definition 
‘non-legislative’ and mainly  refer to executive acts  carried out 
by  the Commission (art. 290 and 291 TFEU). Some confu-
sion  remains as to nomenclature: both legislative and non-
legislative acts  can take the form  of  directives, regulations 
and decisions (as the principal  legally  binding output of the 
EU), alongside multiple other instruments of  diverse legal 
character. Conflicting accounts of  the EU’s  legislative output 
therefore often  differ  as to what kind of output they actually 
cover. 
The second difficulty in  capturing the EU’s legislative output 
lies  in  the differing purposes of  its central  databases  and the 
information they record. This information is not always uni-
form  across different entries. Whereas “EUR-Lex”32, the go-
to database for all EU activity, encompasses an  exhaustive 
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range of  individual  documents  produced by  all  EU institu-
tions, both the Commission’s “PreLex” 33 and the European 
Parliament’s “Legislative Observatory”34 database document 
processes between the Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament, resulting for the most part in  what  is 
now formally defined as a “legislative act”. All  databases 
overlap significantly, but they individually  record different 
characteristics  of legal  acts and sometimes contain conflict-
ing information. 
While the Commission regularly  publishes  aggregate data on 
legal  output in  its  annual  “General  Reports on  the Activities 
of the European Union”  (presumably based on  either EUR-
Lex or PreLex data), there are a number of publicly  available 
datasets that take individual  legal  acts or  processes  as  their 
units of analysis  (cf. König, Luetgert et al. 2006; Kovats 
2010; Häge 2011). Predictably, the information  contained in 
these sets overlaps, but they  are not identical. Frank Häge’s 
2011 European Union  Policy-Making (EUPOL) dataset en-
compasses a  vast  amount of  decision-making  procedures that 
are not captured in the other  sets, but  he concedes that if re-
search  is primarily  interested in  ‘standard’ inter-institutional 
processes such  as legislation  – as my  study is – his dataset 
might not be useful (Häge 2011: 460). Both Laszlo Kovats’ 
and Tomas König, Brook Luetgert and Tanja Dannwolf’s da-
tasets restrict their  data  collection  to inter-institutional  pro-
cedures that are relevant for my purposes. Figure 4.1 pro-
vides an  overview of  the total  amount of Commission legisla-
tive initiatives reported in these datasets and compares them 
to the aggregate data reported by the Commission. 
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34 www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/home/home.do
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While the trends are similar (a  general  decline in legislative 
initiatives), the sources  report divergent aggregate numbers. 
The Kovats dataset, based solely  on data  derived from the 
PreLex database, appears to underestimate the total amount 
of legislative initiatives relative to the Commission reports 
until  about 1998, from  which point it appears to slightly 
overestimate them. The König, Luetgert and Dannwolf data-
set consistently underestimates the number of legislative ini-
tiatives  relative to the other two. The reported trends are 
consistent with the other  data  sources, albeit with  a  slightly 
widening  gap, until  about 1999, from which point the re-
ported numbers for Commission initiatives drop off steeply. 
The consistently  lower reported aggregate figures have sev-
eral  reasons. First, König, Luetgert and Dannwolf combine 
data from  both the PreLex and the EurLex (or  rather  CELEX, 
its predecessor) databases. Their  last reported data is from 
February 2003. Only  initiatives that can be identified in  both 
databases are retained. Apparently, this merging  process ex-
cludes a  significant amount of pending legislation, explaining 
the deviation in reported initiatives for  the last years of  the 
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dataset. Second, König, Luetgert and Dannwolf  employ a  
restrictive definition  of legislative initiatives, reporting  only 
those which are based on  a reference to primary  treaty  law or 
secondary  legislation. This excludes all those initiatives 
based on  other  sources, such  as accession treaties  or interna-
tional agreements, that are included in the other figures. 
A  more detailed look at  the data reveals that the differences 
in  reported Commission activity  mainly pertains to decisions 
(figure 4.2).35  The König, Luetgert and Dannwolf  dataset 
only slightly  underestimates the amount of legislative initia-
tives for regulations and directives relative to the other 
sources – again  until about 1999, from  which point the re-
ported data deviates for the stated reasons. 
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Commission Activity Reports
For the purposes of my study, the dataset published by 
König, Luetgert and Dannwolf  has a number of central  ad-
vantages over  the Kovats dataset that lead me to select theirs 
for  my test. In  particular, the detailed coding of the data 
lends itself more closely  to the purposes  of testing my hy-
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between different types of legislation before 1993. 
potheses than the data  compiled by Kovats. König, Luetgert 
and Dannwolf have comprehensively coded legislative acts 
closely  corresponding to the current definition of  the term 
(i.e. those acts decided according to a  legislative procedure). 
Since their data are based on  a cross-reference of two data-
bases, EUR-Lex (the former CELEX) and PreLex, they  con-
tain more detailed information  about the date of initiation, 
type of legislative procedure (outlining the involvement of 
the European  Parliament), voting rule in  the Council  (based 
both on the available information in  the PreLex  database and 
an additional  coding  of the treaty basis as  indicated in  EUR-
Lex), policy  area, and type of item  on the Council agenda (A 
or B point, indicating the degree of contentiousness of the 
issue). The other dataset contains a vast amount of  missing 
values for the crucial  variables “EP involvement”  and “Coun-
cil voting rule”, which  would make an  empirical  test of  my 
hypotheses tenuous at best. This  decision, however, has sev-
eral  drawbacks. Most importantly, their data  ranges from 
January 1984 to February  2003, whereas Kovats  includes 
more recent data. As I have shown  above, the merging proc-
ess between  the two sources moreover leads them  to signifi-
cantly  underestimate legislative initiatives from about 1999. I 
have therefore decided to further  truncate their  dataset to 
end with  1998, which is close to the entry  into force of  the 
Treaty  of  Amsterdam. This of  course means that I have no 
information about the past decade and a half. This disadvan-
tage is made up, in my opinion, by  the outlined advantages in 
the richness of their codings. 
Litigation
Finding data on  judicial  proceedings is somewhat less 
fraught with  difficulty, although  for  infringement proceed-
ings in particular there are again  several  sources to choose 
from. Detailed information on  individual  cases is again  con-
tained in EUR-Lex, which  covers documents relating to 
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judgements, orders and opinions of the courts  (the Court of 
Justice, the General  Court and the Civil  Service Tribunal) as 
well  as opinions of the advocates  general. Similar informa-
tion  can  be obtained from  the database provided by  the Court 
of Justice itself.36 The principal  other  source of information 
on infringement proceedings is the Commission itself, which 
annually publishes aggregate data on its  use of the infringe-
ment procedure in  its “Annual  Reports on Monitoring the 
Application of EU Law”.37  Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas 
Brunell  have moreover compiled a  publicly available dataset 
containing all  individual infringement proceedings lodged by 
the Commission before the European  Court of Justice from 
1958 to 2005, based on data from  the Court of Justice (Stone 
Sweet and Brunell  2007). This latter dataset is particularly 
useful, since it contains information  on  individual  cases, such 
as date of referral, defendant, and subject matter. Comparing 
this dataset with  the aggregate data  published by  the Com-
mission  indicates close correspondence, with  the slight de-
viations most likely  due to the handling of cases that where 
withdrawn or joined (figure 4.3). 
Note that compared to the declining trend in legislative ini-
tiatives, there is a distinct increase in  infringement proceed-
ings referred to the Court of Justice after  about 1993 – the 
number of court referrals increases  nearly five-fold between 
1993 and 2003. This demonstrates that the amount of in-
fringement proceedings brought to the Court of  Justice is not 
just a  function  of the level  of  legislative activity, or  the total 
amount of legislative acts in  force, which rises continuously 
over time (cf. Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998: 59).
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36 Available at curia.europa.eu. 
37  The Commission also grants selective access to its internal database on 
infringement proceedings, which is not usually open to the public (cf. Börzel, 
Hofmann et al. 2012: 456). 
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The increase also cannot be explained by  reference to en-
largement alone. While the increase in member  states  poten-
tially infringing their legal  obligations certainly amplifies the 
observed trend, the trend also holds when looking solely  at 
the initial  nine member states for  the period observed (figure 
4.4). The variance in  court referrals over  time must therefore 
be explained with  reference to Commission  strategy  (cf. Bör-
zel 2001: 820). Note also that the trend reverses  dramatically 
after  2008. This is due to a  major  revision of the Commis-
sion’s approach  to infringement proceedings (cf. COM 2011/
588: 3).
One of the central  strategies of the Commission since the late 
1970s has  been to place particular emphasis on the timely 
transposition  of directives (cf. COM 84/181: 5). Infringement 
proceedings are routinely  initiated when member states  fail 
to notify the transposition of  a directive within the prescribed 
period and are referred to the Court when the member state 
in  questions continues to fail  to do so. Figure 4.5 depicts this 
strategy. From  initially  (1983, the earliest available data-
point) less than  20 percent of all  infringements referred to 
the Court, non-transposition cases continually  increased as  a 
subset of all  referrals to reach a ratio of about 80 percent in 
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1995, to later  recede to more or less half of all  referred cases 
between 1998 and now.
Figure 4.4 Infringement proceedings referred to the  Court 







1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
Total Total EU 9 Total EU 12 Total EU 15
Source: European Commission “Annual Reports on Monitoring the Applica-
tion of EU Law”.
Non-transposition  cases are routine technical  cases  that do 
not constitute policy-tools – after all, the policy  content of a 
legal  norm  is not at issue. Even when  discounting these 
cases, however, the general  trend remains robust: a slight  
decrease in  infringement referrals  from the early  1980s to 
1995 (with  two spikes in 1985 and 1989), a  continuous in-
crease between 1995 and 2007 (with a  brief drop in 2005), 
and a  sharp drop after  2008. This finding underscores the 
need to take into account the varying prevalence of directives 
when analysing  the relationship between legislation and in-
fringement proceedings. Unfortunately  the Stone Sweet and 
Brunell  dataset does not  allow me to discriminate between 
non-transposition  cases and those that concern  a  dispute 
about policy  content. Nonetheless, for the purposes of  this 
study, they  offer  the most comprehensively  coded dataset 
available.
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Figure 4.5 Infringement proceedings referred to the  Court 
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Source: European Commission “Annual Reports on Monitoring the Applica-
tion of EU Law”.
Legislation and litigation combined
In  order  to test my hypotheses, I have combined data from 
the König, Luetgert and Dannwolf dataset on legislative ini-
tiatives  with data  from the Stone Sweet and Brunell  set on 
infringement proceedings. The subsequent dataset initially 
consisted of individual  (disaggregated) Commission actions 
in  both  modes of policy-making in a  period from 1984 to 
1998. Observations  can  either  be legislative initiatives or  re-
ferrals of alleged infringements  to the Court of  Justice. I 
coded this variance in type of Commission action as 0 in  the 
case of  legislation (or  rather, a  proposal  for legislation), and 1 
in  the case of  litigation  (or, more correctly, referring an  exist-
ing infringement procedure to the European Court of Jus-
tice). 
In  order to investigate a possible systematic relationship be-
tween the two modes of policy-making, I needed to establish 
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common characteristics for both  legislation and litigation. 
Since my hypothesis is that the Commission is more inclined 
to use litigation  when legislation is unlikely  to be successful, I 
needed to find a measure that gauges the legislative obstacles 
had the  Commission initiated legislation instead of litiga-
tion. If my  unit of analysis were to remain  the individual 
Commission choice of action, I would have needed to define 
values for hypothetical  legislative procedural  rules corre-
sponding to each  case of  litigation. However, the information 
available in  the current dataset was not detailed enough to 
connect an  individual  infringement procedure to a  treaty  ar-
ticle that unambiguously  mandates a certain  legislative vot-
ing rule or procedure. In its stead, I defined common charac-
teristics  for legislation and litigation  at the level of the  wider 
subject matter. The assumption  is that both legislation and 
litigation can be grouped into policy fields  that broadly  share 
certain  characteristics, such as voting rules in  the Council 
and EP veto powers, and that these characteristics  have a 
meaningful  impact on the ratio of litigation to legislation in 
these policy fields. My unit of analysis is  hence not an indi-
vidual instance of  Commission action, but a policy  field over 
time (i.e. ‘policyfield-years’). 
As with  many  categorisations based on  empirical  data, defin-
ing which  act pertains to what policy  field is  not as straight-
forward as one might think. Just take for  example standards 
for  motor  vehicle emissions: a legislative act or  infringement 
proceeding pertaining  to this subject matter touches upon 
environmental  matters, transport, industry, and the internal 
market. Some coding  rule was necessary  to decide which  pol-
icy field is dominant. My  combined dataset would have al-
lowed for three such  rules. The first is based on  so called di-
rectory codes used by  the Commission to categorise legal  acts 
contained in  the EU’s  “Directory of  Legal  Acts in Force”38. 
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The second is based on  the Treaty  chapter on which  the legal 
act  is based. The third is based on  the primarily  responsible 
Directorate General (DG) within the Commission. While the 
latter  would have been of particular interest, König, Luetgert 
and Dannwolf only  code the eight  DGs responsible for the 
bulk of legislative initiatives, combining all other DGs under 
the heading “Others”. This unfortunately  omits too much 
information to be truly  useful  as a coding rule for applicable 
policy field. The dataset on litigation, moreover, does not 
contain information on  responsible DGs. The other  two cod-
ing options provide for a more detailed classification of legis-
lative initiatives, but yield somewhat different results. I have 
opted for  a coding  rule based on directory codes, because the 
resulting list  of  policy  areas is more meaningful  than that of 
Treaty  chapters. In particular, the directory  codes allow me 
to differentiate between the free movement of workers, serv-
ices and capital  respectively, whereas coding along Treaty 
chapters would have lumped theses fields together. The same 
applies to competition, taxation  and the approximation of 
laws, which would have been  counted as one policy field ac-
cording to Treaty chapter.
The resulting  list of policy  fields contained a number  of cate-
gories that were of only peripheral  interest to my study. Since 
I am  primarily  interested in questions of policy-making, I 
subsequently excluded all  areas  that do not directly  pertain 
to the policy-making process. These include institutional is-
sues or  financial  provisions (although  these undoubtedly 
have a secondary  policy impact). Also, in  order to present a 
choice of policy-modes to the Commission, policy areas will 
have to be (in theory) amenable to both  legislation and litiga-
tion. Matters pertaining to Justice and Home Affairs  do not 
fall  in that category  for  the period observed, and external  
relations  are traditionally  not subject to judicial  review. In 
effect, I restricted my  analysis  to policy areas that  are in 
some way related to the internal market. 
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A  cross-tabulation  of the frequency  of legislative initiatives 
by  policy  fields according to directory  code and responsible 
DG highlights the difficulty of finding a classification of  pol-
icy fields that would allow for an  unambiguous coding of leg-
islative initiatives (table 4.1). Evidently, multiple overlapping 
competencies among  DGs, and the subsequent joint respon-
sibility  for legislative proposals  make for difficult classifica-
tion  (cf. König, Luetgert et al. 2006: 568). For twelve out of 
the 14 policy fields, however, the classification by  directory 
code correctly predicts the intuitively corresponding DG as 
primarily responsible more than half the time.
The notable exception  is transport policy – the cases classi-
fied as transport policy according to the directory  codes ap-
pear  to have largely  been handled by DG Agriculture. DG 
Industry also turns out to be responsible for  just under half 
of all initiatives coded as  “industrial  policy  and internal mar-
ket”  according  to the directory  code reported in  CELEX. This 
is due to the fact that this directory  code includes all  legisla-
tion  concerning the harmonization of  member state product 
standards, spanning many different subject areas.
On the basis of this tabulation I have coded policy areas ac-
cording  to the categories ‘market-oriented’ or ‘intervention-
ist’ to create a variable corresponding  to H6 (cf. Hartlapp 
and Lorenz 2012: 11). I have created a dummy  variable that 
takes on  the value 1  if the policy area is market-oriented (cus-
toms union  & free movement of goods, establishment & serv-
ices, transport, competition, taxation, free movement of capi-
tal, energy, industrial  policy  & internal  market, and under-
takings). The variable takes  on a value of 0 if  the policy  area 
can  be classified as  ‘interventionist’ (agriculture, free move-
ment of workers  & social  policy, regional policy, environ-
ment, consumers & health, and science, education and cul-
ture). The rationale for  this classification  is  based on  catego-
ries proposed by Liesbet Hooghe and Fabio Franchino. 
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Hooghe suggests classifying portfolios within the Commis-
sion  by  their  affinity  to “European regulated capitalism” (cf. 
Hooghe 2001: 124-131, 224). Franchino bases his typology on 
the “substantive dimensions that underlie each policy  port-
folio”  as well  as  their  ideological profiles on  a left-right scale, 
using policy  categories suggested by  the Comparative Mani-
festo Project (CMP) (cf. Budge, Klingemann  et al. 2001; 
Franchino 2009: 17). Both  of their  categorisations of portfo-
lio characteristics conform to my coding. 
Table 4.2 tabulates  the list of policy  fields  and the frequency 
of Commission action in the two policy modes. 
Table 4.2 Type of Commission action by policy field
                         |  Type of Commission action
             Directory  Code | legislative   infringement |     Total
                                 proposal     proceeding
         --------------------+----------------------------+----------
             Customs union & 
      free movement of goods |     1,231          127     |     1,358 
     Agriculture & fisheries |     3,124          190     |     3,314 
     Freedom of movement for 
     workers & social policy |       177           91     |       268 
    Right of establishment &
 freedom to provide services |       100          113     |       213 
                   Transport |       210           46     |       256 
                 Competition |        22           32     |        54 
                    Taxation |       160           89     |       249
Economic and monetary union & 
    free movement of capital |        45            7     |        52      
                      Energy |       105            1     |       106 
         Industrial policy & 
             internal market |       379           207    |       586 
Regional policy & coordination 
   of structural instruments |        27             0    |        27 
    Environment, consumers & 
           health protection |       202           211    |       413 
       Science, information, 
         education & culture |        52             0    |        52 
Law relating to undertakings |        25             0    |        25 
      -----------------------+----------------------------+----------
                       Total |     5,859         1,114    |     6,973 
Source: Combined datasets (König, Luetgert et al. 2006; Stone Sweet and 
Brunell 2007). 
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Some patterns emerge from this simple tabulation. In  the 
period of  observation, customs union  & free movement of 
goods and agriculture & fisheries make up the bulk  (roughly 
three quarters) of all legislation, but produce only  about a 
quarter  of all  infringement proceedings. The ratio of in-
fringement proceedings  to legislative initiatives is  highest in 
the areas of competition, environment, consumers & health 
protection  and right of establishment & freedom to provide 
services, whereas the areas of regional  policy, science & edu-
cation and the law relating to undertakings have produced no 
infringement proceedings at all. As this tabulation presents 
the whole of the dataset, it is not  sensitive to temporal varia-
tion. Figure 4.6 depicts the annual frequency of legislative 
initiatives and referral of  infringement proceedings to the 
Court of Justice by policy field over time. I restrict this over-
view to the eight policy  fields responsible for the largest 
share of Commission action. 
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Source: Combined datasets (König, Luetgert et al. 2006; Stone Sweet and 
Brunell 2007).
The first two figures show that the amount of legislative ini-
tiatives  in  the fields of  free movement of  goods  & customs 
union and agriculture & fisheries have declined significantly 
over the period of  observation. As these fields  make up the 
bulk of  all  legislative initiatives, this trend alone should ac-
count for most of the general decline of  EU legislation  over 
all. In  the case of free movement of goods  & customs union, 
the overall  decline coincides with  the envisaged completion 
of the internal market by  the early 1990s. The only  notable 
incline in legislative initiatives occurred in the field of  taxa-
tion, albeit at a comparatively low annual level of initiatives. 
Concurrent with  the decline in legislative initiatives, the 
amount of  infringement proceedings referred to the court 
declined in the field of free movement of goods & customs 
union, whereas all  other policy fields  show a general  increase 
in  referrals towards the end of the period of  observation. This 
uptick in referrals is most notable in the areas of  industrial 
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policy & internal  market and environment, consumer & 
health  protection, where the annual  frequency  has doubled 
since 1995. A  similar increase is notable in the area of free-
dom of movement for workers & social  policy, whereas the 
significant increases  in  referrals  in  the areas of the right of 
establishment & freedom  to provide services and transport 
policy appear to be outliers. 
From the original dataset at  the level  of  individual  Commis-
sion  actions I have generated a ‘collapsed’ dataset where the 
individual  observations represent policy  fields by year. The 
dataset includes 14 distinct policy  areas over 15 years of ob-
servation, yielding a possible 14*15=210 observations. Since 
seven policy field-years contain  no Commission action, the 
total numbers of observations  in my dataset is 203. From 
this information, I have computed a dependent variable 
equal to the annual  ratio of litigation (court referrals) to leg-
islative initiatives for each  policy  area. This  ratio is conse-
quently 0 for years in  which no infringement proceedings 
where referred to the court, 1  where no legislative initiatives 
where forwarded to Council  and Parliament, and between 0 
and 1 where both modes of policy-making occurred. 
Depicting  the annual mean of  the dependent variable (across 
policy areas) on  a temporal  axis, it  becomes apparent  that the 
data contain strong  trends. Concurrent to the trends identi-
fied above, all  else equal, the ratio of litigation  to legislation 
decreases between 1984 and 1992 (with two distinct peaks in 
1985 and 1989), and increases steadily thereafter (figure 4.7). 
In  order to explain the observed variance in  the ratio of  court 
referrals to legislative initiatives, I have created a  number of 
independent variables  that capture certain characteristics of 
the individual policy areas according to my hypotheses.
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Source: Combined datasets (König, Luetgert et al. 2006; Stone Sweet and 
Brunell 2007).
As stated in  hypothesis H1 and H2, I primarily  assume that 
the ratio can  be explained by  the obstacles to legislation  in  a 
certain  policy  area: the higher  the obstacles to successful  leg-
islation  (from  the Commission’s point of view), the higher 
the ratio of court referrals to legislative initiatives. I take 
these obstacles to be primarily determined by the applicable 
voting  rule in  the Council  and the participation  of the Euro-
pean  Parliament in the legislative process. It is impossible to 
assign, a  priori, certain procedural  rules  to a  certain  subject 
matter. Each policy field is  governed by  multiple procedures, 
with  varying voting rules in the Council  and varying  in-
volvement of the European Parliament. I have consequently 
decided to base my  variables  on  the actual  use of certain pro-
cedures, in  effect creating an  ‘average legislative procedure’ 
for each policy field. 
Information on Council  voting  rules and EP involvement was 
available in  the König, Luetgert and Dannwolf dataset on  EU 
legislative activity. In fact, they use two different sources to 
code these variables. The first of  these is information  avail-
able in PreLex which  directly indicates the voting rule in  the 
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Council  and the involvement of the European Parliament. 
Presumably, this is the most accurate indication of what pro-
cedures where actually used in  legislation, since they were 
officially  recorded. Unfortunately, this variable contains a 
large amount of missing values (cf. König, Luetgert  et al. 
2006: 565). For about half of all  legislative initiatives in the 
dataset, the form  of EP participation was not recorded in 
PreLex. The number  of missing values  is even higher  for the 
applicable voting rule in  the Council  – this rule was only  re-
corded in a  quarter  of all  cases. It is not immediately  clear 
whether the cases in  which this  information  was  recorded 
constitute a  representative sample of all  legislation  or 
whether there is a  systematic bias inherent in the recording 
practice. There is  also a clear time trend: the amount of miss-
ing values decreases over  time. Whereas the Council voting 
rule was only  recorded in 10 percent of all  cases for the first 
four years of  the period of observation, this  ratio increases to 
about 40 percent for the final  four years. The trend is  similar 
for  EP involvement. This  indicates that the information re-
corded in PreLex  may be more biased in  the early part of  the 
period of  observation. König, Luetgert and Dannwolf provide 
another source of information  for  the applicable legislative 
procedure. They individually  coded all  Treaty articles that 
served as legal  bases for a  legislative proposal  (as recorded in 
EUR-Lex) and used the legally  prescribed procedure as a 
proxy. The resulting  scores have very  few missing values. 
However, anyone familiar with coding  Treaty  articles will 
know that this  practice necessarily involves a  certain  amount 
of inaccuracy, as the reference to a  legal  base does not always 
indicate which procedural variation is referred to. Treaty  ar-
ticles  often  contain multiple options or  various exemptions 
from  a general rule. König, Luetgert and Dannwolf have 
opted for a ‘conservative’ coding  of  the respective variables, 
where an  unclear  procedural  rule was coded as the highest 
possible obstacle (unanimity rather than  qualitative majority 
voting, codecision rather than  consultation). A cross-
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tabulation  of  the information provided in PreLex and the 
separate coding  effort  based on  the legal basis shows a  num-
ber of discrepancies (Table 4.3 and 4.4). 
Table 4.3 Information on Council voting rule
           |            legal basis (CELEX)
    PreLex |     missing        QMV     unanimity |     Total
-----------+--------------------------------------+----------
   missing |       385        2,967         1,073 |     4,425 
       QMV |        41          524           132 |       697 
                              (39%)39         (10%)       
 unanimity |        49          409           279 |       737 
                               (30%)         (21%)
-----------+--------------------------------------+----------
     Total |       475        3,900         1,484 |     5,859
        
Source: Calculations based on (Stone Sweet and Brunell 2007). 
Table 4.4 Information on EP participation
           |              legal basis (CELEX)
    PreLex |     missing    no Veto40      Veto  |     Total
-----------+------------------------------------+----------
   missing |       394        2,713          14 |     3,121 
   no Veto |        79        2,260         159 |     2,498 
                               (85%)        (6%)
      Veto |         2          134         104 |       240 
                                (5%)        (4%)
-----------+------------------------------------+----------
     Total |       475        5,107         277 |     5,859 
Source: Calculations based on (Stone Sweet and Brunell 2007).
Where information was available from  both  sources, the cod-
ings agree in  60 percent of  cases with  regard to the Council 
voting  rule, and 89 percent with  regard to EP  veto. It appears 
that the manual  coding of  the legal  basis underestimates the 
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39 The percentage in brackets refers to the total amount of cases in the cells 
where information was available from both sources (QMV-QMV, QMV-
unanimity, unanimity-QMV, unanimity-unanimity).
40 I have coded the cooperation procedure to count as an instance of no EP 
veto (see below). 
use of  unanimity in the Council  (despite the ‘conservative’ 
coding), but for  the most part correctly  predicts the (lack of) 
veto powers of the European Parliament. As König, Luetgert 
and Dannwolf  point out: “This  suggests that scholars should 
pay  careful  attention to the drawbacks of procedural  indica-
tors” (König, Luetgert et  al. 2006: 565). About 40 percent of 
the codings for Council  voting rule and 11 percent of the cod-
ings for EP participation did not match. While the coding of 
legal  bases is  more complete, it may at the same time be less 
reliable, at least when  it comes to applicable voting rule in 
the Council  (cf. König, Luetgert  et al. 2006: 566-567). In  or-
der  to escape the ensuing dilemma of having to choose one 
option  over  the other, I opted to run my  analysis with  both 
options and interpret the results accordingly. I have moreo-
ver  included a third option, which  combines the two avail-
able sources, giving  precedence to PreLex information  and 
substituting the coded legal  basis where the former was miss-
ing. This  third option may  in  fact  be the most reliable meas-
ure available.  
Some further  recoding was necessary. The variable for  Coun-
cil voting  rule in  the König, Luetgert and Dannwolf dataset 
was already dichotomous (qualitative majority voting (QMV) 
vs. unanimity), but I recoded this variable to take the value 1 
when unanimity  was required, and 0 when QMV  was re-
quired. For  the participation of the European  Parliament in 
legislative procedures, I created a dummy variable that takes 
on a  value of 1 if  the European Parliament has  veto powers, 
and 0 if  it does not. I have defined veto powers narrowly  to 
exclude the EP’s suspensive veto in the cooperation proce-
dure, in  which  the Parliament’s  opinion  can ultimately  be 
overruled by  a unanimous Council  vote. The reasoning  is that 
the EP can  only  impose costs  on  the Council  in  the coopera-
tion  procedure if  the voting  rule stipulates QMV, which  is not 
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always the case.41 In effect, both  variables  take on a  value of  1 
when the number of  veto players  rises and procedural  hur-
dles for legislation are consequently high.  
In  order  to calculate an  ‘average legislative procedure’ for 
each policy field, I used the mean of the actual  legislative be-
haviour of Council  and Parliament in individual  policy  areas. 
Since I expect this  behaviour to vary  with  the changes in 
Treaty  basis, I calculated this separately for the three time 
periods governed by  different treaties in  my period of obser-
vation  (Treaty  of Rome, Single European Act and Treaty of 
Maastricht). For example, according to the data  recorded in 
PreLex, out of all  legislative acts in  the area of  agriculture 
under the Maastricht rules, the EP  had veto powers in only 
3.5% of cases (or 8.8%  according  to the coding  of the legal 
basis, and 2.7% according  to the combined coding). Council 
voting  rules on the other  hand stipulated unanimity  (as op-
posed to QMV) in  50.8% of legislative acts (or 23% according 
to the coding of the legal  basis, and 41.9% according to the 
combined coding). I would subsequently code the corre-
sponding variables as 0.035  and 0.508 respectively for both 
legislation  and litigation in that policy area  (or 0.088 and 
0.23 for the coding of  the legal basis  and 0.027  and 0.419 for 
the combined codes). In this fashion I created (three sets of) 
two independent variables  for  average Council  voting  rules 
and average EP  participation  corresponding to the percent-
age of actual legislative acts employing  unanimity  in the 
Council  and allowing for EP veto by policy area and appli-
cable treaty rules. 
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41  Apart from this substantial consideration, there are also large coding dis-
crepancies for the cooperation procedure between the different sources. The 
manual coding of the legal basis for legislation appears to greatly underesti-
mate the use of the cooperation procedure, coding many cases as 
“consultation/no EP involvement”. 
The figures below depict  the mean  of the two variables 
across  policy areas  over time – representing an ‘average an-
nual  legislative procedure’.42  It  is apparent that these vari-
ables, too, contain strong time trends.
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Source: calculations based on (König, Luetgert et al. 2006).
As would be expected, both  the Single European Act and the 
Treaty  of Maastricht extended the European  Parliament’s 
ability  to exert veto powers. Since I coded the cooperation 
procedure, introduced by the Single European Act, as no EP 
veto, the increase in EP  veto powers after 1987  is  slight (due, 
presumably, to a  greater  prevalence of the assent procedure), 
whereas the introduction  of codecision  in  Maastricht clearly 
had a significant impact. Compared to the data recorded in 
PreLex, the coding  of  the legal  basis  appears to slightly  un-
derestimate the EP’s veto powers before the entry into force 
of the Treaty  of Maastricht and to slightly overestimate it  
afterwards. This observation  is consistent with  the cross-
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42  Note that the figures technically depict the mean (across policy fields) of 
the mean legislative procedure in each policy field, as if each policy field 
produced the same amount of legislation. This is of course not true – the 
‘mean procedure’ of all actual legislative acts would be greatly skewed to-
wards the procedures applicable in the fields of customs union & free 
movement of goods and agriculture & fisheries, since they make up three 
quarters of all legislation. 
tabulation  of the two codings above, which  had shown slight 
discrepancies. 
A  different scenario emerges  in the data on the use of una-
nimity  in  the Council. It appears  that for the period before 
the Single European Act, the data recorded in PreLex shows 
a clear bias towards QMV. This would indicate that, early on, 
PreLex tended to record procedures that were extraordinary 
– in this case qualitative majority  voting in the Council. This 
consideration  would suggest that the combined code is likely 
a better estimate. Note that the importance of  the Luxem-
bourg compromise does not show in the data. While PreLex 
appears to primarily record the few instances of QMV  where 
they did occur  before the entry  into force of  the Single Euro-
pean  Act (cf. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 49), the cod-
ing of  the legal base does not seem  to take account of the 
compromise. Curiously, even  when  ignoring the pre-SEA 
period, the data show a slight but constant rise in  the use of 
legislative procedures mandating unanimity in the Council. 
This is certainly  counterintuitive, since both  the Single Euro-
pean  Act and the Treaty of Maastricht specifically  set out to 
expand majority  voting  to more policy areas. The informa-
tion  recorded in  PreLeX data for the actual  use of  the oppor-
tunity structures provided by the treaty indicates that this 
did not come about in  practice. The trend is still  puzzling, 
since it conflicts with the information  presented by  Fiona 
Hayes-Renshaw and Helen  Wallace for the period immedi-
ately following  the one covered above, based on  data pro-
vided by  the Council Secretariat  (Hayes-Renshaw and Wal-
lace 2006: 262). From  1999 to 2004, they  show legislative 
acts decided by  QMV  to outweigh  unanimous decisions by  a 
factor  of  2:1. I cannot resolve this conflict, but only  point to 
the vagaries of data availability, coding  rules and the defini-
tion of legislative acts. 
I employed a similar  procedure, using policy  field averages, 
to create two further  independent variables. The first of  these 
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is an  indicator for the degree of conflict in  the Council. The 
König, Luetgert and Dannwolf dataset contains information 
about the type of agenda item each proposal  ends up as  in 
Council  meetings, as documented in  the Official  Journal (cf. 
König, Luetgert et al. 2006: 561). The agenda for  each  Coun-
cil meeting is  made up of so-called A  points and B points. A 
points are issues that have been  resolved at the level  of work-
ing groups or the Permanent Representatives  and require no 
further discussion at ministerial  level. B points on the con-
trary  designate items that are still  contentious where conflict 
will  have to be resolved at the Council  meeting  itself. The 
prevalence of  B points on the Council  agenda is therefore a 
useful  indicator for the degree of conflict within the Council 
in a certain policy field. I created a  dummy variable that 
takes on the value of  1  if a proposal  ended up as a  B point, 
and 0 in  all  other  cases  (provided the information was not 
missing). From  this information, I created a  variable equal to 
the mean of B points by  policy  field and applicable treaty 
rules. Similarly, I created a  variable indicating  the prevalence 
of directives as a  legislative instrument in  a  particular policy 
field. The König, Luetgert and Dannwolf  dataset captures 
Commission initiatives for regulations, directives and deci-
sions. I subsequently  created a  dummy  variable that takes on 
a value of 1  if  the legislative instrument is  a directive, and 0 if 
otherwise. From  this, I created a variable equal to the mean 
of directives by policy area and applicable treaty rules.
Figure 4.9 depicts the mean of these variables across policy 
areas and over time. The two variables show distinct time 
trends. Over  time, the prevalence of directives as a policy 
instrument declines across policy fields, whereas the amount 
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of B points in the Council  rises after  1986 and recedes after 
1993.43
Figure 4.9 Mean of variables controversy and prevalence 
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controversy in the Councilprevalence of directives
Source: Calculations based on (König, Luetgert et al. 2006).
Political positions
I used data from  a  third dataset to create a  variable measur-
ing the ideological  distance between  the Commission, the 
Council  and the European  Parliament. Andreas Warntjen, 
Simon  Hix and Christophe Crombez (Warntjen, Hix et al. 
2008) have compiled information on  the party-political 
composition  of the EU’s legislative bodies from  1979 to 2006 
and combined this  with  information  on the parties’ ideologi-
cal  position based on data from  the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (Budge, Klingemann et al. 2001). This  project is a 
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43 Again, the figure technically depicts the mean (across policy fields) of the 
mean use of directives in each policy field, as if each policy field produced 
the same amount of legislation.The mean prevalence of directives of all ac-
tual legislative acts would be greatly skewed towards the procedures appli-
cable in the fields of customs union & free movement of goods and agricul-
ture & fisheries, since they make up three quarters of all legislation.
large scale attempt to position political parties  in a  multi-
dimensional  political space based on  a coding, as the name 
implies, of party manifestos. 
Warntjen, Hix  and Crombez’ dataset offers two dimensions 
of ideological  positions. One is  the ‘traditional’ left-right di-
mension, the other a measure of pro- or anti-European  lean-
ings. I have chosen  to concentrate solely  on the left-right di-
mension for several reasons. First, I find most conflicts over 
policy at the European  level  to be better  captured by  the left-
right spectrum  than pro- or anti-integration. Second, gov-
ernments tend to agree that some sort of  European  solution 
is preferable to the persistence of national rules. This is re-
flected in the data  that show very little variance on the pro-/
anti-European dimension  in the period of observation. All 
three legislative bodies are consistently scored as mildly  pro-
European, with very little volatility. Third, the CMP data on 
this dimension appears to be less reliable when  compared to 
other methods of estimating the ideological positions of par-
ties, expert surveys  in  particular. Scores for positions  on the 
left-right dimension on  the other hand correlate highly  be-
tween the CMP data and data derived from expert surveys 
(cf. Warntjen, Hix et al. 2008: 1250). 
In  order to position  each  of the three legislative bodies on a 
left-right ideological  dimension, Warntjen, Hix  and Crombez 
used the party  political  background of  their constituent 
members. In  the case of the Commission, they  used scores 
for  the party each  Commissioner  belonged to at the national 
level before his or  her nomination, and subsequently  calcu-
lated an  annual  mean of all Commissioner’s scores.44 For  the 
Council, they  used scores for the party-political  composition 
of national governments. In  the case of  coalition  govern-
ments, the scores where weighted by the number of  ministe-
rial  positions each party holds in  government. Since there is 
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44  Non party-affiliated Commissioners have been left out of the coding 
(Warntjen, Hix et al. 2008: 1247). 
greater fluctuation in the party-political make-up of the 
Council  (due to frequent national  elections), Warntjen, Hix 
and Crombez calculated a half-yearly  mean for  the ideologi-
cal  position of the Council  (cf. Warntjen, Hix et al. 2008: 
1249). Finally, the European Parliament’s  position was de-
termined by weighting the constituent (national) parties’ 
score by  their  allocated seats and calculating an annual 
mean. Figure 4.10 shows the resulting positions of the three 
legislative bodies  over time. A  positive score indicates ‘right-
ward’ leanings, negative scores the opposite. 
Figure 4.10: EU legislative institutions’ mean party politi-
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Source: Data based on (Warntjen, Hix et al. 2008).
With the exception of 1984, both  the Commission and the 
European Parliament show very  little volatility. The first and 
third Delors  Commissions leant slightly to the left, the sec-
ond Delors Commission somewhat more pronouncedly  to the 
right, and the Santer  Commission about equally pronounc-
edly to the left. Of the three election periods covered after 
1985, the mean  score of  the European Parliament was largely 
centrist for  two periods, with  a more pronounced move to the 
left after the 1994 elections. Predictably, the scores for the 
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Council  show more volatility. I calculated a  yearly  mean of 
the half-yearly  scores provided by  Warntjen, Hix and Crom-
bez, which  slightly  understates the magnitude of  the 
oscillation.45 Overall, I can identify  three tentative periods of 
Council  positions: an initial  right-leaning period from 1986 
to 1991, a generally  left-leaning period from 1992 to 1995, 
and a final  right-leaning one from  1996. I subsequently cal-
culated the absolute annual ideological  distance between  the 
Commission and the EP,  and the Commission and the Coun-
cil (figure 4.11). 
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Source: Data based on (Warntjen, Hix et al. 2008).
Except for 1984 and the period between 1989 and 1993, the 
ideological  positions of the Commission  and the European 
Parliament largely coincide. The distance between  Commis-
sion  and Council  however varies significantly, with the great-
est agreement in  1985, between 1988 and 1992 and again  in 
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45 In particular, this affects a distinct ‘rightward’ spike in the second half of 
1986, and a pronounced right-left-right oscillation from 1988 and 1990. For 
all other dates, the trends and amplitude of the scores match quite well. 
1995. With  the exception of  1993, these periods cover  the 
respective years of appointment (1985, 1988, 1995). 
Naturally, a number of  caveats apply. Taken for  granted that 
the Comparative Manifesto Project  provides meaningful 
scores, it  may still  be doubtful  whether  the ideological scor-
ing of an individual’s national  party-political background is 
truly a  useful  indicator of  that person’s ideological  position 
on the European  level, be they Commissioners, members of 
the European  Parliament or government representatives in 
the Council. It may be assumed that such  an indicator cor-
rectly  reflects general personal inclinations towards policy 
content, but it may  only  weakly  account for personal  posi-
tions on specific issues. There is evidence for Commissioners 
and Parliamentarians in particular that nationality is a  better 
predictor  of political  positions as party  affiliation (for  the 
Commission, cf. Wonka 2008: 1158).46 Nor does it reflect the 
process of socialisation  and adaptation that comes with  a  
position at the European  level  – this being applicable mainly 
to Commissioners and MEPs, but also to situations of collec-
tive bargaining  in the Council. Moreover, the calculation of  a 
mean  for  a specific institution may  be a crude procedure to 
locate an aggregate institutional position. 
Nonetheless, I find the advantages of this procedure to out-
weigh its drawbacks. Using  means of  constituent individuals’ 
positions as an indicator  for  institutional positions is a  rela-
tively  straightforward measure compared to more elaborate 
procedures. Using the pivotal  member’s position, for exam-
ple, as is widely employed in  spatial analysis, is difficult  to 
apply across  the board, since the pivotal member of an  insti-
tution changes with  applicable decision-making rules (e.g. 
simple or absolute majority  in  the European Parliament, 
qualitative majority or unanimity in  the Council). Mean-
based indicators on  the contrary  can be generally  employed, 
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46  It should be noted that since the CMP codes are based on national party 
manifestos, nationality is at least partially captured. 
are reasonably parsimonious  and have been  shown  to pro-
duce meaningful  results empirically (cf. Warntjen, Hix et al. 
2008: 1247). Using manifesto data to position  individual ac-
tors in political space is also reasonably straightforward and 
generally  replicable. The efforts  of the Comparative Mani-
festo Project have made such  data widely  available, and there 
are often very few alternatives. Using  individual  voting  re-
cords to establish ideological  positions  is only possible for 
roll-call votes in the European  Parliament and for  a  limited 
amount of Council  decisions where such  votes  have been re-
corded. Where expert survey data  is available, this has been 
shown to correlate with the CMP data to a large degree (cf. 
Warntjen, Hix et al. 2008: 1246). 
In  general  I would summarise that the CMP data represents 
a useful  measure to locate an  institution’s basic ideological 
leanings  – not least for lack of  a viable alternative. The de-
scribed procedure in  my  opinion produces a  generally unbi-
ased if  somewhat rough  indicator of the potential  for inter-
institutional conflict over policy  content, all  else equal. Re-
sults will naturally have to be interpreted accordingly. 
Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics on all variables in the 
analysis
                  Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min       Max
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
             ratio lit/leg |       203    .2245109    .2541377          0         1
Council unanimity (PreLex) |       132    .6183941    .2783613          0         1
          EP veto (PreLex) |       193    .1415545    .2088385          0         1
         Council unanimity
             (legal basis) |       203    .5963491    .3176333          0         1
     EP veto (legal basis) |       203    .1429146    .1977036          0        .8
         Council unanimity 
                (combined) |       203    .6272621    .2733097          0         1
        EP veto (combined) |       203    .1267653    .1875563          0        .8
  Distance Commission - EP |       203    1.538479    2.115594   .0463006    6.8805
                  Distance 
      Commission - Council |       203    4.109474     2.93762   .1862149  11.30278
Controversy in the Council |       203     .103824     .083692          0       .25
  Prevalence of directives |       203    .3519254    .3016992          0         1
    market-oriented policy |       203    .6502463     .478071          0         1
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For an overview, table 4.5 provides  descriptive statistics on 
all variables used in the analysis.
4.4 Results and discussion
My hypotheses predict that  the ratio of  litigation  to legisla-
tion  should be higher  in  policy  areas characterised by higher 
obstacles to successful  legislation (i.e. where legislation  is 
less likely to pass). I therefore expect the regression coeffi-
cients  for  the variables Council  voting rule and EP veto pow-
ers to be positive and significant. I moreover expect the coef-
ficient for the variables indicating  the absolute distance be-
tween the Commission  and the Council  and the Commission 
and the EP respectively, as well as the coefficient for  the 
prevalence of B points on the Council  agenda  (as a  proxy for 
conflict within the Council) to be positive and significant. I 
also expect the effect for the variable indicating the preva-
lence of  directives to be positive. Since I expect  market-
oriented policies to produce more litigation, the effect for  the 
dummy variable for  market-oriented policies should be posi-
tive, too. To test the hypotheses, I ran an OLS regression in-
cluding  dummy  variables for the years of  the period of obser-
vation. These dummy  variables act as controls for time 
trends (they function as  time fixed effects). I ran three sepa-
rate models, each  with a different coding  base of the two in-
dependent variables “Council unanimity”  and “EP  veto”. As 
described above, these codings were based on  the informa-
tion  recorded in PreLex (PreLex), the legal base as manually 
coded by König, Luetgert and Dannwolf  (EUR-Lex), and a 
combined coding (combined) respectively. 
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Table 4.6: Results of OLS regression (with time fixed ef-
fects)
                  -----------------------------------------------------------
                       Variable |    PreLex         EUR-Lex        combined       
                   -------------+--------------------------------------------
     Council unanimity (PreLex) |    -0.040                                   
               EP veto (PreLex) |    -0.153                                    
Council unanimity (legal basis) |                   -0.038                    
          EP veto (legal basis) |                   -0.395***                  
   Council unanimity (combined) |                                  -0.017     
             EP veto (combined) |                                  -0.343***       
       Distance Commission - EP |    -0.024         -0.032*        -0.025     
  Distance Commission - Council |    -0.003          0.004         -0.001     
     Controversy in the Council |     0.093          0.435*         0.421  
       Prevalence of directives |     0.526***       0.582***       0.592***  
         market-oriented policy |    -0.093*        -0.075*        -0.056   
                    _Iyear_1985 |    -0.067         -0.074         -0.078     
                    _Iyear_1986 |    -0.186         -0.163         -0.148     
                    _Iyear_1987 |    -0.094         -0.180*        -0.139     
                    _Iyear_1988 |    -0.202         -0.175*        -0.146     
                    _Iyear_1989 | (omitted)      (omitted)      (omitted)     
                    _Iyear_1990 |    -0.102         -0.119         -0.121     
                    _Iyear_1991 |    -0.133         -0.079         -0.077     
                    _Iyear_1992 |    -0.155         -0.184**       -0.170*    
                    _Iyear_1993 |    -0.131         -0.236**       -0.198*    
                    _Iyear_1994 | (omitted)      (omitted)      (omitted)     
                    _Iyear_1995 |    -0.087         -0.034         -0.053     
                    _Iyear_1996 |    -0.036          0.018          0.002     
                    _Iyear_1997 |    -0.007         -0.008         -0.007     
                    _Iyear_1998 |     0.034          0.083          0.074   
                          _cons |     0.263          0.213*         0.176     
                   -------------+------------------------------------------
                              N |       131            203            203     
                             r2 |      .392           .435           .425                   
                   --------------------------------------------------------
                                    legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
The results do not confirm  my central  hypotheses (table 4.6). 
Council  voting rules have no statistically significant effect on 
the Commission’s use of  litigation (measured as the ratio of 
litigation to legislation), regardless of  coding. A  surprising 
effect is evident for the involvement of  the European  Parlia-
ment. When  this variable is  coded according to the legal basis 
or a  combination of  information in  PreLex  and the legal  ba-
sis, the analysis suggests the opposite of  the expected effect. 
Increased involvement of the European Parliament coincides 
with  lesser  use of the infringement procedure by the Com-
mission. It is unlikely that this  is a  causal  effect. The results 
essentially indicate that policy  areas characterised by greater 
EP  involvement also have a  lower ratio of litigation to legisla-
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tion, all else equal. Likewise, one of the models (m2) indi-
cates that an  increasing political  distance between  the Com-
mission  and the EP (as measured by CMP scores) decreases 
the use of  litigation, contrary  to what I predicted. Again, I 
can  think of no sensible causal  mechanism. This finding indi-
cates that, all  else equal, at times of  greater ideological dis-
tance, the Commission’s use of litigation was  lower than at 
times of greater  agreement. A  comparison of  figures 4.7  and 
4.11  above suggests that this is  so. The major period of  ideo-
logical  distance between the Commission  and the EP  (from 
1989  to 1993) coincides with  the lowest ratio of  litigation  to 
legislation. The distance between political  positions of  the 
Commission and the Council have no effect on  the dependent 
variable. 
The effect of the dummy  variable indicating market-oriented 
policies is  statistically significant in  two of the models (m1 
and m2), but  again  the effect is  opposite to what could be 
expected based on some assumptions in  the literature. All 
else equal, market-oriented policy areas see slightly  less liti-
gation  (relative to legislation) than interventionist policy  ar-
eas do, but the effect is not strong. A  possible explanation 
could be James Caporaso and Sidney  Tarrow’s more recent 
argument that legal  developments have in fact  bolstered in-
terventionist social policy and a form of “embedded liberal-
ism” at  the European Union level  (Caporaso and Tarrow 
2009: 615). A  competing  explanation could be related to 
Martin  Höpner and Armin Schäfer’s counterargument that 
legal  developments in  the EU have in fact three dimensions, 
which  they  describe as “market-shaping”, “market-
enhancing”, and the creation of  a “European  area  of nondis-
crimination” (Höpner  and Schäfer 2012: 431). They argue 
that the latter  category, in  particular, has  given rise to judi-
cial  proceedings  that pit individual  rights against collective 
solidarity. While they  agree that this development cannot be 
characterised as market-enhancing, they  demonstrate that 
neither  can it be called interventionist or market-restricting 
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in  a conventional  sense (Höpner and Schäfer  2012: 446). In 
any  case, this finding disagrees with  the assumption  of a  sin-
gular pro-market bias in EU law.
My control  variable for the prevalence of directives has the 
strongest and most robust effect of the analysed variables, 
suggesting  that infringement proceedings cluster  predomi-
nantly around the transposition of directives. This does not 
necessarily  mean  that infringement proceedings predomi-
nantly target technical  issues of  non-transpositions. Cases 
concerning allegedly  incorrect transpositions of directives 
can equally contain controversy about the content of policy. 
Finally, there is limited evidence supporting my  initial 
proposition that the Commission  uses infringement proceed-
ings where legislative obstacles are high. In one of the mod-
els  (m2), the variable indicating  controversy within the 
Council  has a  strong and significant effect. Moreover, the 
coefficient only  narrowly misses statistical significance in  m3 
(p=0.06). Since the effect is  quite strong (almost equal  to the 
effect of  my  control variable concerning directives), this 
leaves some room for my original proposition. 
A  number of conclusions can  be drawn from this result. First, 
as a  general  insight, it  has become apparent that the coding 
of legislative procedures is a complicated process – the dif-
ferent coding rules  I employed have a  significant impact on 
the results of the statistical  test. König, Luetgert and Dann-
wolf’s observation  that more attention  should be paid to the 
quality  of procedural indicators is strongly  corroborated by 
this study (cf. König, Luetgert et al. 2006: 565). 
Some other  insights should carry  over into my case studies. 
There is  some, albeit weak, evidence that the prevalence of 
controversy  in  the Council  has an  effect on the Commission’s 
choice of  strategy. It would be valuable to find evidence of a 
causal  link for  this effect. The substantive dimension or ideo-
logical  profile of  a  policy  area  does not seem to have a  strong 
effect on  the Commission’s use of infringement proceedings. 
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If anything, it  tends to engage in  more litigation (relative to 
legislation) where the subject matter  does  not relate to a 
market-making policy  area in  the classical  sense. My case 
studies concern  both  a  market-oriented and an  intervention-
ist policy  area, so the following chapters should allow for 
more insights. Finally, my analysis has so far  not incorpo-
rated other judicial  strategies  open to the Commission, in 
particular the lodging of observations in  cases arising  out of 
preliminary references. I have stated my  reasons for  doing so 
above, but it is quite possible that the Commission’s use of 
the infringement procedure is not independent of its inter-
ventions in  preliminary  reference procedures. The case stud-
ies will allow me to include such  proceedings in my analysis 
and I should be able to say more about the interrelationship 
between different judicial  procedures in my concluding chap-
ter.  
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Chapter 5 
Removing barriers to trade
This chapter and the next cover two case studies  of the 
Commission’s use of legislation  and litigation  in two policy 
areas over  time. The first of these case studies (this chapter) 
concerns the free movement of  goods within  the EU, in par-
ticular  the prohibition  of barriers to trade arising from na-
tional  product standards. The second (chapter 6) traces 
Commission action  aiming to expand the right to free move-
ment for member state nationals from an  initial  economic 
right to a  fundamental  freedom  of all  Union citizens  regard-
less of their economic activity. 
The aim  of this procedure is to provide a  further empirical 
test  of the propositions developed in the preceding chapter, 
while taking account of the results of the statistical  analysis 
as described in the conclusion to that chapter. The case stud-
ies cover a longer  time period than  the statistical  analysis, 
tracing Commission action  in the two policy  areas from the 
early  years of  the European  Economic Community to close to 
the present day. This allows me to take into account long-
term dynamics and learning  effects that  have informed the 
Commission’s choice of strategy  over  time. They also cover  a 
wider range of Commission action, including the Commis-
sion’s use of legislative initiatives, infringement proceedings, 
observations in  preliminary  references proceedings and 
other forms of presenting its  policy  positions to the political 
environment (annual reports, action  plans, responses to par-
liamentary  questions, etc.). A closer attention  to the stated 
motivations underlying Commission  action, as  revealed in 
such  documents, provides  the potential  to causally  link the 
proposed explanatory factors to actual strategy choices. 
The rationale for case selection has been  laid out  in  detail  in 
chapter 1. While covering essential  fields of  Commission 
policy-making efforts, both cases  differ  with  regard to the 
substantive dimension  and ideological  profile of the policy 
areas concerned, legislative procedures (after the Single 
European Act), and the degree of contentiousness over time. 
This chapter  proceeds as follows. I will start with a brief 
overview of central  characteristics  of the policy area. The 
second part (5.2) focuses on  the contested interpretation of 
which  national  measures were illegal by virtue of the Treaty 
provisions on  the free movement of goods. The third part 
(5.3) then  takes up the Commission’s legislative efforts at 
harmonizing member  state laws in the areas where member 
state action had not been  precluded by primary law. The 
fourth  part (5.4) combines  the strands, focusing on  the 
Commission’s efforts following the Court’s ruling  in  the Cas-
sis de  Dijon case to establish  the principle of mutual  recogni-
tion. The remainder  of  the case study  traces the use of  mu-
tual recognition  as a contested policy  tool  to the current day 
(5.5), while a final section concludes (5.6). 
5.1 Overview
Following  the objective of gradually  building  a  common 
market, the governments of the member  states  had set them-
selves the aim  to abolish barriers to trade in  goods, targeting 
those national rules that  put imports at a disadvantage com-
pared to domestic products. First and foremost this  con-
cerned custom duties and quantitative restrictions on im-
ports, classical  hallmarks of protectionist economic policies. 
But many non-discriminatory rules of  trade also adversely  
affect imports, or generally  impede trade, while at the same 
time serving  important purposes, such  as  public health  and 
consumer  protection (like rules prohibiting additives for  cer-
tain foodstuffs). The original means of dealing with  this 
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problem was common legislation  that would harmonize the 
divergent national product norms and standards, allowing 
for  possible economies of  scale in  the production  of  goods for 
a European market. The central  question that emerged was 
how much  leeway member states would have in organising 
their domestic markets in the absence of harmonization.
The central  legal provisions in this domain were listed in  part 
three, title I, chapter  2 of the EEC Treaty under  the heading 
“elimination of quantitative restrictions between member 
states”. These articles state the general  prohibitions and ap-
plicable exceptions. The original  wording has remained 
largely  unchanged since. The Treaty  of Amsterdam  replaced 
the word “elimination” with  “prohibition”, reordered some of 
the articles  and deleted those that had become obsolete since 
the end of  the original transitory  period after  the Treaty of 
Rome. The remaining provision  are now articles 34-37  TFEU 
following the Treaty  of Lisbon. While these provisions state 
general  prohibitions, the corresponding procedures for legis-
lative harmonization were codified in article 100 EEC, which 
stipulated that “the Council, acting  unanimously  on a pro-
posal from the Commission, shall  issue directives for the ap-
proximation  of such provisions laid down by  law, regulation 
or administrative action  in Member States as directly  affect 
the establishment or functioning of  the common  market”. 
Additionally, the EP was to be consulted in  cases where na-
tional  implementation would “involve the amendment of leg-
islation”. The Single European Act added article 100A, which 
introduced both  qualitative majority  voting and the coopera-
tion  procedure for harmonization  measures in the context of 
the single market programme. The Treaty of Maastricht 
changed the procedure for  this article to codecision. This 
framework essentially  remains in place today. Article 114 
TFEU covers harmonization  measures that apply  to ”  the 
achievement of the objectives” of the internal  market (as out-
lined in  article 26 TFEU), and mandates the ordinary legisla-
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tive procedure, subject to a  number of  exceptions and safe-
guard measures. In particular, fiscal provisions, measures 
relating to the free movement of persons, or those related to 
the rights  and interests  of employed persons are exempted 
from  its range of application  (art. 114(2) TFEU). Such meas-
ures require the application of article 115 TFEU, which re-
mains essentially  the old article 100 EEC, stipulating una-
nimity  and the consultation procedure, and allowing only for 
the passage of directives. 
5.2 Quantitative restrictions and measures having 
equal effect
Article 30 EEC prohibited quantitative restrictions to trade 
and all  measures having equivalent effect.47  As  with  many 
such  general  prohibitions, the Treaty  went on  to state a  series 
of exemptions, enumerated in  article 36 EEC, listing a series 
of justifications for national  trade barriers. These were “pub-
lic morality, public policy or public security; the protection  of 
health  and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection 
of natural  treasures possessing artistic, historic or  archeo-
logical  value; or the protection  of industrial  and commercial 
property”. These justifications, in turn, were subject to the 
stipulation  that they  must not “constitute a means of arbi-
trary  discrimination  or a  disguised restriction  on trade be-
tween Member States”.
While the concept of  ‘quantitative restrictions to trade’ was 
easy enough  to define, the Treaty  did not provide a  definition 
of what would constitute a  ‘measure having  equivalent ef-
fect’. There was also no precedent in  international  law (cf. 
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47 While this prohibition applied to all national rules adopted after the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Rome, the High Contracting Parties authorized the 
Commission in article 33(7) to issue directives addressing national measures 
that had previously been in effect.
Deringer 1981: 95).48 While this  definition may  have seemed 
like a  technical  detail, it in fact bore substantial  conse-
quences. The core of the conflict was (and continues to be) 
about the balance between the basic concept of the ‘free 
movement of  goods’ (the absence of barriers to trade) and 
the national  regulatory  autonomy of the member states (cf. 
Deringer 1981: 96). Both  aims are inherently conflictive. Na-
tional  trade regulations may  hinder cross-border  trade (say, 
by  imposing  marketing standards that are more costly  to 
meet for  foreign producers than  domestic ones), but at the 
same time serve legitimate goals of public policy, such  as 
consumer  protection, public health  or environmental protec-
tion. 
An  expansive interpretation of the treaty’s  prohibition  of 
measures having an equivalent effect would have included all 
national  trade regulations that potentially  hindered cross-
border  trade, even where they indiscriminately applied to 
foreign  and domestic products alike.49 The official  Commis-
sion  position  consisted of a somewhat more cautious ap-
proach. The question about the interpretation of what na-
tional  measures might constitute (illegal) measures having 
an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions was first pub-
licly posed by  the chairman of the Legal  Affairs  Committee of 
the European Parliament, German  MEP Arved Deringer. 
While the Court of  Justice had already provided an interpre-
tation of ‘charges having equivalent effect to customs duties’, 
prohibited under article 12 EEC, its equivalent for quantita-
tive restrictions had so far not been subject to Court proceed-
ings. In a  series  of written  questions to the European  Com-
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48  While the GATT also aimed to remove import quotas, it did not include 
measures having equivalent effect. 
49  Such an interpretation was in fact proposed as early as 1967 by Pieter 
VerLoren van Themaat, who had just retired from his position as Director 
General of the influential DG IV (competition), which he had held from 
1958-1967, and who would later become Advocate General at the Court of 
Justice from 1981 to 1986 (cf. Ehlermann 1977: 583; Veelken 1977: 319).
mission, Deringer  asked how many related cases had oc-
curred and whether the Commission had arrived at a work-
ing definition of  the concept (OJ 1967, No. 9/122, German 
edition). The Commission responded that it had indeed en-
countered a  number of such  cases and was addressing them 
on a case by  case basis (OJ 1967, No. 59/901, German  edi-
tion). As a result of this  practice, most national measures 
that preclude or raise the costs  of imports relative to domes-
tic products would be considered a measure having equiva-
lent effect to a  quantitative restriction. Such  ‘measures’ 
would be interpreted widely to include an  extensive range of 
government actions. Also, it would be sufficient for measures 
to be potentially  harmful  to trade, making  it unnecessary  to 
demonstrate that such  measures actually  hindered imports. 
So far, the Commission  followed an expansive interpretation 
of measures having and equivalent effect. However, it 
pointed out that national measures  that applied indiscrimi-
nately to domestic and imported goods alike would as gen-
eral  rule not be captured by the restrictions. It  also pointed 
out that its interpretation  might be subject to change with 
further experience and that a final  answer to this problem 
would lie with  the Court  of Justice (OJ 1967, No. 169/12, 
German edition).
Three years later, the Commission adopted an  official inter-
pretation  in Commission  Directive 70/50. Based on  article 
33(7) EEC, which  empowered the Commission to issue direc-
tives abolishing measures  of equivalent effect which  had 
been in  place before the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Rome, this directive was  technically legally binding  only until 
the end of the transitional  period on 1 January  1970 (cf. Craig 
and de Búrca 2011: 639). It nonetheless served as  an impor-
tant guideline in the interpretation of what constitutes a 
measure having equivalent effect beyond that date (cf. Oliver 
1982: 56). This directive paid closer attention  to the distinc-
tion  between national measures that discriminate between 
Removing barriers to trade 143
domestic and imported goods and those that do not (so 
called ‘indistinctly applicable rules’). The basic rationale was 
to generally  prohibit discriminatory barriers, except in  such 
cases where such  a rule could be justified by  one of the objec-
tives listed in  article 36 EEC. For indistinctly  applicable 
rules, i.e. such rules that  imposed certain  marketing  stan-
dards on all products within  a  state,50 imports  and domestic 
goods alike, the Commission foresaw greater national  discre-
tion, recognising that restrictive effects on  trade “are nor-
mally  inherent in the disparity  between rules applied by 
Member States” (recital 9, Directive 70/50). In principle, 
such  rules should be upheld where they serve a legitimate 
policy goal  (including objectives  not listed in  article 36 EEC) 
and simultaneously  meet  strict proportionality criteria  (Craig 
and de Búrca 2011: 647) – they  would be legal  as long as they 
were appropriate for the achievement of the stated goal  and 
there were no alternative measures to achieving  this goal  that 
are less  restrictive to trade.51  The Commission’s aim in  this 
twofold approach  was to prevent an expansive interpretation 
of the exemptions listed in article 36 EEC without unduly 
restricting  member state regulatory  autonomy (cf. Ehler-
mann 1973: 11).52  
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50  The directive speaks of “measures governing the marketing of products 
which deal, in particular, with shape, size, weight, composition, presenta-
tion, identification or putting up” (article 3, Directive 70/50).
51  The directive would uphold such measures unless their restrictive effect 
exceeds their “intrinsic effect”, in particular where “the restrictive effects on 
the free movement of goods are out of proportion to their purpose”, or “the 
same objective can be attained by other means which are less of a hindrance 
to trade” (article 3, Directive 70/50).
52 Ehlermann, later Director of the Commisison’s Legal Service (1977-1987) 
moreover states: “Denn nach der von der Kommission erarbeiteten Theorie 
ist es zur Rechtfertigung einer unterschiedslos anwendbaren Maßnahme 
nicht notwendig, auf Artikel 36 zurückzugreifen; insbesondere ist es nicht 
erforderlich, daß einer der in diesem Artikel genannten Gründe vorliegt. Es 
genügt vielmehr irgendein Ziel, das unter Berücksichtigung der handelsbe-
schränkenden Wirkung des zu seiner Erreichung erforderlichen Mittels 
legitim erscheint: ob sich dieses Ziel mit den in Artikel 36 aufgeführten 
Gründen deckt, ist nicht entscheidend.” (Ehlermann 1973: 7). 
This interpretation was the outcome of a long series  of cases 
the Commission  had dealt  with throughout the 1960s (cf. 
Oliver 1988: 83). The Commission  had initiated a number of 
infringement proceedings since the early 1960s  against sev-
eral  member  state measures (cf. European  Commission 
1968: 42), including such  diverse subjects as  an (indistinctly 
applicable) Belgian rule regulating  the nitrate content of  fer-
tiliser, a  French rule regulating  the marketing of woolen 
blankets, a  Dutch  rule regulating  ingredients in meat prod-
ucts, and a German rule regulating the lead content in  petrol 
(cf. Ehlermann 1973: 9-10). All  of  these disputes were settled 
at the administrative stage of the procedure, and none of 
them were referred to the Court of Justice.
The Commission first tested its definition of a  measure hav-
ing equivalent effect  before the Court in its  observations in 
International Fruit Company (joined cases 51  to 54/71)53. 
Here, the Commission defined such  measures as those whose 
effect on trade is indirect and “arises  from the fact that im-
ports  or exports are rendered more difficult or  costly  in  com-
parison with  the marketing of the domestic product. The dif-
ficulties  created for imports or exports may be absolute or 
relative but it is in any event the potential  effect of the meas-
ure in  question  which must  be taken  into consideration” 
(joined cases  51  to 54/71, ECR  1971: 1113). This view con-
flicted with that of the Dutch  government, which  had also 
intervened in  the proceedings. It considered that the “prohi-
bition on quantitative restrictions and measures having 
equivalent effect must be interpreted as meaning that in-
fringement of the articles  referred to in the question  asked 
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53  A note on my citation of court cases: ECR is short for ‘European Court 
Reports’, which is an annual publication by the Court of Justice, containing 
all available documentation of a case. The volume’s year of publication also 
indicates the year of the judgement. The name in italics indicates the name 
of the central party. Infringement proceedings carry the title ‘Commission v 
[member state]’. All other cited cases arise from preliminary references.
can  only  follow from an actual application of  measures con-
trary  to this prohibition” (joined cases 51 to 54/71, ECR  1971: 
1112, original italics). 
Despite these differences, the Commission repeated its con-
ciliatory stance on  the regulatory autonomy of member 
states: “Of course it must not be concluded from  this that  all 
measures having a  restrictive effect on  imports or  exports are 
to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions: [...] there are other measures 
which, although  they have an inherently  restrictive effect on 
trade, are compatible with  the Treaty. These are measures 
falling within the framework of the powers or options explic-
itly or  by implication left to the Member States  (for example 
provisions on  commerce and on  customs clearance). Natu-
rally  those measures are also prohibited if the restrictive ef-
fect which they involve exceeds the extent necessary  to attain 
the objective sought” (joined cases  51  to 54/71, ECR 1971: 
1114). 
While the case shows the divergent views of the Commission 
and some member states, the Court did not solve the conflict 
or address this interpretation in its  ruling. Later  judgements 
also refrained from doing so, although the Court started re-
ferring intermittently to the Commission’s definition in 
Commission Directive 70/50, lending it a  certain  degree of 
legal  authority  (cf. Veelken  1977: 338). This situation 
changed in  the central  Court case in  this early conflict about 
national  regulatory  autonomy, Dassonville  (Case 8/74, ECR 
1974: 837), which  is still part of all  introductory courses  on 
internal  market law. Like several later landmark judgements, 
curiously, Dassonville  related to the import of alcoholic bev-
erages, in  this instance Scotch whisky. Gustave and Benoit 
Dassonville, Franco-Belgian wholesalers of  spirits, had im-
ported to Belgium from  France a batch  of  ‘Johnnie Walker’ 
and ‘Vat 69’ Scotch  whisky, contravening  a Belgian  law that 
mandated a  certificate of  origin for such products, issued by 
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government authorities of  the exporting country. Having 
bought the whisky  in  France, the Dassonvilles merely  affixed 
to their  bottles a  reference to the documents held by  the 
original French importer, which the Dasonvilles  themselves 
did not possess. For this practice, they were taken to court 
both by the Belgian  government and by  two private Belgian 
companies, who had been  the exclusive importers of these 
Scotch  whiskies for  Belgium. The case came before a  Belgian 
appellate court, where the Dassonvilles argued that the Bel-
gian requirement for a  certificate of origin  constituted a 
measure having  equivalent effect to a  quantitative restriction. 
The Belgian court in turn  referred the question to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. 
In  its observation in  Dassonville, the Commission repeated 
its assertion  that “any  measure, whatever its nature or con-
tent may, by  reason of  its effect  on  the free movement of 
goods, constitute a measure having equivalent effect” (Case 
8/74, ECR 1974: 846). This was  disputed by the British  gov-
ernment, which, echoing the earlier  assertion by  the Dutch 
government in  International Fruit Company, stated that 
“the concept of ‘measure having equivalent effect’ does  not 
cover  measures which  are only potentially  liable to have such 
an effect” (Case 8/74, ECR 1974: 844). The Court’s judge-
ment in return  provided an authoritative interpretation, 
which  has subsequently  become the standard textbook defi-
nition: “All  trading rules enacted by Member  States  which 
are capable of hindering, directly or  indirectly, actually or  
potentially, intra-Community  trade are to be considered as 
measures having an  effect equivalent to quantitative restric-
tions” (Case 8/74, ECR 1974: 852). To this degree, the Court 
followed the wider  approach  favoured by  the Commission. 
However, in  all  appearance, the Court seemed to go beyond 
the Commission’s position. In  its observations, the Commis-
sion  had reiterated its conciliatory  approach  to member state 
regulatory  autonomy: “Trading rules which apply  equally to 
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national  products and imported products do not in principle 
constitute measures having  equivalent effect within  the 
meaning of Articles 30 et seq of the EEC Treaty”, subject to 
the qualification  that “the right of Member States to regulate 
trade by  means of  provisions applying equally  to imported 
products is  not unlimited. This right can be exercised only to 
attain  the objectives of the rules concerned and must be 
suited to those objectives”  (Case 8/74, ECR 1974: 846-847). 
The Court made no mention of  this distinction. In  fact, its 
use of the phrase “all trading  rules enacted by  Member 
States”  (my emphasis) seemed to indicate that it  disagreed 
that a  distinction should be made between  discriminatory 
and indistinctly  applicable rules. Moreover, the judges 
seemed to introduce a ‘rule of reason’ approach  to all  restric-
tive measures (cf. Craig  and de Búrca  2011: 640). In  the ab-
sence of common rules, member states would be allowed to 
take measures to prevent “unfair practices”. Such  potentially 
justifiable measures however, would be subject to the condi-
tion  “that these measures should be reasonable” (Case 8/74, 
ECR 1974: 852). This  seemed to indicate that the Court 
agreed to the proportionality  test proposed by the Commis-
sion, but extended it to all  possible justifications, even  those 
expressly listed in article 36 EEC.
This broad interpretation threatened to severely  curtail 
member states’ ability  to regulate trade, going well beyond 
the Commission’s  conciliatory  stance on indistinctly applica-
ble measures. However, all  relevant court cases to this  date 
had concerned rules relating specifically to imports – no 
genuine indistinctly  applicable rule had yet been  disputed 
(cf. Ehlermann 1977: 589; Oliver 1980: 110-111). 
Such  rules first  became subject of court proceedings in a  se-
ries of cases concerning mandatory  minimum pricing. In  its 
observations in van Tiggele (Case 82/77), yet another case 
about alcoholic beverages (Genever, this time), the Commis-
sion  specifically  repeated its assertion  that “there is  no doubt 
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that even rules  fixing price and profit margins which  apply 
without distinction to domestic products  and imported 
products may also constitute measures having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions within  the meaning  of 
Article 30”, in particular (quoting  Directive 70/50), “‘where 
the restrictive effects on  the free movement of  goods are out 
of proportion to their purpose’ and where 'the same objective 
can  be attained by other means which are less of a hindrance 
to trade'”  (Case 82/77, ECR 1978: 33, my emphasis). This 
view was specifically contested by the Dutch government 
(Case 82/77, ECR  1978: 31-32). While the Court clearly  fol-
lowed the Commission’s position, it did not seem  to take ac-
count of the stated qualifications to this view. Ruling that 
“Article 30 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted to mean 
that the establishment by a national  authority of  a  minimum 
retail price fixed at a specific amount and applicable without 
distinction  to domestic products and imported products con-
stitutes [...] a  measure having an effect equivalent to a  quan-
titative restriction on imports which is prohibited under the 
said Article 30”  (Case 82/77, ECR  1978: 40), the Court did 
not address the question if  such an  indistinctly  applicable 
measure might be justified, as was the Commission’s posi-
tion, and whether  such  justification might be subject to a 
proportionality test. 
This question was the subject of yet another  landmark case 
concerning national  regulations of the market for alcoholic 
beverages. In  Cassis  de  Dijon (Case 120/78), the German 
retail company Rewe complained against a  decision of a 
German regulatory authority  (the ‘Bundesmonopolverwal-
tung für  Branntwein’) barring  the marketing  in Germany  of 
the French black currant liqueur Cassis de Dijon, on account 
of the fact that its alcohol content was lower  than that man-
dated for the sale of  liqueurs in Germany. The Commission 
had in  fact some years earlier initiated infringement proceed-
ings against the German  government in  a very similar case 
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concerning an  import ban  for  aniseed liqueur, based on the 
same reasoning, but this case had been concluded before 
reaching the Court. The German government had granted an 
exception  for the product in question, without abolishing  the 
general rule (cf. Alter and Meunier Aitsahalia 1994: 538). 
The Court’s judgement in Cassis  de  Dijon had two important 
implications. It is  primarily  known for the introduction of the 
principle of ‘mutual  recognition’ into Community law con-
cerning the free movement of goods, of which more later. It 
also, for  the first time, explicitly  addressed possible justifica-
tions for  a national measure that was formally  non-
discriminatory (or ‘indistinctly  applicable’). It is  interesting 
to note that by  the time of  the judgement in Cassis de  Dijon, 
one of  the outspoken  critics of the Court’s expansive ap-
proach  to measures having equivalent effect, Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann, had advanced to the post of Director  of the 
Commission’s Legal Service and was in  effect in  charge of  the 
Commission’s legal position presented to the Court in  the 
proceedings. Ehlermann  had previously  defended the Com-
mission’s more cautious stance that indistinctly  applicable 
measures (as opposed to discriminatory  measures) should be 
exempted from  the Treaty prohibition, as long as they were 
justified by defensible policy goals, were appropriate for the 
achievement of such  goals  and constituted the least  restric-
tive alternative (cf. Ehlermann  1973: 10-11; Ehlermann  1977: 
584). In  fact, the careful reasoning in  his 1977 paper some-
what presages the Cassis de Dijon ruling (cf. Ehlermann 
1977: 589-591). 
The Commission’s observations in  Cassis de  Dijon repeated 
its prior argument that restrictions on  trade that apply 
equally  to imported and domestic goods  may be justified on 
several  grounds, but that such  a justified restriction  must be 
proportionate to the intended goal: “In the final  analysis, the 
essential  question  is whether  rules which are applicable 
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without distinction  [...] must be considered to be ‘out of  pro-
portion’” (Case 120/78, ECR 1979: 659). In its judgement, 
the Court chose wording  which did not immediately  conform 
to the Commission’s position, but presented an  approxima-
tion: “Obstacles to movement within the Community result-
ing from disparities between the national  laws relating to the 
marketing of  the products in  question  must be accepted in so 
far as those provisions may  be recognized as  being necessary 
in  order  to satisfy  mandatory requirements relating in par-
ticular  to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protec-
tion  of public health, the fairness of  commercial  transactions 
and the defence of the consumer” (Case 120/78, ECR 1979: 
662). 
The Court effectively acknowledged that the catalogue of jus-
tifiable measures was  larger than  those enumerated in article 
36 EEC and established a  set of  “mandatory requirements” 
that member states could invoke if they wished to maintain 
non-discriminatory regulations of  trade. These mandatory 
requirements largely  coincided with the justifications  enu-
merated by  the Commission in its  observation: protection of 
health, protection  of the consumer (consumer information 
and protection against fraud) and fair  competition between 
producers (Case 120/78, ECR 1979: 658-659).54 Contrary  to 
the position  of  the Commission, it  reversed the burden  of 
proof: a restrictive national trade rule would constitute a 
measure having equivalent effect (and be illegal) unless  the 
member state could demonstrate that this rule served a 
mandatory requirement (cf. Oliver 1980: 112). The Court 
concluded that  the German measures  in  question  did not 
serve to achieve any  of  the enumerated aims: the unilateral 
fixing of  minimum alcohol levels for fruit liqueurs could not 
be justified on  public health grounds, “since the consumer 
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54 The Court’s inclusion of the “effectiveness of fiscal supervision” is a nod to 
a previous case, INNO, where it had held that fiscal concerns where a justifi-
able restriction to trade (Case 13/77, ECR 1978: 2142) (see also Oliver 1980: 
112). 
can  obtain  on the market  an extremely  wide range of weakly 
or moderately  alcoholic products and furthermore a  large 
proportion of alcoholic beverages with a  high alcohol  content 
freely  sold on the German  market is  generally consumed in  a 
diluted form”, and in order “to protect  the consumer against 
unfair  practices on  the part of producers and distributors“, 
less restrictive measures could be employed, “since it  is  a 
simple matter to ensure that suitable information  is con-
veyed to the purchaser” by means  of labeling  (Case 120/78, 
ECR 1979: 663-664). Without using the terminology, the 
Court had applied a  proportionality  test: certain  justifica-
tions for national restriction  to trade existed, but the German 
measures in  question, where they  may  have been  justified in 
terms of consumer  protection, were not proportionate to 
their goal, since less restrictive means were available.  
While the Court in Cassis de  Dijon unquestionably dealt with 
an indistinctly applicable measure, its judgement did not 
specifically  address the distinction between  discriminatory 
and indistinctly applicable measures as such. A  chance to 
clarify  the relevance of this distinction came up shortly  after 
in  Peureux (Case 119/78), again a  case concerning  alcoholic 
drinks (fruit brandies). More specifically, this  case concerned 
a French rule prohibiting the distillation of imported raw 
materials other  than fresh fruit. Since this prohibition  only 
related to imported and not domestic raw materials, the 
measure in question concerned a  clearly  discriminatory 
measure. In fact, the Commission had already initiated an 
infringement proceeding against the French  government for 
its failure to abolish this rule, holding it to be a measure of 
equivalent effect, but this proceeding  had not yet been  re-
ferred to the Court of  Justice (Case 119/78, ECR 1979: 980). 
While the Commission’s observation did not mention the 
distinction  between discriminatory and indistinctly applica-
ble measures, the Court’s  judgement repeated it’s Cassis de 
Dijon provision, albeit  with  an  important specification: “Ob-
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stacles to intra-Community trade resulting from  differences 
between the provisions of  national laws which  have not yet 
been harmonized in  relation  to the marketing and use of  cer-
tain products constitute, in  principle, measures having  an 
effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions  unless  those 
provisions apply  without discrimination to products  im-
ported from other Member States and to those produced or 
manufactured in  the national  territory”  (Case 119/78, ECR 
1979: 985). This  wording suggested that  the Court would fol-
low the Commission’s  initial  distinction  (cf. Oliver 1980: 112-
113): discriminatory measures would always be illegal  unless 
they could be saved by one of the justifications contained in 
article 36 EEC, interpreted narrowly. Indistinctly applicable 
rules, on the other hand, could be saved by reference to 
broader  “mandatory  requirements”, as long  as they are pro-
portionate. 
The Court of Justice specified this position  shortly thereafter 
in  Gilli and Andres (Case 788/79). This case concerned (for a 
change) an  Italian rule that prohibited the sale of vinegar 
that was not made from wine. Again, the Commission  had 
already  initiated infringement proceedings against this  rule, 
holding  it to be an  unjustifiable restriction  to trade. This pro-
ceeding  had not yet reached the court when  the same rule 
was disputed in  a preliminary  reference. In  its observation, 
the Commission considered whether  the Italian  prohibition 
could be justified as a  mandatory  requirement in the line of 
the Cassis de  Dijon ruling, concluding  that this was not so. In 
its judgement, the Court specified its previous  assertions in 
Peureux: “In the absence of  common rules relating to the 
production and marketing  of the product in  question  it  is for 
Member States to regulate all matters relating  to its produc-
tion, distribution  and consumption  on  their  own  territory 
subject, however, to the condition that those rules do not 
present an  obstacle, directly or indirectly, actually or poten-
tially, to intra-Community trade. It is only where national 
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rules, which apply without discrimination to both  domestic 
and imported products, may be justified as being necessary 
in  order to satisfy imperative requirements relating in par-
ticular  to the protection  of  public health, the fairness of 
commercial  transactions and the defence of the consumer 
that they may constitute an exception to the requirements 
arising under Article 30” (Case 788/79, ECR  1980: 2078). 
This interpretation seemed to make clear that the mandatory 
(or “imperative”) requirement justification  would only  be 
available to indistinctly applicable rules. 
Still, some confusion remained. The Commission  seemed to 
be unsure about the possible derogations from  discrimina-
tory  rules in  its submission in  Commission v Ireland, one of 
the few infringement proceedings at the time that actually 
reached the Court. Since the disputed rule (a particular label-
ing requirement) pertained only  to goods (souvenirs) that 
were not produced in Ireland, the subject was clearly  a dis-
criminatory measure. The Irish government had submitted 
that the labeling  requirement was justified with respect to 
consumer  protection  and to combat fraud, referring to the 
Cassis de  Dijon ruling. The Commission  in return argued 
that none of the exceptions listed in  article 36 EEC applied to 
the rule in  question, and added that “although  the Court held 
in  its  judgment [in Cassis de  Dijon] that consumer protection 
may  justify  restrictive measures, the restrictions at  issue are 
not justified under Community  law because they are not nec-
essary  to protect the consumer” (case 113/80, ECR 1981: 
1630). The Commission  submission  in this case was co-
authored by Peter  Oliver, member of the Legal  Service, who 
had previously  commented on  Cassis de Dijon and Peureux 
in  Common  Market Law Review. In  this comment, he had 
expressly  posed the questions “does  the distinction  between 
discriminatory and ‘indistinctly applicable’ measures sub-
sist?”  and “what is the role of Article 36?” (Oliver 1980: 112). 
He offered two solutions: “according  to one the distinction 
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between discriminatory and ‘indistinctly applicable’ meas-
ures has been rejected, in which case Article 36 merely  serves 
as a guideline as  to what purposes justify  restrictions on im-
ports. According  to the other  solution, the distinction  lives 
on, Article 36 applying only  to discriminatory measures, 
while the REWE-Zentral [Cassis  de Dijon] test applies to ‘in-
distinctly applicable’ measures” (Oliver  1980: 112). Oliver 
went on to cite another  member of the Legal  Service, René-
Christian Béraud, who had presented the Commission posi-
tion  to the Court in  Dassonville, and who had supported the 
latter  interpretation, indicating that this view most likely  had 
support within  the Legal  Service. Oliver  then  interpreted the 
Court’s ruling in Peureux as indicating that the Court shares 
this view, and concluded by  posing the question: “Is the ref-
erence to discrimination  in  Peureux  due to a  deliberate deci-
sion  to retain the distinction between discriminatory  and 
non-discriminatory measures or  simply  to a  failure by the 
judges of the Court to coordinate their judgments?” (Oliver 
1980: 113). Although  the Commission  (and Oliver  himself) 
did not explicitly pose this  question  in  Commission v Ire-
land, the Court seemed to respond directly to Oliver’s  prior 
questions, pointing out that “in  view of the fact that neither 
the protection  of  consumers nor  the fairness  of commercial 
transactions is included amongst the exceptions set out in 
Article 36, those grounds cannot be relied upon as such in 
connexion with  that article. [...] The orders  concerned in  the 
present case are not measures  which  are applicable to do-
mestic products and to imported products without distinc-
tion  but rather  a  set of rules which apply only to imported 
products and are therefore discriminatory  in nature, with the 
result that the measures in issue are not covered by the deci-
sions  [like Cassis de  Dijon, allowing for  a consumer protec-
tion  justification] which  relate exclusively  to provisions that 
regulate in a uniform  manner the marketing of domestic 
products and imported products” (Case 113/80, ECR 1981: 
1639).  
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The Commission followed this up in  an  answer to a parlia-
mentary question: “if (and only if) the measure in  question 
applies equally to domestic and imported goods, it may be 
permissible in  Community law if  it is the 'essential  guarantee' 
of the observance of some 'mandatory  requirement' of na-
tional  interest; this  means not only those interests referred to 
in  Article 36 EEC, but also certain  others — the Court gave 
consumer  protection and prevention of  tax evasion  as exam-
ples”  (OJ 1981, No. C 295/30). The Commission early  on 
proposed that the list  of justifications for  non-discriminatory 
barriers to trade (the mandatory requirements) may  be 
longer than  that offered by the Court in Cassis de  Dijon. Re-
acting to the Cassis  de  Dijon judgement, Commission  presi-
dent Gaston  Thorn remarked in  reply  to a question  from  an 
MEP that “The list of such  requirements is not exhaustive. It 
will  be the responsibility  of  the Commission, when  examin-
ing individual cases and under the supervision  of the Court of 
Justice, to determine which  other  'mandatory  requirements' 
may  be taken into consideration. The protection of  the envi-
ronment may, for example, be considered to be a case of this 
nature” (OJ 1981, No. C 309/8).
Summary
The preceding section describes the early  conflict  about the 
meaning of an essential  Treaty  provision. The question cen-
tred on the degree of member states’ autonomy in  regulating 
their domestic markets in  goods. What national  measures 
resulting in barriers  to intra-Community trade would be ille-
gal  by  virtue of primary law, without the necessity  of secon-
dary  legislation? The Commission enjoyed certain  agenda 
setting prerogatives, as it could autonomously issue legal 
guidelines, which it did in Commission Directive 70/50. This 
initial  interpretation, which  expressed a  strict stance on  dis-
criminatory measures but a  conciliatory stance on  non-
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discriminatory ones, informed the legal  position of  the 
Commission for  the following decade and a  half, and was 
partially  endorsed by  the Court. The member states reacted 
selectively, and for the most  part only when their  domestic 
rules  were challenged in  Court. Their  expressed legal  posi-
tions argued for  a limited effect of the relevant Treaty  rules. 
National measures should be legal as long  as  they  did not  
actually  affect trade, and the catalogue of  available justifica-
tions should be interpreted extensively. These positions 
could not be upheld in  the face of multiple Court judgements. 
Since the conflict centred on primary  law, member state gov-
ernments were significantly  constrained in the range of pos-
sible responses. Treaty change being almost impossible to 
achieve as  long  as a single member state favoured the Court’s 
position, their preferred reaction  seemed to consist  of a se-
lective application of single rulings, a “contained compliance” 
in  Lisa  Conant’s  words (cf. Conant 2002: 32). They yielded to 
individual  judgements, but did not adapt their overall policy 
stance. This would explain  the fact that many  Court cases 
addressed very similar  issues, and often almost identical 
product classes. Consequently, the Commission’s  ability to 
remove barriers to trade was confined to one barrier  at  a 
time, a cumbersome and time-consuming effort that yielded 
more limited results than  potential  harmonizing  legislation, 
which is the subject of the following section. 
Another feature of the described legal  process is the dearth  of 
infringement proceedings that reached the Court of Justice. 
In  several  instances, the Commission  had initiated such  pro-
ceedings, but there were parallel  cases brought before na-
tional  courts that were referred to the Court of Justice more 
quickly  than  the Commission’s own efforts. This could be 
indicative of the fact that  the Commission  did, up to this 
stage, not pursue infringement proceedings  as a policy  strat-
egy, but rather as a tool for  negotiation  with individual 
member states.
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5.3 Mutual recognition and the harmonization of 
laws regulating trade
The aspect for  which the Cassis de  Dijon judgement is per-
haps  better  known today is the way it established a  link be-
tween the Community’s legislative efforts at harmonizing 
national  trade rules according  to article 100 EEC and the re-
moval of barriers to trade according to article 30 EEC, which 
has been  the subject of the previous section. While this  con-
nection was not explicitly raised by  the plaintiff, it  was exten-
sively  covered in the observations of  the German  govern-
ment: “The scope of the questions of interpretation  referred 
to the Court goes well  beyond the subject-matter  of the main 
action: in  most Member States there exist provisions, very 
diverse in nature, relating  to the minimum  wine-spirit con-
tent of potable spirits and those provisions constitute merely 
a small  pan  of the complex  problem  raised by the existence of 
a considerable number of  divergent national "technical stan-
dards" for numerous goods. [...] The resulting  obstacles to 
trade must be reduced by recourse to the procedure for the 
approximation  of  such provisions [...]. Until  such  time as the 
national  rules relating to manufacture and marketing  have 
been harmonized, Article 30 of the EEC Treaty  is to be ap-
plied only  in  so far  as those provisions lead to discrimination 
against imported goods in relation  to domestic goods” (Case 
120/78, ECR 1979: 655). The argument of the German gov-
ernment therefore rested on the assertion that the appropri-
ate method of  dealing with  barriers to trade resulting from 
differing production  or marketing norms was to adopt har-
monizing legislation. It  specifically warned against the effects 
of following  a  different approach: “In  view of the fundamen-
tal importance to an  assessment of  the technical  specifica-
tions of all  other  sectors of  production  [if  non-discriminatory 
rules  should be declared illegal], it should be noted that its 
consequence would be that the minimum alcohol content of a 
given  product in  the Federal  Republic of  Germany would no 
longer be governed by German law but by  French  law; [...] in 
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an extreme case, a  single Member State could enact legisla-
tion  for  the whole Community, without the collaboration  or 
even  the knowledge of  the other  Member States. The result 
would be to lower minimal requirements to the lowest level 
set in any given  national rules, in the absence of the authori-
zation required by Article 100 of the Treaty, which  presup-
poses the consent of  the Member  States”  (Case 120/78, ECR 
1979: 656). In  effect, this observation conjured up the possi-
ble effect  of a  doctrine of mutual  recognition. Needless to 
say, the German government was vehemently  opposed: “The 
Member States must continue to be able effectively to exer-
cise those [regulatory] powers, until  the achievement of  har-
monization transfers their  freedom of  action to the Commu-
nity” (Case 120/78, ECR 1979: 656-657).   
The Danish  government seemed to agree with  the German 
government’s  view in  principle. In  its observation it  argued, 
in  a  roundabout fashion, that “rules relating  to the quality of 
products” and “a technical  obstacle to trade which may be 
eliminated by the adoption  of harmonization directives pur-
suant to Article 100 of  the Treaty” should not be considered 
measures having equivalent effect to a  quantitative restric-
tion  (Case 120/78, ECR 1979: 659). However, pointing out 
that Danish  cherry wine also fell  foul of the German regula-
tion, it held that  the German rules in question did not fall 
under this category. 
The Commission, possibly  wishing to avoid taking  a  stance 
on a  controversial  issue, did not take up the German gov-
ernment’s elaborations, and confined its arguments  to a 
strict proportionality  test. The judges themselves also did not 
react  to the scenario outlined in the German observation, 
although they restated the German governments argument: 
“Furthermore, according to the German Government, to al-
low alcoholic products into free circulation wherever, as re-
gards their alcohol  content, they  comply  with  the rules laid 
down  in the country  of  production  would have the effect of 
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imposing as  a common standard within  the Community the 
lowest alcohol content permitted in  any of the Member 
States, and even  of  rendering  any requirements in  this field 
inoperative since a lower  limit of this nature is foreign to the 
rules  of several Member States”  (Case 120/78, ECR 1979: 
663). While they had addressed – and refuted – every  other 
argument the German government had offered in defense of 
its rules, they curiously left  this  one unanswered (Craig and 
de Búrca 2011: 649). To the contrary, the Court ended up 
proclaiming exactly  what the German government had 
warned against. Its  formulation again  is now a  mandatory 
element of all  EU law textbooks: “There is therefore no valid 
reason  why, provided that they have been  lawfully  produced 
and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic bever-
ages should not be introduced into any other  Member State” 
(Case 120/78, ECR 1979: 664). This was the nucleus of  the 
concept of  mutual recognition  as it was subsequently taken 
up and pursued by the Commission. 
The origins of the concept and its relation to legislative har-
monization, however, date back somewhat further. The Cas-
sis de  Dijon ruling, and others quoted above, implicitly estab-
lished a link between the Community’s  legislative efforts at 
harmonizing laws and the Treaty’s  more general prohibition 
of barriers to trade. These judgements particularly  referred 
to the “absence of  common rules  relating  to the production 
and marketing”55 of goods as leading to an  application of  ar-
ticle 30 and the consequent prohibitions. In  the Cassis de 
Dijon ruling, the Court specifically recalled that a Commis-
sion  proposal  for a  harmonization  of national provisions for 
the production and marketing of certain spirits  had been  be-
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55 This is the wording from Cassis de Dijon (Case 120/89, ECR 1979: 662), 
repeated in Gilli and Andres (Case 788/79, ECR 1980: 2078) and Commis-
sion v Ireland (Case 113/80, ECR 1981: 1639), among many others. The 
Court had already used similar wording in Dassonville (Case 8/74, ECR 
1974: 852). 
fore the Council  for  three years, but not been  decided upon 
(Case 120/89, ECR 1979: 662). This passage can  be read as 
an implicit comment about the slow progress of  the legisla-
ture’s programme of harmonizing  production  and marketing 
rules. In effect, the Court went on to propose a different 
strategy. How does this relate to the Commission’s earlier 
legislative and judicial efforts? Did Cassis de Dijon present 
entirely new options?
The corollary to the removal  of trade barriers was the simul-
taneous harmonization  of trade rules across the Community. 
The corresponding procedure was laid out in  article 100 
EEC, which, as  described above, mandated a unanimous 
Council  vote. The Treaty  also provided the option  of qualita-
tive majority  voting  in  such cases where the Commission 
finds a member state rule to be “distorting  the conditions  of 
competition” (article 101 EEC)56, and authorised the Com-
mission  to issue recommendations where a  member  state 
planned to introduce or amend a provision that could cause 
such distortion (article 102 EEC) . 
The Commission’s view on the Community’s  harmonization 
agenda  is indirectly  discernible from its approach  to the bar-
riers to trade that has been discussed above. Recall  the 
Commission’s initial  position  on  the treatment of  non-
discriminatory member  state rules: such rules were generally 
justified, since restrictions on  trade “are normally inherent in 
the disparities  between rules applied by  Member States in 
this respect”  (recital  9, Directive 70/50). Conversely, the re-
moval of trade barriers arising from  these disparities would 
be achieved by  harmonizing national  laws. Pieter  VerLoren 
van Themaat, Director  General  of  the Commission’s  DG 
Competition, early on identified the approximation  of  laws  as 
a central  part of the Commission’s effort to establish  a com-
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56 The resolution on the use of majority voting at the extraordinary Council 
session in Luxemburg on 17-18 January 1966 (the “Luxemburg compro-
mise”) significantly curtailed the advantages of this provision. 
mon market, targeting among others  “technical  and admin-
istrative obstacles to trade, including veterinary  regulations, 
foodstuffs control, pharmaceutical  rules; and regulations for 
industrial  health and safety”  (Verloren  van Themaat 1960: 
17). 
During the 1960s, however, the Commission’s efforts  at initi-
ating the harmonization of member state laws concerning 
trade in goods were limited in  number and scope.57 Member 
state opposition was entrenched, not only at the political 
level, but also at the level  of  member state administrations, 
particularly during the transitional  period before the full  ef-
fectiveness of the rules concerning the common market (cf. 
Seidl-Hohenverldern 1981: 175-176). The Commission  even 
largely  refrained from  issuing the recommendations pro-
vided for in article 102 EEC (where a member  state intro-
duced new regulations), despite the fact that it could do so on 
its own  initiative without involvement of  the Council (cf. 
Seidl-Hohenverldern 1981: 188). This may  be due to the fact 
the Commission adopted a  cautious stance, granting  the 
member states considerable leeway: “Approximation of legis-
lation  involves work in  so vast a field, with  subject-matter 
which  has so many  ramifications, that progress cannot and 
should not be other than  cautious  and gradual” (European 
Economic Community  Commission  1965: 101); but it is also a 
reflection of the Commission’s limited capacities  to monitor 
new legislation  in  the member states. Up to this point, there 
was no legal  requirement for the member states to inform the 
Commission of their legislative proposals for new trade rules, 
and repeated attempts by the Commission  to introduce such 
a requirement found no support in the Council  (e.g. OJ 1965, 
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57  “Progress in eliminating other obstacles to trade due to differences in 
regulation has been very meagre” (European Economic Community Com-
mission 1966: 16).   
No. 160/2611; cf. also Houin  1971: 790).58 Despite these ob-
stacles, the Commission  started to pursue, in  the mid to late 
1960s, a growing number of directives regulating  potential 
barriers to trade. These proposals targeted disparate national 
requirements concerning quality, composition and packaging 
as well as mandatory  border inspections (cf. COM 62/300: 
14). The latter in  particular  were the subject  of early  efforts 
by  the Commission to achieve a mutual  recognition of re-
quirements and controls: “For  effective elimination  of obsta-
cles to trade, harmonization must be carried out at two dif-
ferent levels: not only  technical  rules, but the inspection and 
supervision procedures which  ensure their enforcement, 
must be brought into line. Approximation  of  the various pro-
cedures is intended to ensure reciprocal recognition of  in-
spections by the competent authorities of  the Member 
States”  (European Economic Community  Commission 1965: 
102, my emphasis; cf. also Verloren van Themaat 1965: 248). 
While the concept of mutual  (or reciprocal) recognition  in 
the field of  goods was evidently  discussed as  early as the mid 
1960s, the scope of this approach  was more limited than  the 
approach  suggested by the Cassis de  Dijon ruling. The aim 
was primarily  to establish  “common  approval and inspection 
procedures” that would serve to eliminate duplicate and 
costly  border controls for imported goods (cf. European  Eco-
nomic Community  Commission 1965: 102). The Commission 
formulated this idea  in a proposal for  a “Council  resolution 
on the mutual  recognition  on  inspections” that  formed part 
of its “General  Programme for the elimination  of technical 
barriers to trade” (OJ 1968, No. C 48/30). It proposed that if 
Removing barriers to trade 163
58 In this vein, while the Commission had foreseen in its proposal for a first 
directive approximating the law of undertakings that member states should 
provide information on all new legislative proposals in this domain early 
enough for the Commission to react before their adoption (OJ 1966, No. 96/
1520-1524), the Council struck the respective recital and limited member 
state obligations to ensuring “that they communicate to the Commission the 
text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field cov-
ered by this Directive” (article 13, Directive 68/151).
the technical  requirements of a  given  product are “rendered 
equivalent by Community action or  are considered to be al-
ready  equivalent, the Directive relating to that product 
should provide for  mutual  recognition of  inspections carried 
out before it is put on  the market” (OJ 1968, No. C 48/30).59 
This is a very indirect  form of  mutual  recognition, requiring 
the adoption of  secondary  law relating  to individual  product 
classes. In  the absence of harmonizing  directives, the Com-
mission  suggested in an annex to the General  Programme, a 
more general  “mutual  recognition of inspections” as part of 
five possible approaches to harmonization.60  This approach 
proposed that inspections conducted in  one member state 
should automatically  be recognised in the other member 
states.61  It would be applicable in  economic sectors where 
there is very  far reaching correspondence between member 
state technical  and administrative regulations62  (cf. also 
Falke and Joerges 2010: 253). The reference to the mutual 
recognition  of  inspections  might be somewhat misleading, 
since inspections also entail  adherence to nation  standards. 
As the Commission  pointed out in  an  information  memo 
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59 While the Council adopted the proposal shortly after, it did not take up a 
recital from the Commission’s proposal stating that the multiplicity of in-
spections constituted a distortion of competition between domestic and 
foreign producers in member state markets (cf. OJ 1969, No. C 76/31).
60  These proposed approaches were not included in the proposal as pub-
lished in the Official Journal. They can be inferred from European Parlia-
ment Documents 15 1968/1969 and 114 1968/1969. 
61 “Danach wird zugestanden, daß die in einem Mitgliedstaat durchgeführten 
Kontrollen, die eine Voraussetzung für das Inverkehrbringen eines Erzeug-
nisses sind, von allen übrigen Mitgliedstaaten automatisch als gültig aner-
kannt werden. Dies führt zu einer Beseitigung der Hindernisse, die sich aus 
der Wiederholung der systematisch in jedem Mitgliedstaat vorgenommenen 
Kontrollen ergeben” (European Parliament Document 114 1968/1969: 18).
62  “Diese Lösung kann jedesmal dann in Betracht gezogen werden, wenn in 
einem Wirtschaftszweig eine sehr weitgehende Übereinstimmung der gel-
tenden technischen und Verwaltungsvorschriften festgestellt wird oder 
wenn diese Vorschriften auf Gemeinschaftsebene oder in größeren interna-
tionalen Gremien harmonisiert worden sind. Im letztgenannten Fall kann 
sie zum Zug kommen, bevor die laufenden Arbeiten ganz abgeschlossen 
sind” (European Parliament Document 114 1968/1969: 18). 
three years later, such  a recognition of inspections is  equiva-
lent to a  recognition of product norms: “la  solution  dite de 
‘reconnaissance réciproque des contrôles‘ consiste à admet-
tre purement et simplement, sur une base de réciprocité, les 
produits conformes aux normes des autres Etats membres et 
contrôlés  par ceux-ci suivant leurs critères” (European 
Commission 1972: 2; cf. also Slot 1975: 81). In  this wording, 
the proposed approach, albeit only one of  several, seemed 
fairly close to the one the Commission adopted in the wake of 
the Cassis de  Dijon ruling – with  the caveat that it would 
only apply  to sectors where there was prior correspondence 
of norms. Nonetheless, the Commission seemed skeptical as 
to the merits  of mutual  recognition, giving priority to the 
harmonization of member state laws: “Toutefois, ces deux 
solutions [‘reconnaissance réciproque des contrôles‘ et ‘re-
connaissance conditionnelle des  contrôles‘] sont difficile à 
mettre en oeuvre sur  la plan  pratique, et comme elles ne 
conduisent pas à unifier  les législations, elles ne donnent pas 
tous  les avantages  d’une réglementation harmonisée” (Euro-
pean  Commission  1972: 2). Should Cassis de  Dijon therefore 
be seen  as a  watershed that took even the Commission by 
surprise (cf. Alter and Meunier Aitsahalia 1994: 540)?
While mutual recognition had been employed or intensively 
discussed in the areas of company  law and degrees and di-
plomas (cf. European Commission 1969: 67-69, 81), member 
state opposition to mutual  recognition in  trade was evident 
early  on. Martin Seidel, Director General  (‘Regierungsdirek-
tor’) in the German  Federal  Ministry  of Economics, who on 
occasion represented the German government before the 
Court of  Justice,63 voiced such  opposition  at a  conference of 
European law professionals in 1969, arguing that a  system of 
mutual  recognition  would entice producers to choose the 
least onerous standards, leading  to harmonization at  the 
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63 See for example Case 152/73, discussed in the following chapter.
lowest common denominator (cf. Seidel  1971: 736)64  – this 
line of argumentation presaged the content of the German 
government’s observation in Cassis de Dijon.65 
In  the aftermath of the General  Programme, the Commission 
did not pursue any explicit  measures with  regard to mutual 
recognition. Only minor pieces  of evidence suggest that the 
Commission may  have been debating  the uses of mutual  rec-
ognition more generally. Somewhat cryptically, the Commis-
sion, in  its General  Report on the Activities  of the Communi-
ties for the year of  the adoption of the General  Programme 
(1968), interpreted this programme to imply  “a basic politi-
cal  choice in  that it lays down  that the final  objective of all 
measures to eliminate technical  obstacles is the mutual  rec-
ognition of  the national  decisions on the subject so as to en-
able producers in the Community to manufacture on the 
scale of the common  market, and consumers to make a better 
choice among the products thus made available” (European 
Commission 1969: 55). While this  phrasing seemed to hint at 
a more expansive reading, it was subsequently not repeated. 
The root of the problem with  mutual recognition, from  the 
Commission’s point of view, may be inferred from  a speech 
by  Internal Market Commissioner Finn  Olav  Gundelach be-
fore the European  Parliament in  February 1974. He pointed 
out that the Commission’s programme for  abolishing barriers 
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64  “Die wechselseitige Anerkennung der nationalen Rechts- und Verwal-
tungsvorschriften durch die Mitgliedstaaten stellt ebenfalls kein Verfahren 
dar, das sich zum Abbau der technischen Handelshemmnisse eignet. Die 
Einführung eines solchen Systems [...] kann allenfalls für die Fälle erwogen 
werden, in denen die nationalen Rechtsvorschriften gleichwertig sind [...]. 
Bei mangelnder Äquivalenz der Vorschriften führt die gegenseitige Aner-
kennung zu einer Entwertung der strengeren Regelungen” (Seidel 1971: 
735).  
65  Cf. also the opinion of Pieter Slot, writing in 1975: “As the matter stands 
today, there is no chance of [mutual recognition] being accepted anywhere 
in the near future by the national governments, the main reason being that 
the national authorities are unwilling to give up their exclusive exercise of 
approval and inspection” (Slot 1975: 88). 
to trade included other measures  than a  “total”  harmoniza-
tion  of member  state laws. Among the methods the Commis-
sion  employed “in order  to develop a free market” would be 
such  where ”the Member states accept goods which  comply 
with  other Member  states' regulations; in this case, no Com-
munity  considerations demand approximation  of the na-
tional  legislation but  the method may  be combined with  cer-
tain minimum  standards. Unfortunately, the mutual  trust 
among the authorities of the Member  states does not appear 
to be sufficient to allow the use of  this  method as often as the 
Commission would like to” (European  Commission 1974: 3). 
This suggests that the Commission  saw member state oppo-
sition as the decisive obstacle to a  strategy of mutual  recogni-
tion  – even where it was accompanied by  harmonized mini-
mum  standards. By all  other indications, it  appears that the 
Commission by  this  stage had given  up on mutual  recogni-
tion  as  an  effective tool in  the removal  of  national barriers to 
trade.
Nonetheless, the measures foreseen  in the 1968 General  Pro-
gramme suggested an  inclusive approach. While the pro-
gramme, in  particular its timetable of harmonizing directives 
to be pursued by the Commission and the Council, appeared 
“very  ambitious but utterly unrealistic” (Falke and Joerges 
2010: 248), it is unlikely  a  coincidence that the General  Pro-
gramme was formulated concurrently  to the Commission’s 
Directive 70/50 on the treatment of measures  having equiva-
lent effect to quantitative restrictions. From this  point on, the 
Commission started to use a two-pronged approach to the 
removal  of technical  and administrative barriers to trade: 
“Obstacles to trade resulting  from such trading rules  nor-
mally  have to be removed by harmonization under  Article 
100. To the extent, however, that such provisions constitute 
measures with  effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions, 
Articles 30 et seq. are applicable. On  this  point, the Commis-
sion's  experience and thinking lead it, in the present circum-
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stances, to class among  such  measures any  provisions that 
are applicable without distinction  to both  domestic and im-
ported products and whose restrictive effects on the free 
movement of goods exceed those proper to rules on  trade. It 
is from  this angle that the Commission  intends to examine 
the cases currently  referred to it” (European Commission 
1969: 30). As a general  principle, the Commission  stated it 
would pursue harmonizing legislation. This however would 
not mean that member  states are free to regulate trade where 
there are no Community rules. Rather, the Commission 
would seek judicial action to remove those national rules that 
appear unjustified or  disproportionate. Underlining  this ap-
proach, the Commission  started listing its efforts  in  the field 
of measures having  equivalent effect to quantitative restric-
tions and the harmonization of technical  obstacles to trade 
back to back in its  General  Reports on the Activities of  the 
Communities. 
This specific link between the Commission’s legislative ef-
forts at  harmonizing national  laws and judicial  interventions 
to remove existent trade barriers was taken up by  the Court 
in  Dassonville: “In the  absence  of a Community system 
guaranteeing for consumers the authenticity  of  a product's 
designation  of origin, if a  Member State takes measures to 
prevent unfair  practices in  this connexion, it  is however sub-
ject to the condition that these measures should be reason-
able and that the means of  proof required should not act as  a 
hindrance to trade between  Member States and should, in 
consequence, be accessible to all  Community nationals” 
(Case 8/74, ECR 1974: 852, my emphasis). This phrasing, 
similar  to the one the Court later used in Cassis de  Dijon, 
implied a trade-off between harmonization  at the Commu-
nity level, and the residual competences  left to the member 
states, lending judicial  support to the Commission strategy. 
Where there were no common rules, member  states  retained 
the ability  to regulate trade, but only within  very  strict pa-
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rameters. Harmonization, it could be imputed, would thus 
represent for the safer approach for member states  than  rely-
ing on their residual autonomy.
While the Commission’s efforts to remove barriers to trade in 
court offered – as  I have shown  above – some success, the 
legislative element in  this strategy lagged behind considera-
bly, despite the implicit  threat of judicial  action in the case of 
non-harmonization. On the one hand, this was due to the 
nature of the task of harmonization as it was then under-
stood, in  particular in the field of  technical  barriers  to trade, 
where the drafting  of legislative proposals  required minute 
attention to details that in themselves proved a moving tar-
get: not only  would common  standards  have to be agreed 
upon, they  would also continually  have to be adapted to 
technological  progress (cf. Falke and Joerges 2010: 254; 
Craig and de Búrca  2011: 583). On  the other hand, the Com-
mission  frequently  expressed frustration with the handling of 
its proposals by the Council 66  and the European  Parlia-
ment67. This no doubt was also a reflection  of the difficult 
economic situation  faced by  the member states in the 1970s. 
The Commission acknowledged this but remained commit-
ted to its programme of trade liberalization: “In  the desire to 
preserve what has already been achieved in  the free move-
ment of goods and the opening-up of the Community market, 
the Commission's  main  effort this year was directed towards 
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66 “The Council has been unable to meet all its commitments this year, hav-
ing adopted only 13 directives. The Council will therefore have to intensify 
its efforts if it wishes to achieve the objective it has set itself” (European 
Commission 1975: 60). “The rate of adoption of directives by the Council has 
remained as slow as before and the number of proposals still pending re-
mains about the same as for last year – 65 compared with 59” (European 
Commission 1976: 62). 
67 “The long time taken by Parliament to give its views on a number of direc-
tives has considerably delayed the programme for adoption of Commission 
proposals. In the case of the proposal for a directive on the lead content of 
petrol this delay has exceeded 22 months” (European Commission 1976: 
62). 
containing and halting the protectionist  trend which has 
been one of  the most preoccupying  effects of the very  difficult 
economic situation affecting certain  industries  in  the Mem-
ber States” (European  Commission  1978: 77).68 In the face of 
the ‘deteriorating’ situation, including the increased resort to 
such  ‘protectionist’ measures by  the member states, the 
Commission had been in the process of adapting its strategy 
to the obstacles it faced even  before the Cassis de Dijon rul-
ing: “Realizing that much  firmer measures must  be taken  to 
reverse this  [protectionist] trend and ensure strict compli-
ance with  the rules  of the Treaty, the Commission  has con-
centrated greater  efforts and resources on  resolving cases of 
infringements and following up complaints submitted to it” 
(European Commission 1977: 76). The extent of the problem 
was reflected in  the growing number of complaints the 
Commission reported.69  While no comprehensive statistics 
on the earlier  (pre-court) stages of the infringement proce-
dure exist for this period, the trend is  evident in the succes-
sive General  Reports on the Activities of  the Communities: 
“At the end of  1978 the Commission  was investigating  over 
four hundred cases of barriers to the free movement of 
goods, mostly  under Articles 30 to 36 of the EEC Treaty. And 
even  this  figure, which  is more than  four  times as many  as 
four years ago, represents only  the tip of  the iceberg” (Euro-
pean  Commission 1979: 82). In  reaction  to this  trend, and, in 
its own  words, “conscious of the imperative need to sound 
the alarm in  face of  the repeated attacks by the Member 
States on the free movement of goods within the Commu-
nity” (European Commission 1979: 81), the Commission  sent 
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68 Cf. also: “The difficult economic situation which prevailed during the year 
drew the Commission's attention more closely to the need to safeguard and 
preserve achievements gained in freeing the movement of goods in the 
Community and opening up the market to trade” (European Commission 
1977: 76).
69  The Commission’s language is unambiguous: “The restrictive measures 
complained of constituted a veritable arsenal of covert measures in an ex-
ceedingly broad range of regulations” (European Commission 1978: 77).
a letter to Member State governments, outlining  the central 
elements  of its revised strategy for  the “safeguarding of  free-
dom of trade within the Community” (COM 78/337  final: 1). 
The letter again repeated the close connection  between legis-
lative efforts  at harmonizing member state trade rules  and 
the Commission’s legal  action to remove barriers to trade. 
While non-discriminatory rules regulating goods sold in  a 
member state may  serve legitimate aims,70 “such  rules  may, 
however, be directed towards preventing or discouraging 
imports of products coming from other Member  States. The 
same applies  to national  technical  standards drawn up by the 
professions which are often  based on  manufacturing criteria 
employed by national  industry. When these are made obliga-
tory  by  Member States and thus are equally  imposed on im-
ported products, the consequence is  that they bear more 
heavily, if not exclusively, on  the latter than  on indigenous 
products. The restrictive effects of these rules  and technical 
standards are doubly harmful  to free trade: on  the one hand 
they partition markets within  the Community; on  the other, 
they paralyse the enactment of Community  rules in  the mat-
ter” (COM 78/337  final: 2). In  order  to address this, and 
other, problems more effectively, the Commission  an-
nounced that it would focus more rigorously  on enforcement: 
“Thus being conscious of  the need to maintain  this element 
which  is essential  for  the functioning and development of  the 
internal  market, freedom of trade, the Commission  has de-
cided to act firmly and promptly and has placed this  action 
among its priority tasks” (COM 78/337 final: 3). To this aim, 
it had revised its internal  procedures  regarding infringe-
ments, “allowing it to initiate a  very significant number of  
infringement procedures [...] and to prosecute them in half 
the time required previously. [...] About two hundred and 
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70  Here the Commission lists such exemptions as had been brought up in 
recent case-law: “the protection of life and health of humans, protection of, 
and information for, the consumer, improvement of products’ quality” 
(COM 78/337 final: 2). 
eighty-five dossiers are therefore involved; during 1974-1975 
less than a hundred dossiers were the subject of  such deci-
sions”  (COM 78/337 final: 3-4). The considerable uptick in 
infringement proceedings for the field of  goods that  has  been 
interpreted to be a  result  of the Court’s ruling  in  Cassis de 
Dijon (cf. Stone Sweet 2004: 136-137) is therefore not solely 
a reaction  to the judgement, but also a reflection  of the pre-
vious adaptation of the Commission’s strategy.71  This obser-
vation  is supported by  Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, then  Direc-
tor  General  of  the Commission’s  Legal Service (from  1977  to 
1987), who described the Commission’s  changes to its han-
dling of the infringement procedure in  more detail. Accord-
ing to this account, the Commission  started out with  a cau-
tious  stance on enforcement actions (cf. Ehlermann  1981: 
139). The reevaluation originated with the appointment of 
the new Commission under   president Roy Jenkins, who 
from  1977 on  elevated the importance of infringement pro-
ceedings to rank equally  with  legislative initiatives, following 
the aim of safeguarding  market freedoms in  face of  increas-
ing member state opposition (cf. Ehlermann 1981: 141). The 
Commission in effect declared its legislative strategy  to have 
failed in  the face of increasing member state opposition, and 
that it would concentrate on a judicial strategy instead.
It is nonetheless important to note that despite the confron-
tational wording of  the 1978 letter and the General  Reports, 
the Commission did not raise the idea of a mutual  recogni-
tion  of  trade rules. Rather, its strategy  seemed to address 
each barrier  to trade one at a  time, although this approach 
was constrained by  staffing  problems (cf. COM 78/337  final: 
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71 The Commission summarises this approach as follows: “Finally, the Com-
mission proposes to explore, in accordance with the new guidelines set out 
by recent interpretative decisions of the Court of Justice, all the possibilities 
which will enable it to ensure that the rules of the EEC Treaty on the free 
movement of goods, especially Articles 30-36, are strictly applied and thus 
to achieve a greater and more effective liberalization of intracommunity 
trade” (COM 78/337 final: 4).
4). Although it  has been asserted that the Commission was 
not involved in  bringing  about the Cassis de Dijon case (cf. 
Alter  and Meunier Aitsahalia  1994: 538), the judgement, 
which  mentioned the idea of mutual recognition almost as a 
byline, therefore came at  an opportune moment. Specific 
parts of the ruling, like earlier in  Dassonville, even  read like a 
direct admonition  of the member state’s  failure to harmonize 
trade laws: “In  the absence of common  rules relating  to the 
production and marketing of alcohol  — a  proposal  for a  regu-
lation  submitted to the Council  by the Commission on 7  De-
cember  1976 (Official Journal  C 309, p. 2) not yet having re-
ceived the Council's approval  — it is for the Member States to 
regulate all  matters relating to the production and marketing 
of alcohol  and alcoholic beverages on their  own  territory”, as 
long as those national  rules are “necessary in  order  to satisfy 
mandatory requirements”  (Case 120/78, ECR 1979: 661), 
which  the German  rules in question  were judged not to be 
(cf. Craig and de Búrca 2011: 684).
The Commission  reacted by adjusting  its already revised 
strategy in the light of the ruling, further  de-emphasising  its 
legislative harmonization efforts  for the benefit of  infringe-
ment proceedings  as an alternative means. It outlined its new 
strategy first  in  a communication  to the European Parlia-
ment (COM 80/30) and later in a  letter  to the member  states 
(OJ 1980, No. C 256/2). It becomes clear  from these docu-
ments that the Commission would employ a very  wide inter-
pretation  of the Court’s pronouncements, and that it would 
use it offensively against member state trade regulations. 
While the Court had formulated its interpretation  of  mutual 
recognition  specifically  with regard to alcoholic beverages, 
the Commission  extended this  principle to all  product 
classes: “Any  product lawfully produced and marketed in one 
Member State must, in  principle, be admitted to the market 
of any other  Member State” (OJ 1980, No. C 256/2). Any ex-
emptions from  this principle would be interpreted very 
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strictly: “Even if  [member  state] rules apply  indiscriminately 
to home-produced and imported products, they can only  cre-
ate barriers if  these are necessary  in  order  to satisfy manda-
tory  requirements, are in the general  interest, are the main 
guarantee of  that general  interest and if  that general  good is 
more important than the requirement of  free movement of 
goods which is one of  the basic rules  of the Community” 
(COM 80/30: 3). Note that the Commission is  suggesting, 
next to the proportionality  requirement, a  universal trade-off 
between a general  interest, however defined, and the basic 
market freedom; the Commission mentions no a  priori  ex-
emptions. The consequences would be far  ranging: “As a  re-
sult of  the court's decisions, and the judgement referred to 
above in  particular, Member States may control  marketing 
conditions as regards their  own products while the same is 
not the case for products imported from  other Member 
States. An  approach  based on the guidelines described would 
make it possible henceforth  to put stop to the application of a 
large number of national  regulations insofar as these hinder 
trade between the Member  States”  (COM 80/30: 4). On the 
basis of these observations, the Commission outlined a  gen-
eral  rationale for  its future strategy, which would be flexibly 
based on several  elements: “The aim is not to accumulate 
directives, but to remove hindrances to trade (COM 80/30: 
6)”. New strategies would be necessary  not least with respect 
to the Commission’s  overall  capacity: “the method adopted 
hitherto for the removal of technical  barriers to trade poses 
yet another  fundamental  problem: it results  in  a  growing 
burden of responsibility  for the Commission  and a constantly 
increasing  workload for  its staff. Whereas a  few years ago the 
task of Commission  officials in  this field was to draw up new 
proposals  and justify them to the other Community  institu-
tions, today much of  their  work is taken up with the man-
agement of directives already  adopted, i.e. controlling  their 
implementation in  the member states (nearly 250 actions for 
infringement are pending) and adapting them to technical 
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progress. These last-mentioned tasks are bound to grow with 
the Community patrimony, i.e. with the number  of directives 
adopted by the Council, and will entail  a  steady expansion of 
the Commission’s  staff” (COM 80/30: 8-9). The limits of 
harmonization would therefore be obvious: “Bearing in  mind 
that under  Article 100 of the Treaty a  binding provision  must 
generally  already exist in one Member  State at least, it is  not 
hard to see how cumbersome is a procedure that requires 
Community consensus to solve a problem  that could be cre-
ated by  one national civil  servant working with two or three 
experts. The Commission  must therefore review the whole of 
its activities in connection with  the removal  of  barriers to 
trade in  the light of the policies it  intends to pursue (COM 
80/30: 9-10).72  As a result, the Commission  announced it 
would limit its legislative efforts  to those limited areas of na-
tional  trade regulation  that would, according to its narrow 
interpretation of the Cassis de Dijon ruling, continue to be 
justified (cf. OJ 1980, No. C 256/3; Craig  and de Búrca 2011: 
638). Without  explicitly  saying  so, the Commission implied 
that all  other  (presumably  inadmissible) obstacles  to trade 
would primarily be addressed by means  of infringement pro-
cedures (cf. also European Commission 1981: 84).
In  subsequent court proceedings, the Commission  started 
employing variations of the Cassis de  Dijon formula concern-
ing barriers to the trade of a wide array  of product classes: 
vinegar  (Case 799/79, ECR 1980: 2076), bread (Case 130/80, 
ECR 1981: 533), margarine (Case 261/81, ECR 1982, 3967), 
vitamin additives (Case 174/82, ECR 1983: 2456), poultry 
meat (joined cases 47 and 48/83, ECR 1984: 1732), milk 
Removing barriers to trade 175
72 Cf. also a passage later in the document: “For the Commission to sponsor 
a flood of directives that it would have the utmost difficulty in managing 
would be pointless: the aim is the free movement of goods within the Com-
munity, and in order to achieve that aim the Commission intends to broaden 
its present activities by placing as much emphasis on the prevention of bar-
riers as on the removal of those already created” (COM 80/30:16). 
products (Case 97/83: ECR 1983: 2378), video-cassettes 
(joined cases 60 and 61/84, ECR  1985: 2625) and, repeat-
edly, beer (Case 94/82, ECR  1983: 955; Case 176/84, ECR 
1987: 1208; Case 178/84, ECR 1987: 1246), among others. 
Many of these proceedings originated from  preliminary ref-
erences and were decided according  to the Commission posi-
tion, but the Commission also referred a  growing  number of 
infringement proceedings to the Court. Where member 
states submitted observations in  these cases, they  almost 
uniformly argued that, while the rules in questions may con-
stitute a barrier to trade, they would still be justified by one 
of the reasons previously accepted in case law. None of  them 
specifically  contested the idea of mutual  recognition, but at 
the same time almost none of these observations  made spe-
cific reference to the concept (for  an  exception, see the Dan-
ish observation in  Case 174/82, ECR 1983: 2454). This de-
velopment was not lost on  the Commission. As it pointed out 
in  its General  Report for the year  1981 (and continued to do 
in  a  similar manner  throughout he early 1980s): “In  their  
efforts to contend with the deterioration  in  the international 
political  climate and the continuing economic and social cri-
sis at home the Member States' governments tended to resort 
to unilateral, national action  which not only makes it  harder 
to impose a common discipline but can also be the gradual 
undoing  of  what the Community has  achieved so far. There 
were more and more cases of  aids distorting competition  and 
rules  and technical  standards inhibiting  freedom of move-
ment, while the number of infringements of  Community leg-
islation  increased. [...] Delays in  taking  decisions which 
would strengthen  the Community hampered the convergence 
of policies, and the Community's  main concern  has now be-
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come the preservation  of the common  market”  (European 
Commission 1982: 18).73 
Summary
The preceding section demonstrates a  distinct connection 
between the Commission’s legislative agenda  and its  actions 
in  the judicial  sphere. These findings  corroborate some of my 
earlier  assumptions and do not conflict  with the findings of 
the analysis in  chapter  4. The Commission expresses a  pref-
erence for legislative harmonization  as a  tool  for  market in-
tegration, but alters  its strategy as this course of  action  be-
comes increasingly  difficult to realise. As Commission docu-
ments demonstrate, its increased concentration on  judicial 
proceedings can  be interpreted as a reaction to the hesitance 
of the legislative institutions to act on Commission initia-
tives. The difference in  preferences about the scope of market 
integration between the Commission on the one hand and 
the Council  (and, possibly, the European Parliament) on  the 
other, as well  as possible internal  conflict within  the Council, 
can  be made out as  the principal  factors  influencing the 
Commission’s strategy in bringing about trade liberalization.
The section also shows that the Commission  had been inten-
sifying its judicial  efforts  in the face of increasing obstacles to 
legislation, and started to reform internal  procedures for  in-
fringement proceedings even before Cassis  de  Dijon provided 
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73 Cf. also the reports of subsequent years: “The Community's difficulties in 
preventing the fragmentation of the market during this time of recession are 
greater than ever. Constantly rising unemployment leads every country in 
the world to seek salvation in falling back on overt or covert protectionism 
while accusing other parties of taking similar steps unilaterally. [...] In this 
third year of recession, national tribulations loomed so large that the gov-
ernments were unable to make any real progress towards reaching a consen-
sus on Community problems” (European Commission 1983: 18, 20); “There 
was a marked re-emergence of non-tariff barriers to trade, with the result 
that the Commission had to deal with a large number of complaints based on 
Article 30 and subsequent articles of the Treaty (European Commission 
1984: 82).
the legal  tools to engage in a more circumspect litigation 
strategy. While the Commission  cannot be demonstrated to 
have brought about the case, or  even to have suggested the 
outcome to the Court, its reaction to the Court’s judgement 
indicates an  advanced degree of preparedness. The Commis-
sion  would not have been  utterly  surprised by  the suggestion 
of mutual  recognition as a  legal standard, as  it itself had con-
sidered such a concept only  half a  decade before – only  to 
abandon it in the face of member state resistance. 
5.4 Mutual recognition and the single market pro-
gramme
The subsequent success of legislation  pursued by the Com-
mission  with  regard to the harmonization of product stan-
dards (cf. European  Commission  1985: 83) are difficult to 
ascribe to changes  in  Commission strategy  alone. They coin-
cided with a suitably  changed environment for the pursuit of 
free market policies. The economic recession showed signs of 
abating, and the growing predominance of  neo-classical eco-
nomical  thinking among governments supplied the corre-
sponding ideological disposition towards trade liberalization. 
As a measurable consequence, the number of  pending  pro-
posals for  harmonizing  legislation dropped from an average 
of 50 in previous years to about 20 in 1985 (European Com-
mission  1986: 104). A  first sign of  this development was the 
adoption  by  the Council  of  a  Commission  proposal  for a  le-
gally  binding ‘stand-still’ directive (OJ 1980, No. C 253/2) 
which  would replace a  prior ‘gentleman’s agreement’ that 
had been  part of the 1968 General  Programme (cf. Pelkmans 
1987: 254), after  having been held up in  the Council  for three 
years. This proposal  required member states  to inform  the 
Commission of the preparation  of new technical  regulations 
or standards before their adoption, in order to enable it to 
monitor  their  compatibility  with  the free movement of goods. 
The directive gave the Commission the opportunity  to re-
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quest  the stand-still  of a new technical regulation for a  period 
of six months  while it investigated their compatibility  with 
free movement rules, if it  felt that the new regulation  consti-
tuted a barrier to trade, or up to twelve months if it intended 
to propose harmonizing  legislation  (article 9, Directive 83/
189). 
Member state governments hence demonstrated a  new will-
ingness to cooperate to remove barriers to trade. At a  Euro-
pean  Council  meeting  in Brussels in  March 1985, govern-
ments called on  the Commission to propose concrete meas-
ures with regard to ”action to achieve a single large market 
by  1992, thereby  creating a  more favourable environment for 
stimulating enterprise, competition  and trade”  (Bull. EC 3-
1985: 12). The Commission clearly  acknowledged this 
changed environment in the introduction  of its correspond-
ing White Paper on  the completion of  the single market. Af-
ter the restrictive measures introduced during the recession 
of the 1970s and early  1980s, “the mood has begun to 
change, and the commitment [to market freedoms] to be re-
discovered: gradually at  first, but now with  increasing 
tempo” (COM 85/310: 5). In  light of  these developments, the 
Commission felt confident to assert its approach to the re-
moval of technical  barriers to trade: “The general thrust of 
the Commission’s approach  in this area will  be to move away 
from  the concept of harmonisation  towards that of  mutual 
recognition  and equivalence. But there will  be a continuing 
role for  the approximation of  Member States’ laws and regu-
lations, as  laid down  in Article 100 of the Treaty. Clearly, ac-
tion  under  this  Article would be quicker  and more effective if 
the Council  were to agree not to allow the unanimity re-
quirement to obstruct progress where it could otherwise be 
made” (COM 85/310: 6-7).
The White Paper restated the Commission’s opinion  that, “if 
a  product is lawfully  manufactured and marketed in one 
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Member State, there is no reason  why it  should not be sold 
freely  throughout the Community. [...] The Commission is 
fully  aware that this strategy implies  a change in habits and 
in  traditional  ways of thinking. What is needed is a  radical 
change of attitude which  would lead to new and innovative 
solutions for  problems – real  or apparent – which may  ap-
pear  when border controls no longer  exist”  (COM 85/310: 
17). In  keeping  with  the earlier  formulations, the Commis-
sion  described its strategy to be twofold. Legislative har-
monization, on  the one hand, would be “restricted to laying 
down  essential  health and safety  requirements which will  be 
obligatory  in  all  Member States” (COM 85/310:19). The 
Commission, moreover, suggested in  this regard that the 
Council  “off-load technical  matters by making more use of its 
powers of delegation” to the Commission  (COM 85/310: 20). 
On the other hand, the Commission would determine which 
remaining national  regulations constitute unjustified barriers 
to trade and prosecute them accordingly  (COM 85/310: 19, 
22).  
At the same time, the Commission  repeatedly  emphasised 
the need for  simplified decision-making mechanisms in  the 
Council. In its  1984 General  Report it asserted that “The 
Community's  inability to take decisions is  becoming  more 
and more obvious. The shortcomings of the Community's 
cumbersome decision-making procedures are blocking dy-
namic development, and the practice of making one issue 
dependent on another  tends to hamper any fresh moves” 
(European Commission 1985: 20). A  year  later, it  repeated 
this observation: “Attainment of the ambitious goal of  creat-
ing a  single market by  1992 is conditional  on  institutional  
reform: gradual removal of  physical, technical  and tax barri-
ers will prove extremely difficult unless existing decision-
making procedures are changed” (European Commission 
1986: 26).
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The member states evidently  agreed with this assessment. 
The Commission proposed to the Intergovernmental Confer-
ence on  the Single European Act the extension of  qualitative 
majority  voting to all  legislation affecting the completion  of 
the single market (cf. European Commission 1986: 32). 
Member state governments subsequently  agreed to introduce 
into the EEC Treaty an article 100A, which  foresaw majority 
voting  for the approximation of  laws concerning the estab-
lishment and operation  of the internal  market. Taking  ac-
count of persistent member  state concerns, subsequent para-
graphs limited the applicability of this rule, excluding fiscal 
matters, the free movement of persons  and employee rights. 
Moreover, the new article 100A(4) EEC included the possi-
bility  to maintain  national  provisions regulating trade, even 
in  the face of  Community harmonization, if they  could be 
justified by one of  the exemptions listed in article 36 (cf. Bull. 
EC 11-1985: 9). Claus-Dieter  Ehlermann, then  Director  Gen-
eral  of  the Commission’s legal  service, commented that this 
last paragraph  “was drafted by  the Heads of  State and Gov-
ernment themselves”, with  the aim  “to protect any  Member 
State in  a minority position  from being  forced to accept the 
majority  line” (Ehlermann 1987: 381, 389). The transfer  to 
majority  voting was therefore limited, with specific safe-
guards firmly in place.74
While the Commission’s  vigorous endorsement of mutual 
recognition  as  the cornerstone of  a new legislative pro-
gramme to remove barriers to trade coincided with  a new 
member state interest in free market measures, this did not 
mean  that national  governments accepted the concept. The 
Council, for its part, never  specifically  endorsed mutual rec-
ognition, and in fact avoided any  reference to it. While the 
Commission proposal  for  the 1983 stand-still directive con-
tained a specific reference to Cassis de  Dijon (“technical 
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74 Member State Governments also rejected wider implementing powers the 
Commission had demanded for itself (cf. Ehlermann 1987: 403).
regulations relating to products, where  they impede  the  free 
movement of goods legally manufactured and sold in a 
Member State, are lawful only if  they are necessary in order 
to meet essential requirements and have an objective in the 
public interest of  which they constitute the main guarantee”, 
recital  4, OJ 1980, No. C 253/2, my emphasis), the Council 
deleted the wording reminiscent of mutual  recognition.75 It is 
also not mentioned in  the Council  recommendation  for “a 
new approach to technological  harmonization  and stan-
dards” (OJ 1985, No. C 136/1). The wording used here is 
“presumption of conformity”, which  relates to the mutual 
recognition  of the results of tests  that had already been  dis-
cussed in  the early 1970s. The member states clearly wanted 
to avoid mutual recognition  as a general  concept and place it 
in  strict confines – mutual  recognition  should be applicable 
where secondary  legislation allows for it, and preferably  on 
the basis of harmonized requirements. 
The negotiations about the Single European  Act, moreover, 
demonstrated that member states  opposed an  incorporation 
of mutual  recognition into primary  law. While all parties 
agreed on the 1992 deadline for  the completion of the inter-
nal  market, disagreements arose as  to the consequences of 
this date. As Claus-Dieter  Ehlermann  recounts, the Commis-
sion  initially proposed a  “radically  progressive solution” (Eh-
lermann  1987: 370). In a  corresponding working paper, the 
Commission suggested that in  the case of a failure on the 
part of the legislative institutions to successfully  harmonize 
the relevant national  provisions in time, national  govern-
ments should, “by 31  December 1992 at the latest, recognize 
the equivalence of  the rules of the other Member States con-
cerning persons, goods, services and capital”  (cited in Eh-
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75 The corresponding recital to the adopted directive read: “barriers to trade 
resulting from technical regulations relating to products may be allowed 
only where they are necessary in order to meet essential requirements and 
have an objective in the public interest of which they constitute the main 
guarantee” (recital 4, Directive 83/189). 
lermann  1987: 405). Not only  would all  safeguard clauses be 
rendered nugatory, but also all  exemptions arising from  arti-
cle 36 or the mandatory requirements  contained in the Cas-
sis de  Dijon ruling  (cf. Ehlermann  1987: 371). In effect, these 
clauses would have put in  place the complete mutual  recogni-
tion  of all  member states  rules in the event that harmoniza-
tion  should fail  to be completed by  the deadline – a signifi-
cant penalty meant to entice the speedy  adoption  of  Commis-
sion  proposals. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Commission 
resoundingly  failed to convince national  governments of this 
approach. The final  text omits all reference to a  possible di-
rect effect  of single market rules. The new article 100B 
merely allowed for a  Council decision (albeit by  majority  vote 
on a  Commission initiative) to recognize an  unharmonized 
class of national rules as equivalent. At the conclusion of the 
intergovernmental  conference, moreover, member state gov-
ernments issued a  “Declaration  on  Article 8A  of the EEC 
Treaty”, underlining that “Setting the date of 31 December 
1992 does not create an automatic legal  effect” (cf. Ehler-
mann 1987: 371-372). 
While the member states continued to oppose mutual  recog-
nition  understood broadly, it is also not entirely clear what 
the role of the concept was in the programme pursued by  the 
Commission. The legal concept of  mutual recognition  as 
formulated by  the Court  and endorsed by the Commission  is 
certainly  very  abstract (cf. Pelkmans 2007: 703). Its effect is 
essentially negative – mutual  recognition will  have to be in-
voked in  court (either  by  the Commission or by  affected trad-
ers) against a  restrictive practice to become effective. It is  an 
extension  of the prohibition of measures having an equiva-
lent effect to quantitative restrictions: any  national  trade rule 
that prohibits the import of a good lawfully  produced in  an-
other member state is illegal, unless  it can be justified by 
mandatory requirements, provided the rules are proportion-
ate to their  aim. Contrary  to the procedure regarding  the 
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drafting of  new, potentially  obstructive trade regulations as 
specified in  the stand-still  directive, the legal  concept of mu-
tual recognition gives little concrete guidance to national 
authorities, who reflexively  resort to national  regulations (cf. 
Pelkmans 2007: 711). The Commission  implicitly  acknowl-
edged that it  was very costly  to enforce: “As the national 
courts and the European  Court (Article 30 is directly appli-
cable) decide on a  case by case basis, the absence of Commu-
nity legislation thus leaves to the judiciary the responsibility 
of deciding on  questions which normally  fall  to the responsi-
bility  of the legislator. The ensuing uncertainty is highly  det-
rimental  to economic operators” (COM 85/19: 5). The Court 
judgement in Cassis de  Dijon and the subsequent efforts 
provided the Commission  with  a  very wide ranging  legal 
norm with  very  narrow practical  applicability  – it would have 
to pursue infringements case by case. The member  states, in 
refusing to endorse the principle, were again  able to contain 
the effects (cf. Conant 2002: 32). 
The principal utility of mutual recognition for  the Commis-
sion  was  therefore its implied threat to member states: in the 
absence of European rules, each potentially restrictive na-
tional  rule could be subject to legal challenge, imposing on 
national  authorities (and traders alike) continuous costs  and 
uncertainty.76 This threat in  return  served as an incentive to 
pursue harmonizing  legislation, which  would, under the new 
approach, be confined to specifying  regulatory goals, broadly 
in  correspondence with  the justifications provided for in  arti-
cle 36 EEC or the mandatory requirements outlined by  the 
Court in Cassis de  Dijon, while leaving specification to na-
tional  administrations or common  standardization bodies. 
Removing barriers to trade 184
76  The Commission evidently acknowledged this dual approach: “The re-
moval of non-tariff barriers to intra-Community trade in goods is a corner-
stone of the buildings of the single market. The Commission has two basic 
instruments for this purpose at its disposal, the prohibition on all measures 
having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions (Article 30 to 36 of the 
EEC Treaty) and the harmonization of technical rules” (OJ 1990, No. C 232/
10).
Whereas the old approach  to harmonization  (the pre-Cassis 
approach) was to draft highly specific technical  specification 
that would apply  to all  European  products, the new regula-
tions ‘merely’ specified the degree of health and safety, envi-
ronmental and consumer protection requirements that 
products would have to comply  with  (cf. Craig  and de Búrca 
2011: 594).77  
Summary
The general  outlook for Commission policies  at the outset  of 
the single market programme was highly  favourable. There 
was less ideological  distance to the Council with regard to 
market integration, voting rules in  the Council had changed 
to include the possibility of majority  voting, enhancing the 
Commission’s ability to successfully propose legislation while 
also speeding up the process: “Decision-making by the insti-
tutions has accelerated considerably  since the Single Euro-
pean  Act entered into force, primarily due to the changes in 
procedure. The extension of qualified majority  voting to most 
issues connected with  the internal  market has stepped up the 
pressure to find a  consensus within  the Council. [...] It took 
just 12 months to reach a  common position on the key pro-
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77 The new approach is best summed up in the Commission own words: 
“legislative harmonization is limited to the adoption [...] of the essential 
safety requirements (or other requirements in the general interest) with 
which products put on the market must conform, and which should there-
fore enjoy free circulation throughout the Community,
the task of drawing up the technical specifications needed for the production 
and placing on the market of products conforming to the essential require-
ments established by the directives, while taking into account the current 
state of technology, is entrusted to organizations competent in the stan-
dardization area,
these technical specifications are not mandatory and maintain their status of 
voluntary standards,
but at the same time national authorities are obliged to recognize that prod-
ucts manufactured in conformity with harmonized standards (or, provision-
ally, with national standards) are presumed to conform to the "essential 
requirements" established by the directive” (COM 85/19: 6-7).
posal concerning  machine safety, compared with 70 months 
to adopt the first Directive to reduce noise from  lawnmow-
ers” (COM 89/311: 2).78 With the legally  established principle 
of mutual  recognition as  an implied threat to national  rules, 
moreover, the Commission  could apply leverage over Council 
positions. The introduction of the cooperation procedure 
seems not to have introduced large legislative obstacles: 
“Parliament has played its  part in the cooperation  procedure 
with  great efficiency; the current delay in adopting  the com-
mon position on television  is the responsibility  of  the Coun-
cil, Parliament having done all  in its  power to enable a  deci-
sion  to be taken  before the European elections” (COM 89/
422: 2). Given  these conditions, my hypotheses would pre-
dict a much  less confrontational  stance. This is evident to 
some degree in the rhetoric of Commission documents from 
that time, which  emphasised the willingness of all  Commu-
nity institutions to cooperate. These documents also stress a 
predominant concern  with  legislation, in particular with  re-
gard to the proposals included in the 1985 White Paper  (al-
though  these concerned more policy areas than just  the free 
movement of goods). 
5.5 Mutual recognition after 1992
By  the end of  the 1992 deadline for  the implementation of 
the single market  programme, most of the initiatives  an-
nounced in  the White Paper had in fact been  adopted. The 
Commission had transferred all  282 envisaged proposals to 
the Council  and the Parliament by  mid-1990, and the legisla-
tive institutions had adopted 90%  of the programme by late 
1992 (cf. COM 90/90: 6; COM 92/383 final: 1-2). This 
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78  Compare this to a comment a year later: “But no such speeding-up has 
been seen where unanimity is imposed either by the legal basis (trade mark 
law, taxation) or the Council's refusal to implement the principles of the 
Single Act concerning the powers of implementation of the Commission; for 
this reason the Commission has requested a debate at the General Affairs 
Council on the subject of ‘comitology’” (COM 90/90: 3).
amount of activity  stands in contrast to the 177 harmonizing 
directives adopted by  the Council  between  1969 and 1985. 
The amount of legislative proposals for harmonization  suc-
cessively  dropped after  the 1992 deadline, while the focus  of 
legislation  changed to other  aspects  of the internal  market, 
such  as taxation  and services, or the liberalisation of trans-
port and electricity markets  (cf. Craig 2002: 30).79  The 
Commission did, however, introduce a  number of proposals 
over the course of  the last two decades with the aim of im-
proving its  monitoring  and enforcement position  vis-à-vis 
national  barriers to trade. These measures were primarily 
aimed at limiting member  states’ discretion in  applying na-
tional  regulations to Community  products, and pursued two 
central  goals: expanding  the application of mutual recogni-
tion, and expanding the Commission’s authority to prevent 
member states from  autonomously applying existing and 
creating new domestic rules.  
As for the latter, the Commission justified the need for im-
proved procedures  by pointing out that “the persistent  ten-
dency of some Member States  to prescribe detailed technical 
regulations for products  represents a  constant threat to the 
Single Market; on  average more than 450 new national  tech-
nical rules  for products are notified to the Commission every 
year. There is  little sign yet that Member  States are ready  to 
observe the self-discipline in rule-making that they  advocate 
so vociferously for the Union” (COM 96/520: 20). Restricting 
this tendency  constituted one of the four  “strategic targets” 
formulated by the Commission’s “Action  Plan for the Single 
Market” which it presented to the European Council  in Am-
sterdam (COM 97/184: 6). In  the conclusions to this meet-
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79 Cf. also: “Eleven years after the 1985 White Paper programme was agreed, 
a 'hard core' of its proposals still remains to be adopted, and market liberali-
sation in sectors which were not covered by that programme has not been 
completed. [...] The main stumbling blocks are in key areas affecting busi-
ness management, such as company law and corporate taxation, financial 
services and the liberalisation of the transport and energy markets” (COM 
96/520: 18).
ing, the European Council, in turn, requested the Commis-
sion  "to examine ways and means of guaranteeing in  an ef-
fective manner  the free movement of  goods, including the 
possibility of imposing sanctions on Member States”  (cf. 
COM 97/619: 3). The Commission subsequently proposed an 
intervention  mechanism which would essentially replicate 
the procedure for intervention  in state aid cases. In the event 
of a “grave disruption  of  the free movement of  goods”  result-
ing in “serious loss to the individuals  affected” (COM 97/619: 
3), the Commission would be able to take a  decision  with 
binding legal effect on  the member state concerned, outlining 
the course of action to be taken. Should the member state not 
comply, the Commission  would be able to immediately  refer 
the question to the Court of  Justice, effectively abridging  the 
infringement procedure by eliminating the requirement for  a 
letter of  formal  notice and shortening the time limits  for a  
response to the Commission’s reasoned opinion to three 
days. The rationale for  these enhanced legal  competences 
was a  plain  admission that the infringement procedure alone 
was insufficient for the prevention and removal  of trade bar-
riers: “the application  for  a declaration in infringement pro-
ceedings is still  unsuitable for reacting efficiently  to certain 
serious breaches of  the principle of the free movement of 
goods which need to be rectified urgently. The litigation 
process remains lengthy, with a minimum of two years elaps-
ing before the judgment establishing the infringement is de-
livered. In the intervening period, no legally  binding instru-
ment will  be available particularly  to help economic opera-
tors enforce their rights  quickly  and effectively as part  of the 
means of redress provided by  the Member  States”  (COM 97/
619: 3). 
While the Council  adopted a  regulation based on  the Com-
mission’s proposal  just over a year  after  its submission, the 
content of that regulation bears little resemblance to the 
proposal. Instead of  the authority  to issue legally  binding 
decisions, the Commission  was  granted strictly declaratory 
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competences only, including an ability  to publish its  obser-
vations in the Official Journal. Member state governments 
only set  themselves the requirement to respond to Commis-
sion  allegations, with  no legal  consequences foreseen. The 
Council  moreover stressed that the regulation “may not be 
interpreted as  affecting  in any way the exercise of fundamen-
tal rights as recognised in  Member States, including the right 
or freedom to strike” (article 3, Regulation  2679/98). In all 
likelihood, this  was a reaction to an earlier  infringement case 
where the Commission, supported by  the Spanish and British 
governments, had taken  the French  government to Court  for 
its failure to adequately respond to a series of public 
protests.80 French  farmers, in an  effort to prevent the import 
of foreign  fruit and vegetables, had repeatedly  attacked 
transport operators and retailers  offering such  produce, and 
the Commission  accused the French authorities of  largely  
refraining from intervening. This failure to assure the free 
movement of  goods, the Commission argued, constituted a 
measure having equivalent effect to a  quantitative restriction 
to trade. The Court accepted the Commission’s position, 
holding  that  “Article 30 therefore requires the Member 
States not merely  themselves to abstain from  adopting 
measures or engaging  in conduct  liable to constitute an ob-
stacle to trade but also, when read with  Article 5 of the Treaty 
[the principle of  loyal  cooperation], to take all necessary and 
appropriate measures to ensure that that fundamental free-
dom is  respected on their territory” (Case C-265/95, ECR I 
1997: 6999).
While its efforts to achieve greater autonomous legal  compe-
tences  largely failed, the Commission was somewhat more 
successful  in giving effect to the principle of mutual recogni-
tion. As I have outlined above, one of the serious drawbacks 
of this principle was the fact that it had its basis in  case-law 
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80 In a corresponding resolution, the Council mentioned this case explicitly 
(OJ 1998, No. L 337/10).
only. The refusal  of  the member  state governments to en-
dorse the principle accounted for its relative invisibility. Na-
tional  authorities, faced with  the choice of admitting an un-
known foreign product to their domestic markets, had very 
little guidance as to the operation of the principle, and, more 
often  than not, chose to ignore it (COM 99/299: 5, cf. also 
Craig 2002: 35-36). One of  the aims of the Commission  was 
consequently to impose on member states an obligation  to 
include ‘mutual  recognition  clauses’ into national  pieces  of 
legislation. A  possible channel for this were the extensive 
notification requirements in  place for national  rules impos-
ing novel  product or marketing  standards as part of the 1983 
‘stand-still’ directive (Directive 83/189). The Commission 
subsequently included a  requirement for such  clauses in its 
assessment of the compatibility  of new national  rules  with 
the Community rules on the free movement of goods. Since 
the Commission’s assessments were not legally binding, 
member state authorities could refuse to follow them. This 
was so in  the case of a  French rule on the content of  ‘foie 
gras’, which  French  authorities passed in  1993. The Commis-
sion  initiated infringement proceedings against the French 
government for its refusal to include a  mutual  recognition 
clause into this rule, arguing that  in  the absence of  such  a 
clause, the rule would constitute an  illegal barrier  to trade.81 
The Court sided with the Commission (Case 184/96, ECR I 
1997: 6226), in  effect  bolstering  its efforts to achieve greater 
visibility  for the principle of  mutual recognition  (cf. Craig 
and de Búrca 2011: 687). 
Despite this success, the Commission  conceded repeatedly 
over the following years that the application  of mutual  rec-
ognition did not work well in  practice. In  a  communication 
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81 The Commission had proposed such a clause to read: “'Preparations with 
foie gras as a base produced in an unvarying and fair manner in accordance 
with traditional procedures existing in other Member States of the EEC may 
be marketed in France” (Case 185/96, ECR I 1997: 6202).
devoted to this issue, the Commission  repeated its observa-
tion  that “there is  a need to reinforce the knowledge of  eco-
nomic operators and the competent authorities of the Mem-
ber States  regarding the principle of mutual recognition” and 
announced greater efforts at providing information and re-
porting on the problem, initiating infringement proceedings 
where applicable, and making  greater  use of  the requirement 
for  mutual recognition clauses in  national  legislation (COM 
99/299: 7-8). The Council reacted with the adoption of  a 
resolution, acknowledging the Commission’s  position  (OJ 
1999, No. C 141/5). While this resolution contained no spe-
cific proposals for further action, its passage was nonetheless 
contested.82 Problems continued to persist in the application 
of mutual  recognition for technically  complex  or  potentially 
hazardous products, leading  the Commission to conclude 
that “in  the specific sectors in  which national  rules provide 
for  such  different levels of protection  that the principle of 
mutual  recognition cannot properly  fulfil  its role (as in  the 
field of  fortified foodstuffs and construction products), har-
monisation will  continue to be the most suitable solution, on 
condition that it  covers all  the problems for  which  mutual 
recognition  cannot provide an effective solution”  (COM 
2002/419: 2). The Commission also reported an increased 
number of infringement proceedings targeting member 
states’ failure to apply the principle of mutual  recognition 
(COM 2002/419: 33). By 2003, the Commission  started to 
mention the possibility  of legislation  on  the application of the 
mutual  recognition principle, in  order to provide “more 
structure so as to enhance transparency” (COM 2003/238: 
7). This  would include binding rules “which would make the 
application  of  the principle easier and more predictable for 
business” (COM 2005/11: 22). The Commission transferred 
the corresponding proposal for a regulation to the Council 
and the EP in  February 2007, stressing  again  the lack of 
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82  Its adoption was listed as a B-Point in Council negotiations according to 
PreLex.
awareness of the principle and the legal  uncertainty  sur-
rounding  its  application, in  particular  with  regard to the 
range of product classes it applies to and the allocation  of  the 
burden of proof  (COM 2007/36: 2). The proposal  introduced 
a legally  binding  procedure for  national  authorities to follow 
should they choose not to adhere to the principle of mutual 
recognition  and apply  a  national  standard to an imported 
product instead. The procedure requires the national  author-
ity to fully  disclose the reasons underlying  the decision, and 
to indicate the possible legal  remedies against it. Such  reme-
dies  would always  include recourse to the national  judicial 
system  (COM 2007/36: 15-16). In  effect, the proposal  firmly 
allocated the administrative burden to the national  authority 
(cf. Craig and de Búrca 2011: 686). Merely  a year later, Coun-
cil and Parliament agreed on the proposal without substan-
tive alterations, adopting the first piece of  legislation that  
explicitly endorses the concept of  mutual  recognition (regu-
lation 764/2008).
Summary
This overview of internal market policy over the last two dec-
ades  stresses the Commission’s concern  with  procedural 
rules  to give effect to mutual recognition as a  central  princi-
ple of market integration, which had until  recently  been 
based exclusively  on  case-law. Member  state opposition, or, 
in  any  case, refusal  to endorse the principle, had rendered it 
an ineffective tool. The Commission’s  concerns for legal cer-
tainty  and its comments about the costliness of the lack of 
clear legal  guidelines echo Susanne Schmidt’s propositions 
about the inherent instability  of case-law and the preferabil-
ity of  legislative codification  (cf. Schmidt 2011a: 46). In es-
sence, this was the strategy pursued by  the Commission  dur-
ing this time. While there was some judicial  activity  in this 
regard, which  resulted in the Commission successfully  im-
posing on  member states an  obligation to include mutual 
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recognition  clauses  in new domestic legislation, the Commis-
sion’s attempt to gain larger  autonomous regulatory  powers 
through  legislation failed, and there is no evidence of it at-
tempting to expand its position in court. The Commission 
did, however, combine its  proposal  for  the legislative codifi-
cation of guidelines concerning the application of  mutual 
recognition  with  the threat of increased resort to infringe-
ment proceedings in this matter. 
5.6 Conclusion
The findings of the case study certainly  add complexity  to the 
analysis of Commission  strategies, but they  also corroborate 
some initial  assumptions. There is evidence for a link  be-
tween the Commission’s  actions in  legislation  and litigation. 
Legislative obstacles to harmonizing legislation  have influ-
enced the Commission’s resort to legal  proceedings particu-
larly  for the period between  the mid 1970s and the early 
1990s.
Early  Commission action in  establishing the common  market 
was essentially  non-confrontative. The Commission  regarded 
discriminatory trade rules as incompatible with  Treaty stipu-
lations  but accepted wider member state discretion  in formu-
lating non-discriminatory  rules characteristic of all  market 
regulation. The Commission referred almost no infringement 
proceedings to the Court during this time. It essentially re-
garded the procedure as  a  forum for  confidential  negotiation 
between member state governments and itself which  should 
generally  not result in confrontation. Its primary  tool  for  the 
abolishment of trade barriers were harmonization measures, 
which  it  initiated with  increasing frequency following the 
1968 General Programme. 
This position  changed over the course of  the 1970s, where 
several  trends overlapped. First, the legislative programme 
for  the harmonization  of  product standards proved unsuc-
cessful. The Commission ascribed this  fact to member state 
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resistance in the face of adverse economic conditions. Sec-
ond, its  interpretation  of  Treaty obligations turned more 
weary of member state discretion, and this  position  was sup-
ported by  the Court of Justice, which, at least in Dassonville, 
even  went beyond the Commission’s interpretation. Third, 
from  1977, the Commission  revised its  position on the use of 
the infringement procedure in the face of increasing  legisla-
tive obstacles, resulting in  a more confrontative stance in  the 
enforcement of what the Commission interpreted as obliga-
tions arising out  of EU law. All three strands combined after 
the Court’s judgement in  Cassis de  Dijon, which provided a 
legal  principle allowing the Commission  to apply pressure on 
member state governments to remove trade barriers. 
The emergence of the single market programme, which  was 
promoted both by  the Commission  and the European Coun-
cil, caused a  change in  the Commission’s strategy, leading it 
to focus on  legislation while de-emphasising litigation. This 
may  be due to several  factors that coincided during this time. 
First, member state resistance to harmonization measures 
receded in  the face of a  changing dominant economic ideol-
ogy and improved economic conditions. Moreover, the Single 
European Act introduced majority  voting to legislative pro-
cedures concerning harmonization. All  of  these factors re-
duced the obstacles to successful  legislation, and the Com-
mission  subsequently  de-emphasised its judicial  strategy. 
The period following the completion  of the single market 
programme is characterised less by  continuing  harmonizing 
legislation, but more by the Commission’s  intention to give 
greater effect to the principle of mutual recognition. 
A  look at descriptive statistics for Commission  action during 
this time supports this interpretation  (figure 5.1). The two 
figures make for  slightly awkward comparison because the 
timelines  are not the same (there are no reliable data on leg-
islative initiatives before 1984). The data on legislative initia-
tives refer  to Commission  proposals  concerning the ap-
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proximation  of  member state trade laws according to the 
internal  market clause (art. 100 EEC and its successors), 
whereas the court cases specifically pertain  to quantitative 
restrictions to trade and measures  having equivalent effect 
(art. 30-36 EEC and successors).






















1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
preliminary references infringement proceedings
court cases
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Luetgert et al. 2006).
The lack of good aggregate data on legislative proposals be-
fore 1984 is unfortunate, as it  is not possible to compare the 
Commission’s activities  before and after the single market 
programme. Evidence from  the Commission’s  General  Re-
ports  and other  documents quoted above, however, suggests 
the conclusion  that  the Commission’s legislative activity in-
deed picked up with  the prospect of  Council  cooperation and 
the introduction  of  majority  voting, to then gradually  taper 
off  after the completion  of the programme around 1992. The 
low point in  Commission legislative activity coincides with 
the reorientation  of the Commission’s strategy from the ‘tra-
ditional’ approach  to the ‘new’ approach to harmonization in 
the Commission’s 1985 White Paper  on  the completion  of the 
internal market.
Looking at court cases, what becomes apparent is a  sudden 
and constant rise in  infringement proceedings referred to the 
Court from the late 1970s, the spike of  which  coincides  with 
the formulation  of  the 1985 White Paper. This is  consistent 
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with  the evidence from  Commission documents that had 
repeatedly highlighted the growing importance of litigation 
in  pursuing its policy  of  market integration  in the face of 
member state resistance to corresponding legislation. The 
origin of the Commission’s increased resort to infringement 
proceedings moreover  coincides with  the reforms of internal 
procedures concerning  enforcement actions  described by 
Claus-Dieter  Ehlermann  (cf. Ehlermann 1981: 141). It is  also 
indicative of a  distinct ‘learning curve’ – the Commission  had 
priorly not made much  use of this procedure across the 
board.
The post-1985 drop in court  referrals  can then  be seen as a 
function of  the success of the legislative programme. The 
spike of  referrals in  1989 is an  outlier  in the general  post-
1985 trend and cannot, by reference to the relevant docu-
ments, be comprehensively explained in terms of a Commis-
sion  strategy. It may have constituted a  form  of ‘warning’ in 
the face of  lagging Council  activity: “While real progress has 
been made in all areas covered by  qualified majority  voting, 
matters requiring  the Council  to be unanimous are falling 
behind schedule” (COM 90/90: 3). More likely, however, is 
an explanation that points to the predominant plaintiff  for 
this year. Whereas the 20 infringement proceedings lodged 
before the Court  in  1985 spread more or  less  evenly across 
member states, half of  the 14 proceedings in  1989 concern 
Italy, which  had been  admonished in a 199o report on  the 
implementation of  the White Paper  as a  laggard in  imple-
menting harmonizing directives.83  The slight increase in en-
forcement actions reaching the Court towards the late 1990s 
is again consistent  with  Commission  documents describing  a 
concentration on  such  action to give effect to the principle of 
mutual  recognition (COM 99/299: 7-8), although  this link is 
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83  “In some countries progress has been much slower, particularly in Italy, 
which despite its experience with Community law, has become the Member 
state with the greatest backlog since improvements in Spain and Portugal” 
(COM 90/90: 6).
not corroborated by other evidence. None of  these cases have 
contributed to a reinterpretation of the legal principle. 
Finally, the data also reveal  a  distinct time dimension to the 
Commission’s activity profile that is due not to changing  in-
stitutional  incentives, but rather the changing policy priori-
ties of the Union (and the Commission) over time. Through-
out the 1990s, the Commission’s rate of legislative proposals 
and enforcement actions concerning intra-Community trade 
in  goods remains well  below its late 1980s peak. The focus of 
activity by the Union institutions evidently moved on  to dif-
ferent subject areas after 1992, reflecting  both  the relative 
success of the single market programme as well  as the re-
vised strategy concerning harmonization. 
The evidence from this overview of legislation and infringe-
ment proceedings largely  corroborates  my assumption  that 
the Commission  increasingly resorts to infringement pro-
ceedings where the prospects of  successful  legislation  are 
low. The reversal in  the ratio moreover coincides with  the 
introduction  of majority  voting, although  there is  less evi-
dence for a  distinct causal  link – the overall alignment of 
preferences regarding market integration  may  equally  ex-
plain this phenomenon.  
What is the role of preliminary reference procedures? One of 
the distinct observations in  this analysis  is that early  legal 
developments stem  almost exclusively  from preliminary ref-
erences. This is consistent with  the finding that the Commis-
sion  did not begin  to systematically  refer cases to the Court 
before the late 1970s. The Commission used its ability  to 
lodge observations in preliminary reference proceedings and 
in  this  way  regularly  presented its legal  positions to the 
Court, which, with  the exception  of Dassonville, largely sup-
ported the Commission’s stand-point. A  comparison between 
the amount of infringement proceedings and preliminary 
references as depicted in  figure 5.1 reveals  several  patterns. 
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First, the number of court cases in total for  this subject mat-
ter was low during  the 1970s. This is largely  in synch with the 
comparatively  low activity profile of the Court at this  time. It 
moreover becomes apparent that from the late 1970s until 
1985, court cases in  this field were predominantly  initiated 
by  the Commission. The situation  changes drastically  after 
1985, when the Commission started referring much  less 
cases to the Court, whereas the number of  preliminary refer-
ences rose until about 1993 and then started receding. This 
pattern  introduces another possible explanation  for  the re-
versal of the Commission’s judicial  strategy  after 1985. The 
rising incidence of preliminary reference procedures before 
the Court could be interpreted as making it plainly  unneces-
sary for  the Commission to pursue infringement proceedings 
against member states, when it could use its limited re-
sources for legislative initiatives while simultaneously  being 
able to keep up pressure on  member states  in the judicial 
sphere. The amount of cases pursued by individual traders 
before national  courts, however, was also regarded with  ap-
prehension  by  some Commission officials, as the subjects of 
such  proceedings appeared increasingly frivolous, potentially 
threatening revolt from national  courts and jeopardising the 
legislative cooperation between the Commission  and the 
Council  (cf. Stone Sweet 2004: 139-140). Perhaps encour-
aged by the Commission’s prior actions, individual  litigants 
started to question  the legality of national  trading rules that 
had no apparent connection to cross-border trade, such as 
rules  governing  opening times for  retail  outlets (cf. White 
1989: 238-239; Steiner 1992: 750). The Court eventually 
went on  to define limits  to this  liberalizing drive in Keck 
(joined cases C-267/91  and C-268/91, ECR  I 1993: 6097), 
essentially adopting  an interpretation  that had previously 
been proposed by  Eric White (White 1989), a member of the 
Commission’s Legal Service (cf. Stone Sweet 2004: 140). 
This demonstrates that preliminary references  can  be some-
thing of a double-edged sword: they are useful  where they fit 
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into the policy  programme pursued by  the Commission, but 
can be counterproductive where they do not.
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Chapter 6
From market citizen to European citizen
The subject of this chapter, the free movement of persons, 
constitutes, next to the free movement of goods covered in 
the last chapter, and the free movement of  services and capi-
tal, one of the ‘fundamental  freedoms’ embedded in  the 
original Rome Treaty that are central  to the Community’s 
rights-based approach  to market building. As such, the poli-
cies pursued in  accordance to it  bear  some resemblance to 
those described in the previous chapter; but they also differ 
in  important ways, which makes for  a fruitful  comparison. 
Importantly, the Commission  has from the outset regarded 
policies concerning  the free movement of persons, while an-
chored in  the economic realm, as having an  essential  social 
policy component (cf. Craig and de Búrca 2011: 715). 
Whereas the free movement of goods was  expected to have 
positive effects on the economic performance of national 
economies, and be noticeable to the consumer through  lower 
prices and increased diversity  in  products, the right for per-
sons to move freely  within  the Community was regarded as 
much more symbolic, not just for  the establishment of a 
common market, but for the advancement towards an  “ever 
closer union among  the peoples  of  Europe”, as was declared 
in  the first preamble of the EEC Treaty. Consequently, the 
free movement of persons, independent of  economic activity, 
was one of the central  elements in the notion of a ‘European 
citizenship’ which  the Commission and the member state 
governments debated since the early 1970s.
This chapter  proceeds as follows. As in  the previous chapter, 
I will  start with  a short overview of the central characteristics 
of the policy  area  concerned. The second part (6.2) describes 
the initial  position  of the Commission with  regard to the free 
movement of  persons, and outlines  early  legislation. While 
this early  phase was cooperative, I demonstrate a growing 
friction  between  the position  of the Commission  and that of 
the member states. The third part (6.3) concerns the emerg-
ing debate about the concept of a ‘European citizenship’ and 
the concurrent attempts by  the Commission to de-couple free 
movement rights from their  economic base. The fourth part 
(6.4) traces  the Commission’s proposal  for a  general  right  of 
residence for Community  citizens, which  it transferred to the 
Council  in  1979 but which  was only  adopted in  1990. The 
remainder of  the case study (6.5) concentrates on the sub-
stantial  rights associated with  the inclusion  of  ‘Union citizen-
ship’ in  the Treaty  of Maastricht and the Commission’s effort 
to consolidate legislation on the free movement of  persons to 
cover all Union citizens. A final section (6.6) concludes.
6.1 Overview
The obstacles to the free movement of  persons, as they ex-
isted in  the first decades of the European Economic Commu-
nity, were of a  different quality than the tariffs, quotas and 
measures having equivalent effect hindering trade in  goods. 
National control  over the entry of migrants to the territory, 
the conditions for  residence and access to the labour  market, 
even  when concerning other Community nationals, touched 
close to the core of  national  sovereignty. This was particu-
larly  true when  it  came to rules governing  access to social  
security  and social welfare, both  of  which, as all  actors un-
derstood, presented barriers to movement. Losing  entitle-
ment to social benefits in  the home country, or the lack of  
access to social  security in the host country, pose significant 
economic disincentives to move from one country to the 
other, even when other factors make migration  an  attractive 
option. The more surprising, perhaps, that it  did not take 
much more than  a decade for the Community legislators to 
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put into effect the essential framework for each  member state 
to open up its labour market to other Community  nationals. 
The issue started becoming  contentious, however, when the 
focus of the debate changed to non-economic migrants: fam-
ily  members, students, pensioners, the unemployed, and the 
‘non-employed’. When  notions of  a  ‘European  citizenship’ 
were debated in the early  1970s, the Commission seized upon 
this concept to promote a de-coupling  of  free movement 
from  its  economic base, a  position that proved highly  conflic-
tive among member state governments.
When formulating the respective articles of the EEC Treaty, 
member state governments couched the rules governing the 
free movement of persons in  mainly  economic terms. While 
the free movement of  goods was treated in  a  separate Treaty 
title, the free movement of persons was paired with the free 
movement of  capital  and services (article 3(c) and title III 
EEC), ostensibly indicating  that it was mainly  barriers  to the 
movement of economic factors that member state govern-
ments intended to remove. This  is evident moreover in  the 
fact that free movement was tied to an  economic activity: 
chapter 1  of title III covered workers, chapter  2 the self-
employed. It is apparent that, as part  of  an  Economic Com-
munity, the free movement of persons was understood as an 
allocation  of  economic assets, say  of unemployed Italian 
workers to northern industries with  high  demand for  labour 
(cf. Craig and de Búrca 2011: 715).
The outlines of  the free movement of  workers  were laid out 
in  article 48 EEC, which stipulated “the abolition of  any dis-
crimination based on nationality between  workers of  the 
Member States  as  regards employment, remuneration and 
other conditions of  work and employment”. Member state 
governments defined in article 48(3) EEC that the free 
movement for workers was reserved for the purpose of “ac-
cepting offers  for  employment actually  made”. They also ex-
empted employment in the public service (article 48(4) EEC) 
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from  free movement rules, reserving  the ability  to regulate 
state employees as a national  domain. Article 49 EEC in  turn 
spelled out the procedure for the adoption of directives and 
regulations governing this field: the Council  would adopt 
such  measures on a proposal  from  the Commission and upon 
consulting the Economic and Social  Committee. While not 
foreseen  in  this article, the Council  subsequently  also con-
sulted the European Parliament on a regular  basis. Finally, 
article 51  EEC governed the procedure to coordinate national 
social  security systems with  the aim  of “aggregation, for the 
purpose of acquiring  and retaining the right to benefit  and of 
calculating the amount of benefit, of  all  periods taken into 
account under the laws of the several  countries” and “pay-
ment of  benefits to persons resident in  the territories of 
Member States” (article 51 EEC). Such  measures would be 
adopted unanimously on a proposal from the Commission. 
Subsequent Treaty  changes did not significantly  alter the 
wording of these articles. The Single European  Act intro-
duced the cooperation procedure to article 49 EEC and ex-
plicitly allowed for qualitative majority  voting in  the Council, 
but did not change article 51  EEC covering social  security. 
The Maastricht Treaty  exchanged cooperation for codecision 
in  article 49 EEC, but article 51 EEC was left  unchanged until 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, which introduced codecision  cou-
pled with  unanimity  in  the Council. Finally, the Lisbon 
Treaty  introduced majority  voting in the form of the ordinary 
legislative procedure for social security  matters, but included 
the option  of  an  ‘emergency brake’ for national  governments, 
should a legislative act “affect important aspects of its social 
security  system, including  its scope, cost or  financial  struc-
ture, or would affect the financial balance of that system” 
(article 48 TFEU). All  matters falling  outside the scope of  
articles 49 and 51 EEC (now art. 46 and 48 TFEU) would 
have to be based on  article 100 EEC, the internal  market 
clause, requiring unanimity  and the consultation procedure 
(which remains in place in article 115 TFEU), or the Treaty’s 
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general  flexibility  clause (the former  art. 235 EEC, now arti-
cle 352 TFEU), which  requires unanimity  and, since the 
Treaty of Lisbon, EP consent. 
6.2 Cooperation and emerging friction
While the Treaty  did not explicitly refer  to non-economic 
objectives in  the free movement of  persons, the Commission 
acknowledged its social  implications  early  on: “The free 
movement of workers is linked with  the economic and social 
policy of the Community, since it aims at a better  distribution 
of manpower  throughout the economy of the six Member 
States and at  raising the workers’ standard of living by  help-
ing to reach  full  employment” (European Economic Commu-
nity Commission  1960: 94). In  this vein, it established a  link 
to the social  policy  mandate included in the Treaty, which the 
Commission summarised as an “equalization of  working and 
living  conditions of labour  in an  upward direction” (Euro-
pean  Economic Community Commission 1961: 155). In many 
ways, this constituted a difficult compromise, as the Treaty 
included very  different economic and social policy mandates. 
If any  inference can  be drawn from  the ordering  of  the 
Treaty, it can be concluded that social policy  objectives were 
at best subsidiary to economic ones.84  In  article 117 EEC, 
member states  agreed “upon the need to promote improved 
working conditions and an  improved standard of living for 
workers, so as  to make possible their harmonisation  while 
the improvement is being maintained. They  believe that such 
a development will  ensue not only  from  the functioning of 
the common market, which will  favour  the harmonisation of 
social  systems”, but also from active harmonization meas-
ures. Member state governments conferred upon the Com-
mission, in  article 118 EEC “the task of promoting close co-
operation  between  Member States in the social  field”. This 
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84  Social policy is covered last amongst the Community’s substantive poli-
cies. 
field would include employment, labour law, vocational 
training, social  security, occupational  health  and safety, and 
collective bargaining rights. While this list of competencies 
may  appear  extensive, the Treaty articles on  social provisions 
did not include a  concrete legislative mandate, safe a stipula-
tion  for  the Commission to “act in  close contact with  Member 
States by  making studies, delivering opinions and arranging 
consultations” (article 118 EEC), presuming that harmoniza-
tion  measures would have to be adopted in  accordance with 
article 100 EEC, the general internal market clause. 
The Commission clearly  took this ostensive mandate seri-
ously: “The work of  approximating  legislative and adminis-
trative provisions also extends to the social  security field” 
(European Economic Community  Commission  1960: 204). 
This should be seen, much like in the field of goods, in  rela-
tion  to its efforts  to remove barriers  to trade as an economic 
necessity: “To ensure the free movement of labour, the 
Treaty  lays down in  Article 51 that any obstacles to such  free 
movement which  may  stem  from  social  security  legislation 
must be removed in such  a  way as to guarantee migrant 
workers and their families the benefits  of social  security” 
(European Economic Community Commission 1960: 96). 
Did this statement of policy goals result in  a  similar two-
pronged approach to harmonization and the removal  of bar-
riers? 
It does not seem  so. Certainly, the harmonization of national 
social  security  systems would have been a very  ambitious 
project. While the Commission  initially upheld its language 
in  subsequent reports,85 it  gradually  toned down its emphasis 
on harmonization, and its  actions remained largely confined 
to the production of numerous surveys, studies, and com-
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about the progressive harmonization of social systems” (European Economic 
Community Commission 1961: 159); “The Commission’s activities in harmo-
nizing social policies are carried on in close contact with the Governments 
and both sides of industry” (European Economic Community Commission 
1965: 251).
parative tables of social  security laws. It finally dropped its 
reference to harmonization  measures from  the subheadings 
in the social policy chapter of its General Reports in 1975. 
Nonetheless, the Commission maintained the dual  economic 
and social  objectives it identified for  the free movement of 
persons. In drafting the first related statutory  provisions, 
“the Commission  had in view not only  the progressive fulfil-
ment of one of the fundamental conditions  for  the establish-
ment of the Common  Market but also the need to fit the pro-
posed liberalization  measures into its social  policy”  (Euro-
pean  Economic Community Commission 1961: 157). It is also 
possible to detect a shift  in emphasis  towards the social  pol-
icy spectrum,86 all  the while acknowledging the limited pow-
ers in the field.87 This is reflected in  the structuring of the 
Commission’s General  Reports. From 1965  onwards, the 
Commission summarised its activities concerning  the “free 
movement of  workers” in  the social  policy  chapter, while 
maintaining a more general  heading  on the “free movement 
of persons” in the internal market section. 
The Commission and the Council cooperated during  the 
1960s to establish  the legislative framework for the free 
movement of economically  active Community nationals. The 
frequency  of legislation and the breadth of issue areas are 
indicative of  the fact that initially  there was little friction  be-
tween the actors involved. In  this first  decade of the Eco-
nomic Community, the legislative bodies  adopted regulation 
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86  “A dynamic social policy, not subordinate to other considerations of the 
Community policy, is needed, not only to gain the support of all workers in 
the building of Europe, but also to achieve the main object of that process 
which, in the terms of the Preamble of the Treaty, is constantly to improve 
the living and working conditions of the peoples of the six countries” (Euro-
pean Economic Community Commission 1963: 174).
87  “During the period under review the Commission has continued its work 
with a view to implementing the few mandatory provisions of the Treaty 
which relate to social matters and, so far as its limited powers allow, to im-
proving the manner of their application” (European Economic Community 
Commission 1963: 174).
3 and 4 of 1958, covering  the coordination of social  security 
systems for  migrant workers, directive 64/221 concerning 
derogations from  the right of free movement, directive 68/
360 abolishing certain  barriers  to movement, regulation 
1612/68 on the free movement of  workers, and multiple 
amendments thereto. These early  pieces of legislation  fleshed 
out the rights of migrant Community  nationals and their 
families  to enter another member  state, to remain in that 
state, to access employment, to be protected from expulsion, 
and not to be discriminated against with  regards to taxes, 
social  advantages, social  security  benefits, vocational  train-
ing, housing, and trade union membership (cf. Foster  2006: 
245-248). 
With this  legislative framework successively  in place, the 
Commission did not adapt a confrontative stance in litiga-
tion, even  where it arose from preliminary  references. One of 
the central  early  points of contention that were raised in 
court was  the definition of the terms ‘worker’ and ‘wage-
earner’, which  by  and large delineated who should be covered 
by  the Community’s provisions on free movement for  per-
sons who were not self-employed, in particular with regard to 
the implications for  social  security  benefits. When this ques-
tion  was first  referred to the European Court of Justice by a 
Dutch court in  1963, the Commission  advocated member 
state discretion. Siding  with  the German  government’s ob-
servation, the Commission  held that the definition of ‘wage-
earner’, as it had been  used in Community legislation, should 
be defined by  national  laws: “the Treaty  does not authorize 
the Community  to create a  unified social law for all the 
Member States. Accordingly, it  should not be assumed that 
there is a  specifically Community  definition of  the legal  con-
cept of ‘wage-earner’” (Case 75/63, Hoekstra, ECR 1964: 
183). The Court did not follow this position. In  direct contra-
diction to the Commission’s observation, it held that “If  the 
definition of this term  [wage-earner] were a matter within 
the competence of national  law, it  would therefore be possi-
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ble for  each  Member  State to modify the meaning of the con-
cept of ‘migrant worker’ and to eliminate at will  the protec-
tion  afforded by  the Treaty  to certain categories  of person. 
[...] The concept of ‘workers’ in the said Articles does not 
therefore relate to national  law, but to Community law” (Case 
75/63, ECR  1964: 184). The same would hold for the expres-
sion  ‘wage-earner’ as used in  the respective implementing 
legislation. The Court favoured a wide interpretation  of  these 
terms. It would not be confined to those currently employed, 
but rather  refer  “to all  those who, as such and under  what-
ever  description, are covered by the different national sys-
tems of social security” (Case 75/63, ECR 1964: 185).
The Community  legislators  subsequently included in regula-
tion  1408/71, the first  major revision of  the coordination re-
gime for  social  security, a thorough  definition of the term 
‘worker’, taking  account of the Court’s  decision (cf. Sindbjerg 
Martinsen  2006: 220). This term  would mean  “any  person 
who is insured, compulsorily  or on an optional continued 
basis, for  one or  more of  the contingencies covered by the 
branches of a social  security scheme for  employed persons” 
(article 1(a), regulation 1408/71, OJ 1971, No. L 149: 418). 
Although the definition  they provided was broad, all ele-
ments specifically  refer  to the exercise, present or past, of  an 
economic activity. The fact that it had taken  over four years 
to adopt this regulation, the original  proposal having been 
sent to the Council  in  January 1966, points to an  increasingly 
conflictive nature of the subject area. In  comparison, the 
equally  important regulation 1612/68 on the freedom of 
movement for workers  within the Community, setting  the 
general  framework for entry and the right to reside, was 
adopted just over a year  after  the Commission  submitted its 
proposal.  
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Emerging friction – the public service exception
This increasingly  conflictive nature of the subject matter was 
subsequently reflected in  judicial  proceedings. Contrary to its 
initial  deferential  position in  Hoekstra, the Commission  took 
the view in the early  1970s that exemptions to the right to 
free movement should be interpreted narrowly. One of the 
subject areas the Commission targeted specifically was the 
public service exception. Member  states had, in article 48(4) 
EEC, exempted “employment in the public service”  from  the 
rules  regulating  the free movement of  workers. National  gov-
ernments interpreted this to mean  that they retained control 
over employment relations where they themselves  were the 
employer. In  particular, they  would retain  the ability  to re-
serve certain  positions to their nationals, and exclude non-
nationals  from certain benefits  that came with the status as 
en  employee in the public service. This position was con-
tested in  another preliminary  reference. Giovanni  Sotgiu, an 
Italian migrant working for  the German postal service (a 
state operation), who had been  denied a raise in  a separation 
allowance paid to workers employed away from their resi-
dence, claimed to be a victim of discrimination based on  his 
nationality. The German  government responded extensively 
to this claim. According to its observation, the Community 
rules  prohibiting  discrimination  on grounds of  nationality 
“do not apply  to the employees of  the Federal  Post Office, 
since the latter forms part of the public service [...]. In ex-
cluding  the sector  of the public service [from  free movement 
rights] Article 48 (4) of the Treaty has taken  account of the 
fact that the Community is  not a unitary state organization 
but is  based upon the state organization of  its Member 
States. The Treaty  does not define what is to be understood 
by  'the public service': the objectives of Article 48 (4) require 
an interpretation  based on  the national concept and idea of 
the public service. This provision is justified by the need to 
be able to rely upon the special loyalties of the nationals of a 
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country at the time of the recruitment of employees in  the 
public service” (Case 152/73, ECR 1974: 156-157).
In  direct contrast to this position  the Commission now ar-
gued in  its  observation that the concept of  employment in the 
public service “is  a concept of Community law which  has no 
reference to the law of Member States”  (Case 152/73, ECR 
1974: 160). The tone of  its argument is altogether different 
from  that a decade before. Reminiscent of  the Court’s argu-
ment in Hoekstra, the Commission  now asserted that: ”If  it 
were left to the Member States to define independently  the 
scope of the public service, this would result in giving to the 
duties which flow from  the principle of freedom of move-
ment, that is, from one of the fundamental  liberties provided 
for  by the Treaty, a very  different scope from one State to 
another”  (Case 152/73, ECR 1974: 158). Employment in the 
public service would have to be interpreted strictly to be 
“limited to the functions of the public service which are con-
cerned with  the genuine interests of the State” (Case 152/73, 
ECR 1974: 159). While the Court did not directly  address the 
extensive definition proposed by  the Commission, it agreed 
that employment in  the public service would be subject to a 
definition under Community law (Case 152/73, ECR 1974: 
163; cf. also Craig and de Búrca 2011: 735). 
The Commission  subsequently  took efforts to enforce its 
definition. In a  later infringement case against Belgium, the 
Commission restated its position  that the public service ex-
ception  should be interpreted narrowly and refer only  to such 
posts that implied “actual participation  in  the exercise of of-
ficial  authority  by those occupying  them”  (Case 149/79, ECR 
1980: 3884). Subject of the proceedings were Belgian laws 
that defined as public servants drivers and signalmen of the 
national  railroad, office cleaners, painter’s assistants and 
canteen  staff  of the local  railways, and architects, night 
watchmen  and garden hands in the employment of  the City 
of Brussels, among others (Case 149/79, ECR 1982: 1847-
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1848). The Belgian  government, supported by the French, 
German and British governments, replied that “when the 
Treaty  was drafted the Governments wished conditions of 
entry to public office to remain their  preserve”, arguing that a 
substantive interpretation of  the “exercise of public author-
ity” would amount to an “unworkable concept” (Case 149/79, 
ECR 1980: 3887). The government of the United Kingdom 
agreed that  an  attempt to apply the Commission’s narrow 
concept of  “participation in the exercise of official  authority” 
to the public service of the United Kingdom  “would in prac-
tice produce chaotic and arbitrary results”. The concept 
would “impose an extremely heavy burden  on  Member States 
which  wished to preserve the national integrity  of their  pub-
lic service” (Case 149/79, ECR 1980: 3893).  The French gov-
ernment submitted that the Commission’s interpretation 
would “have extremely grave consequences  throughout the 
whole of  the French  system of the public service”  (Case 149/
79, ECR 1980: 3897), especially  with  regard to the system of 
promotion, where a foreign national would be able to ad-
vance in  the public service but be prohibited from adopting a 
post that  included the exercise of  public authority. In  effect, 
the French government argued that the “demarcation of pub-
lic services  remains a prerogative of  the Member States”. A 
harmonized concept of the public service would not be for 
the Commission to define, but rather “a matter  for positive 
Community measures which  it  is for  the Commission to pro-
pose and the Council  to negotiate, adopt and amend as do-
mestic situations evolve” (Case 149/79, ECR 1980: 3897).
Despite these interventions, the Court followed the Commis-
sion’s position. It ruled that the concept of employment in 
the public services “requires uniform interpretation  and ap-
plication  throughout the Community” (Case 149/79, ECR 
1980: 3901). According to the Court, the concept of employ-
ment in the public service must be “connected with  the spe-
cific activities of the public service in so far as it  is entrusted 
with  the exercise of powers conferred by public law and with 
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responsibility for  safeguarding the general  interests of  the 
State” (Case 149/79, ECR 1982: 1831).
Based on this judgement, the Commission subsequently  an-
nounced that it  had “decided to implement a  strategy for  the 
elimination of restrictions on grounds of  nationality, which 
in  each Member State hinder the access of workers from 
other Member States  to posts in  certain  particular parts of 
the public sector”, considering that “the functions involved in 
certain  forms of public employment are for the most part  
sufficiently  remote from the specific activities of the public 
service as defined by the Court  of Justice that they would 
only in  very  rare cases be covered by  the exception  in Article 
48 (4) of the Treaty”  (OJ 1988, No. C 72/2-3, cf. also COM 
88/331: 25). The Commission would consequently  act to 
”liberalize the conditions for access to employment in a large 
number of  public sectors  (agencies managing commercial 
services, operational  public health services, teaching  in  pub-
lic establishments, non-military research)”  COM 88/331: 
25), if necessary  by  recourse to infringement proceedings (cf. 
OJ 1988, No. C 72/3). 
Summary
The pattern that becomes evident from  the preceding  section 
is somewhat reminiscent of  that covered in  the previous 
chapter. For the first decade or  so, the Commission did not 
adopt a confrontative stance, and its  legislative programme 
to flesh  out the substance of free movement rights was 
largely  adopted by  the Council. In early judicial  proceedings 
such  as Hoekstra, the Commission  advocated member state 
discretion, but, as in  Dassonville  (although this was a decade 
later), the Court went beyond the Commission’s position in 
restricting  member state regulatory  authority. The reversal  of 
the Commission’s  position over the following  decade, how-
ever, is quite stark, and cannot be linked to frustrations  to its 
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legislative programme, as  was the case with  its 1968 General 
Programme for  the elimination  of  technical  barriers to trade. 
The Commission’s  legal  opinion in  the Sotgiu case is the di-
rect opposite of its previous position. While it had argued in 
Hoekstra that the term ‘worker’ should be subject to member 
state definitions, a decade later it argued that such  a  proce-
dure with regard to the term  ‘public service’ would be detri-
mental  to free movement rights. Not only was this  position 
highly  contentious, but the Commission followed it up with a 
series of enforcement actions  throughout the 1970s  and 
1980s. Notably  absent is any attempt by the Commission  to 
regulate this matter by  initiating legislation. What motivated 
this reversal of positions is not immediately evident from the 
documents.
6.3 Moving beyond the economic base of free 
movement
The conflict about the public service exception, which  played 
out over  a  decade and a  half, is not an isolated case in  the 
question of  who would be covered by  the Community’s rules 
on the free movement of persons, and who could be lawfully 
excluded. The aspect forms part of a wider debate whether 
free movement rights should be de-coupled from  their eco-
nomic foundation  and apply  to all  Community nationals, re-
gardless of their economic status.
An  early Commission  lever to expand the range of persons 
covered by free movement rights was the notion that such 
rights could be extended to ‘recipients of service’.  While the 
Treaty  did not refer to this group of people, the early direc-
tives covering  rights with regard to establishment and the 
provision  of services specifically  stated that “freedom to pro-
vide services entails  that persons providing and receiving 
services  should have the rights of residence for  the time dur-
ing which  services are being provided” (recital 2, directive 
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64/220). In  this vein, article 1 of  directive 64/220 stipulated 
that “Member States shall [...] abolish  restrictions on  the 
movement and residence of [...] nationals of  Member  States 
wishing to go to another Member State as  recipients of 
services”.88 While this concept was potentially  wide ranging, 
the Commission, in  line with  its early  conciliatory  stance, 
initially  adopted a restrictive position on who would be cov-
ered by  this provision. In particular, the understanding 
seemed to be that free movement rights for recipients  of a 
service would only come into effect if the provider  himself 
was also a migrant (cf. Evans 1982: 503). Consequently, the 
Commission stated, in response to a parliamentary question, 
that tourists, among others, would not be included (OJ 1969, 
No. C 159/2).  
As with the public service exception, this  initial  stance gave 
way in the 1970s to a  more expansive approach  to who could 
be covered by the provisions on recipients of service. In the 
case of a  refusal  by French  border  officials to admit a group 
of German delegates of  Amnesty International seeking  to 
have lunch  in France, the Commission argued that “a deci-
sion  by a Member  State to refuse entry  to nationals of  an-
other Member State who wish  to enter its territory  as  recipi-
ents of services  violates the principle of free movement of 
persons and services within  the Community” (OJ 1975, No. C 
242/3). The requirement, pronounced earlier, that the pro-
vider of the service should also be a migrant, seems to have 
been dropped. However, the Commission  held that the pur-
pose of  border  crossing would still  need to be tied to an eco-
nomic activity, and would not apply, for  example, to German 
protesters wishing  to enter France with  the intention of 
demonstrating against the construction of a  nuclear plant: 
“Free movement of persons and services within the meaning 
of the EEC Treaty  and provisions adopted in implementation 
of that Treaty  relates solely  to nationals of  Member  States 
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88  This wording was later repeated in directive 73/149 which replaced the 
prior directive. 
who move and reside within the Community either  to pursue 
an [economic]89  activity  or as  recipients of services” (OJ 
1975, No. C 242/4).90 
Despite this restriction, the concept of ‘recipients of service’ 
as the Commission  interpreted it nonetheless had the poten-
tial to cover almost any Community national  crossing  the 
border  from  one member state to the next, since almost any 
traveler is  a prospective recipient of a  service (cf. Evans 1982: 
507). The Commission  moreover confirmed that it had 
changed its position on tourists, arguing  in its observations 
in  Watson, that tourists would indeed benefit from free 
movement rights  as recipients of  services (Case 118/75, ECR 
1976: 1193).
Debating citizenship
The Commission started to reorient its position on the dis-
cretion member  states would have in restricting rights to free 
movement at around the same time that member state gov-
ernments themselves began to debate the possibility  of a 
‘European  citizenship’. That the Treaty of Rome and subse-
quent legislation  established quite far  reaching rights for 
Community nationals wishing to migrate was clearly in-
tended by  its authors. The language of the relevant secondary 
legislation  in  particular uses the term ‘fundamental right’91 
when referring  to the free movement of workers. At the same 
time, the reasons  the legislators provided for establishing 
such  rights were not purely  economic, but also of a social 
character: “mobility of labour within  the Community  must be 
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89 The English version refers solely to “activity”, but this seems to be an error 
in translation. The German versions reads “Erwerbstätigkeit”, the French 
“activité économique”. 
90 The Commission maintained this view with regard to a similar incident in 
1979 (OJ 1979, No. C 214/31). 
91  Recital 3 of regulation 1612/68, for example, states: “freedom of move-
ment constitutes a fundamental right of workers and their families”.
one of the means by which  the worker is guaranteed the pos-
sibility  of improving his living and working conditions and 
promoting  his social  advancement, while helping to satisfy 
the requirements of the economies of the Member States (re-
cital  3, regulation 1612/68). Both primary and secondary law, 
moreover, explicitly established a link between the right  of 
free movement and the principle of non-discrimination.92 
Member state governments had thus intended a rights-based 
approach  to the free movement of persons. But the exercise 
of these rights would have to bear  a  relation to economic ac-
tivities (cf. Evans 1982: 501-502).
There is evidence that the Commission had considered the 
free movement of  persons as a nucleus for an  incipient Euro-
pean  citizenship from very early  on  (cf. Evans 1982: 409-
501). Lionello Levi Sandri, Social  Affairs Commissioner and 
later Vice-President of the Commission, explicitly used the 
term in a 1961  debate in the European  Parliament: “Ich sehe 
in  der Freizügigkeit der  Arbeitskräfte nicht nur ein Mittel  zur 
bestmöglichen Kombination  der Produktionsfaktoren, son-
dern  ich sehe in ihr vor allem  den  ersten Aspekt einer  euro-
päischen Staatsbürgerschaft”  (EP Debates No. 48: 157, 
22.11.1961, German edition).  He repeated a statement to this 
effect in  1968: “In dieser Sicht ist die Freizügigkeit der Per-
sonen etwas Höheres und Anspruchsvolleres als die bloße 
Beweglichkeit eines Produktionsfaktors. Sie ist vielmehr ein 
erster  Keim, eine noch  unvollkommene Gestalt des Europäi-
schen  Bürgerrechts”  (EC Bulletin 11-1968: 6, German  edi-
tion). In  the run-up to the 1972 Summit Conference in  Paris, 
Commission president Sicco Mansholt again  brought up the 
term when speaking  to the European  Parliament: “Eine 
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92 Recall that article 49 EEC reads: “Such freedom of movement shall entail 
the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of 
the Member States”. Recital 5 of regulation 1612/68 states: “the right of 
freedom of movement, in order that it may be exercised, by objective stan-
dards, in freedom and dignity, requires that equality or treatment shall be 
ensured in fact and in law”.
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft mit Grenzen, an  denen die Bürger 
ihren  Paß vorzeigen müssen  und Kontrollen unterworfen 
sind, ist keine Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. [...] Sie ist erst dann 
verwirklicht, wenn der normale Bürger, der durch  diese Ge-
meinschaft reist, nicht nur  das Gefühl  hat, sondern am eige-
nen  Leibe erfährt, daß etwas Wesentliches verwirklicht wur-
de. Wir fordern  daher auch  von der  Gipfelkonferenz – das 
wird in  unseren  Vorschlägen  festgelegt werden  –, daß das 
Staatsbürgerrecht geschaffen wird, das europäische Recht, 
sich  in  der  Gemeinschaft  frei und ohne jegliche Hindernisse 
bewegen  zu können” (EP Debates No. 149: 110, 19.4.1972, 
German edition). He repeated this position  at the Summit 
Conference, proposing that the Community legislature “open 
the frontiers  which  still  keep its citizens apart from one an-
other. To this end we consider systematic checks at the 
Community’s  internal  frontiers should be done away with, 
and nationals of Member  States progressively integrated into 
the social, administrative and political fabric of the host 
countries, with  the aim  of gradually conferring upon  them 
‘European  civic rights’” (EC Bulletin 11-1972: 59). This notion 
was supported up by Italian  prime minister  Giulio Andreotti, 
who proposed to “establish a European citizenship, which 
would be in addition to the citizenship which  the inhabitants 
of our  countries now possess. It  should permit the citizens of 
the Community countries, after  a stay  of  a certain  length  in 
one of our countries, to exercise some political  rights, such  as 
that of participating in communal elections” (EC Bulletin 11-
1972: 46). The granting of such  political  rights was also 
brought up by Belgian  prime minister Gaston  Eyskens (EC 
Bulletin 11-1972: 39). While the 1972 Summit  Conference did 
not produce any concrete proposals  in  this regard, member 
state governments agreed, somewhat vaguely, at the Euro-
pean  Summit in  Paris two years later  to “study the conditions 
and the timing under which the citizens of the nine Member 
States could be given  special rights as members of  the Com-
munity”  (point 11 of  the Communiqué of  the European 
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Community Summit Meeting  in Paris 1974, EC Bulletin 12-
1974: 8).
While the member state governments did not officially men-
tion  the term citizenship in  their  communiqué, the Commis-
sion  responded to this  point in  a  1975 report  entitled “To-
wards European  Citizenship”. Here, it  referred back to its 
earlier  views on  an expansion  of  the rights of  economic mi-
grants  to all Community  citizens. While it restated that eco-
nomic activity  is  the trigger for rights  under the Treaty, such 
activity would not define the outer limits  of  the ensuing 
rights: “Although  these rights are based on  economic activity 
of the beneficiary, they  are not confined to the person  exer-
cising  the activity nor to the period of the activity” (COM 
1975/321, Bulletin EC 7-1975: 26). The report specifically 
made reference to the concept of ‘recipients of service’, which 
the Commission considered as a potential  basis for an expan-
sion  beyond the purely economic realm. The Commission 
was clearly aware of the broad implications of its approach: 
“Since any national  of a Member State who goes to another 
Member State is  at least a recipient of  services in the latter, 
one can assume that Community  law provides the requisite 
powers [...] to give each  of these Community  nationals the 
economic and social  rights which the nationals of the host 
country possess and the rights to come and go in any of the 
Member States” (COM 1975/321, Bulletin EC 7-1975: 27). 
Summary
The 1975 report demonstrated that the Commission had 
started thinking of ways it  could de-couple free movement 
rights from its economic base in  the 1970s. In  particular, it 
was considering which rights were already  implied in  the free 
movement of persons as contained in law in  force, and which 
would have to be additionally  granted through  Treaty  change 
or secondary  legislation. Its  interpretation  of which  persons 
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would benefit  from  free movement rights as a ‘recipient  of 
service’ pointed to an  expansive position  on  the former. This, 
again, constituted a stark reversal  of stand-points within  a 
short period of time.
This development should not have been  entirely unforeseen 
by  the member state governments. As is  evident from their 
formulations in  primary  law and secondary legislation, they 
clearly intended a  rights-based approach  to the free move-
ment of  persons, and they  couched the relevant provision  in 
the strong language of fundamental  rights. It is unclear, 
however, to what extent they  expected these rights to be 
mainly  symbolical. The concept of citizenship, moreover, was 
discussed at the highest political level  at the European  Sum-
mit in  1974, and member state governments gave the Com-
mission a mandate to pursue that matter further.
6.4 Towards a general right of residence
Subsequent efforts towards fleshing  out the content of the 
special rights of Community  citizens progressed very slowly. 
Three years later, the Commission remarked that Council 
support for the special  rights agenda  seemed to have stalled: 
“Discussions on two other topics  raised at the Paris Summit 
— the grant of special  rights  for  the citizens of the nine 
Member States throughout the Community  and the creation 
of a  passport union — did not advance to a  point at which 
further, more precise, political guidelines could have been 
issued. There is therefore no immediate prospect of  a con-
crete decision on these matters. This  is regrettable, because 
such  a decision  would probably have beneficial  effects for 
freedom of movement and the growth  of a  greater awareness 
of the Community as a  political  entity” (European  Commis-
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sion  1977: 85).93 This  lack of progress  coincided with the per-
ceived persistence of barriers to the free movement of per-
sons which were increasingly put into question by the af-
fected citizens: “The increasing number of  written  and oral 
questions on  this subject put to the Commission by Members 
of Parliament and of  complaints by  private individuals  would 
suggest that crossing the internal  frontiers of  the Community 
is fraught with  difficulties”  (European Commission 1980: 
97). 
The European Parliament, in  a  1977 resolution, urged the 
Commission to take further  steps with  regard to giving  effect 
to “the right of  residence for all  Community  citizens”  (OJ 
1977, No. C 299/26-27). The Commission responded by pre-
paring  a  proposal  for a directive on  the “right  of all  nationals 
of a  Member State to remain on  the territory of other  Mem-
ber States, even without carrying on any  economic activity” 
(European Commission 1979: 91). Existing  rights, in  the 
words of the Commission, “should not remain the preroga-
tive solely  of those engaged in economic activities”  (Euro-
pean  Commission  1979: 96). Such residence rights should be 
granted to migrants “no longer as  persons engaged in eco-
nomic activity  but in their  capacity  as Community citizens” 
(European Commission 1980: 98).
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93  The same holds true for later years: ”the Council continued considering 
these two matters raised at the Paris meeting of Heads of Government in 
December 1974. No decision was taken. The main difficulties concern the 
question of what languages to use and the cover design for the European 
passport. The Commission considers it lamentable that the Member States 
are unable to show enough flexibility on these secondary matters to allow a 
political decision taken by the Heads of Government more than three years 
ago to be put into effect. It would emphasize the beneficial effects of the 
decision that is awaited for the free movement of persons and for the devel-
opment of a sharper awareness of the Community as a political entity” 
(European Commission 1978: 83-84); “Efforts by the Council and the Com-
mission to solve the difficulties involved in the creation of a uniform pass-
port did not meet with success in 1978” (European Commission 1979: 90).
The original  proposal  submitted to the Council  on 31 July 
1979 contained in article 4 three basic stipulations that set 
the boundaries for the exercise of free movement rights: 
“Member States shall  grant the right of permanent residence 
to citizens of  another  Member  State [...] who reside or  wish 
to reside in their  territory. Nevertheless, the Member States 
may  require those citizens to provide proof  of sufficient re-
sources to provide for their  own needs and the dependent 
members of their family. [...] Member  States may  not require 
such  resources to be greater than the minimum  subsistence 
level defined under their law” (COM 79/212, OJ 1979, No. C 
217/15). 
The European Parliament supported the Commission’s  ini-
tiative, noting that “the proposal  for a Directive introduces a 
new dimension  to previous legislation  on  freedom of move-
ment and the right  of  establishment since it extends these 
rights to all  citizens of the Community, independently  of the 
pursuit  of an economic activity”, and welcoming “the fact 
that this  will  represent the first step towards the creation of a 
'European  citizenship'” (OJ 1980, No. C 117/48). Its position 
on the possible constraints  on citizen  rights, however, went 
even  further, to the extent that “the proposal  should not 
grant Member  States the power  to make the exercise of  the 
right of  residence subject to proof  that the applicant has suf-
ficient resources”, since “such  a condition  would make the 
granting of the right of residence dependent upon socially 
discriminatory procedures, which would be contrary  to the 
aims of the Treaties” (OJ 1980, No. C 117/48). Despite the 
fact that the Commission  did not adopt this position and re-
tained the requirement for  sufficient resources (OJ 1980, No. 
C 188/10), the details of this requirement proved contentious 
in  the Council. The general  fear  among member state gov-
ernments was  that a  general right of residence would lead to 
unsustainable burdens  on social security  and social  welfare 
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systems, if the rule of non-discrimination was strictly applied 
in this area (cf. Craig and de Búrca 2011: 721).
Subsequently, there was no progress on  this proposal. By 
1984, the Commission  had even ceased to report on  its status 
in  its General  Report. This situation  changed with the mem-
ber states’ revived efforts towards the establishment of the 
single market, in  connection  with the European Council  at 
Fontainebleau  in  June 1984. In  the conclusions to this  sum-
mit, under  the heading of “A  people’s  Europe”, the member 
state governments acknowledged that the “Community 
should respond to the expectations of the people of Europe 
by  adopting  measures to strengthen and promote its identity 
and its image both  for  its citizens and for the rest of  the 
world”, and called for an ad-hoc committee to prepare and 
coordinate this action, made up of  member  state representa-
tives (Conclusions of the Presidency, EC Bulletin 6-1984: 11). 
Despite the fact that the member states did not refer to 
movement and residence rights, the subsequent report, in 
March  1985, of  the ad hoc committee recommended taking 
up the residence directive that had stalled in  the Council, 
mentioning specifically  the problematic question  of  sufficient 
resources: “The Committee is convinced that the right of a 
citizen of a  Member State of  the Community  to reside in  any 
other Member  State of his free choice is an essential element 
of the right to freedom of  movement. Discussions within  the 
European institutions since 1979 did not lead to final  agree-
ment, because in  particular  debate on  evidence of  sufficient 
resources to live on as a  condition  for unhindered residence 
failed to produce a solution. Such  evidence seems indispen-
sable to avoid migration  motivated only  by economic consid-
erations, because in particular  the European social  security 
systems have not been harmonized. Citizens  wanting to re-
side in  a country  other  than their  own  should not  become an 
unreasonable burden on  the public purse in  the host coun-
try”. The committee nonetheless urged the European Council 
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to take “a  political  decision  of principle on  a  general  right of 
residence for  all  citizens of the Community  [...] linking ad-
mission  to exercise the right of residence with the precondi-
tion  that evidence of adequate resources at  the level of social 
assistance in  the host country  and of  adequate provisions in 
case of illness is provided” (report from the ad hoc commit-
tee on “A People’s Europe”, EC Bulletin 7-1985: 14).
In  June of the same year, the Commission  amended its initial 
proposal  to exclude from the residence directive the difficult 
question of  the rights of  students. Despite this  move, the re-
newed interest in developing a ‘People’s  Europe’, and the 
concrete proposals of the ad hoc committee, the Commis-
sion, in  a November  1985 communication to the Council, 
expressed dissatisfaction about the progress on  this issue: 
“eight months  after the [ad hoc committee’s] first report and 
five months after the second, achievements are lagging be-
hind the objectives. [...] The Commission therefore feels  that 
follow-up to the work of the ad hoc Committee has been un-
satisfactory. The situation reveals once again the divide be-
tween major political  decisions and their  implementation” 
(COM 85/640: 1). The Commission went on to ask the Coun-
cil to approve “proposals embodying some progress towards 
a Europe which is closer to its  inhabitants”, including the 
proposal  on  a “generalized right of residence, which has  been 
discussed several times at Council  level”  (COM 85/640: 1, 3). 
Summarising the present state of negotiations, the Commis-
sion  stated that “In  approving the first report [of the ad hoc 
committee] the European Council  took a political  decision of 
principle on  generalized rights of  residence for all  Commu-
nity citizens. It was to pave the way for a legal  decision  which 
has still  not materialized. Discussions are running  into diffi-
culties; one delegation is opposed to a directive being used to 
extend the right of residence to non-active persons”  (COM 
85/640: 3). 
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A  year later, in  the context of the discussion  about voting 
rights for Community nationals in local  elections, the Com-
mission  again underlined its assertion  that “The Treaty  of 
Rome and legislation  derived from  it have created a unique 
legal  framework which  allows citizens to plan their profes-
sional  lives without regard to national frontiers. This is quite 
new in  that the fact of  being a  citizen  of  one Member  State 
confers rights in the other Member  States too. Citizenship is 
thus disassociated from  the national limits on rights attached 
to a given nationality. [...] European citizens therefore enjoy 
considerable freedom to establish  themselves in the Member 
State of their choice. The Commission, in  presenting a pro-
posal for a  directive on  generalized right of  residence, for  
nationals  of Member States in  the territory  of another Mem-
ber State, hoped to take this to its logical  conclusion  so that 
these freedoms are no longer viewed in  economic terms but 
are generally available to all  citizens”  (COM 86/487; EC Bul-
letin Supplement 7/86: 8). Despite these urgings, again noth-
ing happened for a period of years. The Commission pro-
tested the lack of progress, but, until  the late 1980s, to no 
avail: “Since 1979 a Commission  proposal has been on  the 
table to extend the right of residence to all Community na-
tionals  who do not yet have it (in particular, students and 
pensioners). Despite the Commission’s endeavours, the 
Council  has not yet  reached agreement on this proposal, 
which  is of  major  importance to the man in  the street” (COM 
88/331: 26).
In the absence of legislation, litigation? The question of ‘wel-
fare tourism’
In  the absence of  agreement on  the residence directive, the 
Commission continued to apply  an expansive interpretation 
of who should be covered by the Community’s  free move-
ment rights  in judicial  proceedings. This  included cases 
where there may have been  legitimate reasons to believe that 
From market citizen to European citizen 224
a migrant’s connection  to economic activity  was tenuous at 
best. Such  a case concerned a British citizen (Ms D. Levin) 
living  in the Netherlands who was employed in a  part-time 
position that paid less  than the Dutch  minimum wage. The 
Dutch authorities had denied her  application  for a  residence 
permit on the grounds that her  minimal  employment did not 
qualify her as a  ‘worker’ in the Community sense. Rather, it 
was alleged that the real  objective of  her move to the Nether-
lands  was not employment, but, by taking  advantage of  the 
rights she would enjoy  as a migrant worker, to enable her 
husband, a third country  national, to live with  her on  Com-
munity territory. 
The Dutch  and the Danish governments submitted observa-
tions supporting member states’ rights to refuse residence 
permits to Community migrants who appeared to abuse an 
economic right for  ulterior motives. The Dutch  government 
argued that the definition  of  ‘worker’ should only  apply to a 
person who takes employment “at least to provide himself 
with  means of support”. The migrant’s intention to move 
should therefore primarily  be of an economic nature. As a 
consequence, the right to free movement should be denied 
where “a  national  of a  Member  State moves to another Mem-
ber State in order to pursue an  activity  devoid of economic 
interest with  the sole aim of thus being able to enjoy the ad-
vantages conferred upon persons  to whom the provisions on 
freedom of movement for workers apply” (Case 53/81, ECR 
1982: 1040). The Danish government agreed: “The term mi-
grant worker covers persons  who acquire the means to pro-
vide for  their  own needs and those of  their  family [...]. The 
term also implies that the persons concerned work a normal 
number of hours, which in Denmark is a  minimum of 30 
hours per week” (Case 53/81, ECR 1982: 1041).
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The Commission, supported by the French  government94, 
retorted that Community  law did not prescribe a  minimum 
amount of  income or  work hours for Community citizens 
who make use of their  right to free movement: “an  EEC citi-
zen is just as free as Netherlands nationals to have recourse 
to part-time work as long as he is actually  employed.” The 
restrictive Dutch stipulation would run  counter to the fact 
that the term ‘worker’ must be defined under Community law 
and could not be altered by national regulations (Case 53/81, 
ECR 1982: 1044). Regarding the migrant’s intentions, the 
Commission argued that “the fact  that a  reduced amount of 
work is performed is not necessarily  of itself an  indication 
that there is no intention to pursue an occupation.” Rather, 
as long as employment of whatever kind is actually taken  up, 
the motives for  doing so become irrelevant. All  national rules 
to the contrary  would deprive the migrant of  the “fundamen-
tal right which the free movement of  workers  entails”  (Case 
53/81, ECR 1982: 1044-1045). 
The Court accepted this argument and repeated the reference 
to fundamental  rights  the Commission had used (cf. Craig 
and de Búrca 2011: 721). The term  ‘worker’ and ‘employed 
persons’, the Court argued, were concepts  that “define the 
field of  application of one of the fundamental  freedoms guar-
anteed by  the Treaty  and, as such, may not  be interpreted 
restrictively”. Community  law did not subject the right of free 
movement “to any  condition relating  to the kind of  employ-
ment or  to the amount of income derived from it” (Case 53/
81, ECR 1982: 1049). Ms Levin  would therefore have to be 
treated as a worker. However, the Court  acknowledged, 
somewhat ambiguously, that the rules governing the free 
movement of workers “cover only  the pursuit of effective and 
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94  This constellation is rare. Member states, when neither they nor one of 
their citizens are directly concerned, usually only intervene in support of 
other member state positions. The French government had no apparent 
connection to the case at hand, but nonetheless argued against the Dutch 
and Danish opinion. This constellation of interests might reflect the stances 
of the delegations in the negotiations on the residence directive.
genuine activities, to the exclusion  of  activities on  such  a 
small  scale as to be regarded as purely  marginal  and ancil-
lary” (Case 53/81, ECR 1982: 1050). The Court provided no 
definition of  what the threshold to such marginal  activity 
might be, safe that it was not identical  to part-time work or 
work below the minimum wage. It concluded that “Once this 
condition [non-marginal activity] is satisfied, the motives 
which  may  have prompted the worker  to seek employment in 
the Member State concerned are of no account and must not 
be taken into consideration” (Case 53/81, ECR 1982: 1052). 
This case (and others like it)95  highlighted the problematic 
question to what degree member states  could protect them-
selves against ostensive abuse of free movement rights in 
order to obtain  advantages, be they related to residence per-
mits or  access to social  benefits. The latter question came up 
a few years  after Levin in Kempf, where a German  music 
teacher  employed in  the Netherlands applied for an  income 
supplement on  account of the fact that his music lessons 
earned him less than the Dutch minimum  income. The pa-
rameters, and the arguments exchanged (the Commission 
supporting the applicant’s position  and the Dutch and Dan-
ish governments arguing against), were broadly similar to 
Levin, and again the Court sided with  the Commission, find-
ing that the fact that the meagre income from part-time work 
necessitated a subsidy  did not of  itself make that  work “mar-
ginal  or  ancillary” (Case 139/85, ECR 1986: 1748-1750). A 
similar  question  was also raised repeatedly  with  regard to 
maintenance grants for  students. While all  parties (except for 
the student claimants) agreed that  such a grant, which  is 
normally  paid to nationals as financial support based on  per-
sonal  financial  circumstances, would not  be available to 
Community nationals migrating solely  for the purpose of 
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95  Cf. i.a. Case 66/85, ECR 1986: 2121; case 197/86, ECR 1988: 3205; case 
196/87, ECR 1988: 6159;  case 344/87, ECR 1989: 1621; all arising out of 
preliminary references.
studying, there was considerable disagreement when it came 
to educational courses in  connection to prior employment in 
the host country. The Commission, in  keeping with its overall 
stance, argued that a previously  employed migrant worker 
would retain that  status (and the inherent protection against 
discrimination) when  taking up studies, either  in  direct rela-
tion  to previous employment, or as a  consequence of unem-
ployment due to the general situation in the labour market.96 
The spectre frequently  raised in the context of these cases 
was the potential for  ‘welfare tourism’ arising from  a  right  to 
free movement, and the prohibition on discrimination that it 
entailed, when  the purpose of migration  lost its connection  to 
employment. Member  states sought to safeguard themselves 
against possible expenses arising  from  Community  nationals 
moving to countries that offered more generous benefits  than 
their home country  only  for the purpose of  obtaining those 
benefits (cf. Craig and de Búrca  2011: 721). The Commission 
frequently  took the position  in judicial  proceedings that such 
safeguards should be kept to a minimum.  
Legislative breakthrough: the 1990 residence directives
Although there is no concrete evidence to support this view, 
it appears that the Commission’s confrontative stance in  ju-
dicial  proceedings  has been motivated by the objective to 
apply pressure on the Council to adopt the residence direc-
tive granting  movement rights to non-economically  active 
persons. While the Court cases all  dealt  with  migrants that 
had at least  some connection  to economic activity, however 
tenuous, the Commission’s  position at the same time reduced 
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96  This position is evident from the Commission’s observation in Lair: “the 
three Member States which have submitted observations [Germany, Den-
mark and the United Kingdom] argue that a person loses the status of 
worker, on which the social advantages depend, when, in the host State, he 
gives up either his previous occupational activity or, if unemployed, his 
search for employment in order to pursue full-time studies. The Commission 
disagrees with that view” (Case 39/86, ECR 1988: 3198).
that link to the point of presenting  a  credible threat that a 
general  (non-economic) right to residence might be estab-
lished by judicial rulings. If so, the member  states remained 
largely  unimpressed. By the end of the 1980s, discussion in 
the residence directives was still going nowhere.
In  1989, the Commission  noted that “after ten years of dis-
cussions, the Member States are still  unable to reach una-
nimity  on the proposal  for a directive. Indeed, at  the Council 
meeting  on the internal  market on 13 April  1989, the Minis-
ters came to the conclusion  that, failing any new contribu-
tions, any further discussion would be doomed to failure” 
(COM 89/275 explanatory memorandum: 1). In the face of 
this resistance, the Commission  withdrew its initial proposal 
and introduced three separate proposals differentiated by the 
class of persons covered (COM 89/275), in the hope that by 
disentangling the individual issues it  would be possible to 
find a  more advantageous legal  basis than  article 235 EEC, 
the general  flexibility clause requiring  unanimity, on which 
the initial  proposal  had been  based. The Commission  based 
the first of  the new proposals, covering the rights  of resi-
dence for  students, on article 7  EEC, which concerned the 
principle of non-discrimination, and which, following the 
Single European  Act, stipulated greater involvement of the 
European Parliament through the cooperation procedure, 
and, more importantly  perhaps, majority  voting in  the Coun-
cil. The second proposal, relating to pensioners, was based 
on articles 49 and 54 EEC, relating to the free movement of 
workers and the self-employed, which  also stipulated coop-
eration  and qualitative majority  voting. The third proposal 
then represented the equivalent to the initial proposal  on 
general  residence rights, covering all  those not covered by 
other provisions, i.e. persons who were not and had not been 
economically active and who were not students, as long as 
they were covered by  sickness insurance and could demon-
strate sufficient resources  to avoid becoming  a burden on the 
social  security system  of the host. This  proposal  was based on 
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article 100 EEC, which governs harmonizations measures for 
the free movement of persons. While maintaining unanimity 
in  the Council, article 100 EEC stipulated the cooperation 
procedure.97
The Commission’s aim was evidently to allow for  majority 
voting  as far  as possible. Moreover, the Parliament had con-
sistently  expressed its position  in  favour of residence rights. 
Its inclusion would therefore apply  extra pressure on  the 
Council. 
The new proposals toned down  some of the language of the 
original, omitting a prior  reference to citizenship. Moreover, 
the Commission explicitly  restated member state concern for 
welfare tourism  in the proposal recitals: “it is vital  to avoid 
migration  flows resulting solely  from  financial  considerations 
based on the fact that the social security  and social  assistance 
systems have not been harmonized; [...] a  European citizen 
wishing to reside in  a  country  other than  his own should not 
constitute an unreasonable burden on  the public finances  of 
the host country; [...] therefore, at the present stage in  the 
development of the Community, conditions should be laid 
down  for the exercise of the right of residence” (recital  4, OJ 
1989, No. C 191/5). 
This approach  was very  much  in line with the position of the 
Council, which wished to emphasise the restrictions on  the 
right to free movement by  non-economically  active persons. 
The amendments proposed by  the Council  included a  more 
restrictive stance vis-à-vis the definition  of sufficient re-
sources and the definition of  family  members than the Com-
mission  had proposed. The Council also deleted all  reference 
to rights non-economically active persons might enjoy  under 
legislation  regulating access to social  benefits. With  regard to 
the residence rights for students, the Council  introduced a 
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97 This clause differs from article 100A, discussed in chapter 5, which allows 
for majority voting in issues related to the 1992 internal market project.
new article that prevented the directive from establishing  a 
right to maintenance grants  (OJ 1990, No. C175/99). This 
must be seen as a  direct response to prior litigation. More 
importantly, the Council  insisted on a change of  the pro-
posed legal  basis for all  three directives back to article 235 
EEC, which  stipulated unanimity  and excluded the European 
Parliament.
Under these conditions, and, as the Commission put it, “after 
a tortuous legislative procedure” (COM 93/209 explanatory 
memorandum: 1) spanning  more than  a  decade, the Council 
was able to agree on  the three separate directives (directive 
90/364, directive 90/365, and directive 90/366), which were 
based on  a common template. The resulting text  deleted in 
its recitals a reference to “a guaranteed right of  residence 
throughout the Community  for all  citizens of  the Member 
States”  that had been  reinserted by  the European Parliament 
(OJ 1990, No. C 15/71), and retained the Council formulation 
that “beneficiaries  of the right of residence must  not become 
an unreasonable burden  on the public finances of the host 
Member State” (OJ 1990, No. C 175/85).
These provisions fell  short of what the Commission and the 
Parliament had originally  envisaged. Parliament and Com-
mission  moreover disagreed with the change of legal basis 
depriving the EP of  its influence over  the final text. In  the 
case of directive 90/366, covering student rights, the Euro-
pean  Parliament, supported by  the Commission, subse-
quently initiated an action for annulment before the Court of 
Justice (Case C-295/90). The two institutions  argued that, 
based on prior  case-law, access to vocational  training would 
be governed by  the Treaty rules on non-discrimination, as 
the Commission  had originally  proposed. The Court agreed, 
and annulled the directive.  The result of this ruling, how-
ever, was  largely symbolic. As  the Commission  later  stated in 
its proposal for a replacement directive, “the attached pro-
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posal reproduces the version of the Directive as  adopted by 
the Council, and not the substance of the Commission's ini-
tial proposal. [...] Parliament, through  its appeal, intended 
simply  to secure acknowledgment that the procedure fol-
lowed had failed to respect its prerogatives” (COM 93/209 
explanatory memorandum: 1).
The Council’s agreement on  these directives  must be seen  in 
the context of the negotiations concerning the idea  of  Euro-
pean  Union. During the preparations for the intergovern-
mental  conference that negotiated the new Treaty, the Span-
ish government proposed to consider including provisions  on 
European citizenship (SEC 93/1021: 6). This suggestion  was 
endorsed by the Rome European  Council  in December 1990, 
which  instructed the intergovernmental conference to exam-
ine possible provisions for a “freedom  of movement and resi-
dence irrespective of engagement in  economic activity” (EC 
Bulletin 12-1990: 10). Member  state governments at the 
Maastricht  European  Council  in  December  1991 subse-
quently agreed on  the inclusion of a ‘Citizenship of the Un-
ion’, and, in  particular, in article 8a TEC the right for  Union 
citizens to “move and reside freely  with the territory of  the 
Member States”. This  right, however, would be “subject to 
the limitations  and conditions laid down in  this  Treaty and 
by  the measures adopted to give it effect”. By  referring  to ex-
isting  legislation, member states  limited the possibility  for 
these provisions to establish  any new rights with  regard to 
movement and residence. 
Summary
The preceding section  again demonstrates a  strong link be-
tween legislation  and litigation, albeit of a  somewhat differ-
ent kind than  the one explored in the previous chapter. In 
pursuing a de-coupling  of movement rights  from  their eco-
nomic base, the Commission adopted a two-pronged ap-
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proach  that broadly  resembles its approach to the removal of 
trade barriers, and originated at around the same time in  the 
late 1970s. On the one hand, the Commission used litigation 
to advocate an expansive approach  to movement rights im-
plied in primary law. It would suffice for a  migrant’s  link to 
economic activity  to be remote for the rules on  free move-
ment to apply. Its legal  opinion  prevailed in  court, over the 
repeated objection  of several  member state governments – 
although member  states  retained the ability  to selectively  
apply the Court’s  case law. At the same time, the Commission 
introduced legislation  that would formally remove the neces-
sity  for an economic base, proposing  a  general  right to move 
and reside for Community  citizens, provided that the exercise 
of that right would not lead to a burden  on member state 
welfare systems. This, however, is where the analogy ends. 
First, the Commission did not explicitly  state a link between 
judicial  action  and legislative progress, as it had done repeat-
edly and forcefully in  the case of  trade barriers. In fact, the 
Commission’s annual  reports on  the application of Commu-
nity law do not mention  the term ‘citizenship’ at all  until 
1998. Second, judicial activity  in  this area  was almost exclu-
sively  a  result of preliminary references. Infringement pro-
ceedings initiated by  the Commission  are almost completely 
absent, safe for a few cases  concerning  access to tertiary edu-
cation. The eventual  success of  the Commission’s  legislative 
initiative came at the cost of coherence (the initial  proposal 
was split in  three) and is possibly  best explained as a precur-
sor  to the inclusion of ‘Union  citizenship’ in  primary  Treaty 
law at Maastricht . 
6.5 Defining the substance of European citizenship
After the Council  had adopted the three residence directives 
and the heads of  state or government agreed on Union  citi-
zenship in Maastricht, the Commission  undertook efforts to 
give effect to this new status. Even  before the entry  into force 
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of the new Treaty, the Commission proposed to extend the 
coordination  of social  security  systems, so far  confined to 
employed and self-employed persons, to all  insured Commu-
nity citizens. This plan  was nearly  as ambitious and contro-
versial  as  the prior residence directive. The Commission  re-
garded the coordination regime as an  essential  element in 
the framework of free movement that would be “indispensa-
ble in the context of the social  dimension of the internal 
market and a People's Europe” (COM 91/528 explanatory 
memorandum: 3). Its  proposal  was therefore “to extend the 
Community coordinating rules to all insured persons, in par-
ticular  to students and non-employed persons” (COM 91/528 
explanatory memorandum: 5). In  keeping with  earlier  pro-
posals that aimed at a  general right to free movement, this 
proposal  met with  equal  reluctance in the Council  (cf. 
Sindbjerg  Martinsen 2006: 225). Nothing happened for a  
series of years. 
In  order to “generate new momentum in this area”  (COM 98/
394 explanatory memorandum: 4), the Commission set  up a 
so called ‘High  Level  Panel’ on  the free movement of persons 
in  1996, which  had the aim  of  “identifying  the existing  or po-
tential  obstacles  encountered by  European citizens in exer-
cising  their right to move freely  and to work within  the Un-
ion” (COM 98/403 Annex: 1). This  group subsequently, in 
March  1997, produced a lengthy  report that included a  series 
of proposals addressing “lacunae” of existing  legislation. In 
general, the group’s report suggested that “Free movement 
rights should be brought in  line with  the new concept of 
European citizenship. [...] The concept of European citizen-
ship suggests that a  piecemeal  sectoral  approach  to residence 
rights should be replaced by  consolidated legislation and in 
time treating all  European  citizens as equal”  (Veil, Andre et 
al. 1997: 4). With  regard to legislation on  social  security, the 
panel remarked that “The current scope of  the Regulation as 
regards the persons covered is inadequate in view of changes 
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that have taken place since its  adoption  and, in particular, 
since the adoption  of the three Directives on the right of resi-
dence of retired persons, students  and other persons with 
sufficient resources and sickness/maternity  insurance. In 
1991, the Commission submitted a  proposal  to the Council  on 
extending  the scope of  Regulation  1408/71 [on  social security 
coordination] to persons who do not already fall  within  it 
[...]. The proposal, however, is still  before the Council”  (Veil, 
Andre et al. 1997: 46).
The report of  the High Level  Panel prompted a  series of re-
plies from the Commission outlining its  intended course of 
action. These reactions coincided with  member state gov-
ernment’s efforts towards another Treaty revision, which 
included an intensified focus on employment. The European 
Council  at  Amsterdam  in June 1997  had endorsed an “Action 
Plan” for  the full implementation of the single market, set-
ting out the future steps in  this  area  (cf. chapter  5). As an 
ancillary to this plan, the Commission, in  November 1997, 
presented an “Action  Plan for free movement of  workers”, 
which  went into greater  detail  regarding  its proposals for an 
extension  of  free movement rights. In  this  plan, the Commis-
sion  stated its “intention to present in 1998 proposals to 
simplify  and enhance the existing secondary legislation with 
a view to drawing  all consequences  in  order to give full  value 
to citizenship of the Union” (COM 97/586: 9). The Commis-
sion  stressed that free movement rights “are becoming an 
integral part of the legal  heritage of every  citizen  of  the Euro-
pean  Union, and should be formalised in a  common corpus 
of legislation. For  all  these reasons, the Commission consid-
ers it necessary to harmonise the legal  status of all  Commu-
nity citizens in  the Member States, irrespective of whether 
they pursue an  economic activity or not” (COM 98/403: 2). 
The proposed measures  therefore aimed at consolidating  the 
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vast array of respective secondary legislation98 and bringing 
it in line with existing case law (cf. Nic Shuibhne 2009: 167). 
Following  up on  this statement of intentions, the Commis-
sion  started drafting  proposals covering a  generalised right of 
free movement. A first success in its  legislative programme 
was the Council’s agreement on that part of  the Commis-
sion’s 1991 proposal  on  extending social  security  coordina-
tion  which related to students (regulation 307/99; cf. 
Sindbjerg  Martinsen 2006: 226). Of all  classes of  persons the 
Commission aimed to include in the coordination  scheme 
this left out only ‘non-employed’ persons. All  others were 
covered by one provision or  the other, albeit in a piece-meal 
fashion. The Commission’s main  objective for subsequent 
proposals  was a consolidation of  existing  rights more than  a 
further expansion of  their personal scope. Hence, its 1998 
proposal  for  a generalised coordination  of social security 
would apply  “to all persons who are covered by  the social  
security  legislation  of a Member  State” (COM 98/779 ex-
planatory  memorandum: 2).99 Rules governing  such  coordi-
nation  should “no longer have the sole aim  of ensuring  the 
free movement of  workers, but are about protecting  the so-
cial  security  entitlements of all  persons  moving within the 
European Union. Coordination must therefore be seen  from 
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98  Cf. also (COM 98/403: 1-2): “As stated in the High-Level Panel's report, 
rights of entry and residence were initially linked to the pursuit of an occu-
pation. Since then, mainly as a result of secondary legislation, these rights 
have gradually been extended to cover all citizens. This step by step exten-
sion has meant, however, that beneficiaries have been compartmentalised in 
a way that is no longer in keeping with modem forms of mobility or with the 
establishment of citizenship of the Union.”
99 Cf. a little bit further down: ““This is in line with the principle underlying 
the aim of the legislation, which is to protect the social security rights of 
people making use of free movement. Since this right is not limited to the 
active population, it seems appropriate that if a person has an acquired right 
under a social security scheme in a Member State, the said right should not 
be lost when that person goes to another Member State”  (COM 98/779 ex-
planatory memorandum: 4).
the perspective of European  citizenship and the building of  a 
Social  Europe”  (COM 2004/332: 3). Negotiations  in  the 
Council  proved difficult, with the largest disagreement clus-
tering around the right of residence and access to benefits of 
unemployed persons (cf. Council  press release PRES/2001/
225: 15). The proposal ended up as a B-point on  the Council 
agenda  for six meetings over  five years, until it was agreed 
upon in April 2004 (regulation 883/2004). 
In  2001, the Commission completed its work on a  proposal 
for  a consolidated piece of legislation that would summarise 
residence rights for all  persons covered by  Community  law. It 
followed the oft-stated premise that “Union  citizens should, 
mutatis mutandis, be able to move between Member States 
on similar terms as nationals of a Member State moving 
around or changing their place of  residence or  job in  their 
own  country (COM 2001/257  explanatory memorandum: 2) 
and would finally  bring all  disparate sets of rules “together in 
a single legislative instrument”  (COM 2001/257 explanatory 
memorandum: 3). Negotiations on this proposal  were speed-
ier  than those on  social security coordination. Council  and 
European Parliament adopted the corresponding directive 
2004/38 on the same day  as the regulation 883/2004, after 
having been placed twice on the Council agenda as a B-point.
Litigating citizenship
At the same time as the Commission  drafted legislation  flesh-
ing out the Maastricht Treaty  provisions on  citizenship as  
regards the right to free movement and access to social  secu-
rity, it also engaged in  court proceedings to define the mean-
ing of these provisions. Recall  that  the new article 8a TEC 
provided that “Every citizen of the Union  shall have the right 
to move and reside freely  within the territory  of the Member 
States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in 
this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect”. 
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The question in particular  was whether this provision  added 
any  new substantive rights for  citizens to move and reside to 
the existing corpus of  free movement rights, or whether  they 
were a largely symbolic rephrasing of  the status  quo (cf. Nic 
Shuibhne 2009: 170-171; Craig and de Búrca 2011: 824). 
Member state governments, as their  opinions in subsequent 
cases indicated, appeared to argue for the latter.
This subject was first explicitly raised before the Court of 
Justice in  1996 in  a  preliminary  reference. The case con-
cerned a Spanish national, María  Martínez Sala, who lived in 
Germany but had been unemployed for  some time. Her right 
to reside in Germany was not questioned (it had been 
granted by German authorities on  grounds unrelated to EU 
law), but her  request for a child-raising  allowance (“Erzie-
hungsgeld”) was turned down with  the argument that she 
was not a  German national  and she did not enjoy  protection 
from  discrimination since she did not fall under any provi-
sion  of EU free movement law. In  its observations, the Com-
mission  held that the Treaty  provisions on  citizenship estab-
lished a novel  set of movement rights that were directly  effec-
tive. It argued that “the right to move and reside freely 
throughout the Union flows directly  from  the Treaty. The 
limitations and conditions provided for in  Article 8a there-
fore relate solely  to the exercise  of that right, established by 
primary  law as  a  freedom  of the citizen”  (Case 85/96, ECR 
1998-I: 2701, original  emphasis). The fact that Martínez Sala 
did not hold a residence permit under EU law therefore 
would not prevent her from enjoying the rights emanating 
from  her Union  citizenship and the fact that she had moved 
from  one member state to another, including protection 
against discrimination  on grounds of  nationality. This view 
was contested by the German, the French  and the British 
governments, who held that the Treaty provision on  citizen-
ship merely  subsumed existing rights under a new heading: 
“In  their  view, that provision simply  reiterates the rights of 
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free movement and residence already accorded to the various 
individual  categories of  persons concerned and welds  them 
together in  a  single provision of  primary  law — like the frag-
ments of  a  mosaic, as the French Government put it at the 
hearing  [...]. In  other words, Article 8a  does not give freedom 
of movement any new broader substance than earlier legisla-
tion did” (Case 85/96, ECR 1998-I: 2701). 
The Court largely concurred with  the Commission’s position. 
Contrary to the observations  of  the German, French  and Brit-
ish governments it held that “As a  national  of a Member 
State lawfully  residing in  the territory of another  Member 
State, the appellant in  the main proceedings comes within 
the scope ratione  personae  of  the provisions of  the Treaty  on 
European citizenship” (Case 85/96, ECR 1998-I: 2725). 
From this, it would follow that  a Union citizen  lawfully  resi-
dent in another member state enjoys protection  against dis-
crimination concerning the grant of  benefits such  as the one 
Martínez Sala  had applied for (Case 85/96, ECR 1998-I: 
2726). 
Nonetheless, the Commission did not adopt an expansive 
stance to free movement rights where court cases presented 
an opportunity to go beyond the position  the Commission 
had adopted in  its proposals for the both the residence and 
the social  security  directives. In  Baumbast, the Commission 
argued that a German national  living in  the United Kingdom 
but not pursuing an economic activity  there could not rely  on 
rights directly  derived from  the Treaty  provisions on Union 
citizenship if he could not demonstrate adequate sickness 
insurance, a  precondition  – along with  sufficient resources – 
for  residence rights for non-economically  active persons 
(Case 413/99, ECR 2002-I: 7126). Similarly, it held in 
Grzelczyk that neither Union citizenship nor the specific 
residence rights for  students entitle student migrants to so-
cial  benefits (Case 184/99, ECR  2001-I: 6212). And again  in 
Bidar the Commission  defended the express  provision in-
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cluded in its proposal  that residence rights  for students did 
not entitle migrant students to a maintenance grant (Case 
209/2003, ECR 2005-I: 2146). 
In  all of these cases, the Court rejected the Commission’s 
more restrictive position  and significantly extended the reach 
of Union citizenship regarding  free movement rights and the 
concomitant principle of non-discrimination.
Summary
As I have shown above, the Commission  has, since the 1970s, 
consistently  supported an expansive interpretation  of  the 
economic basis for the free movement rights  of citizens. The 
Treaty  articles on citizenship provided a further  resource to 
draw upon where the association between movement and 
economic activity  was no longer  tenable. While the Commis-
sion  continuously  proposed legislation  to fill  in  the ambigui-
ties of  the legal  status quo, it did not shy away from asserting 
its position in  court, despite the objections raised by member 
state governments. Subsequent legislative proposals  would 
then take up the results of  case law in  order to lock in its  ef-
fects: “The Commission  intends to ensure that these propos-
als succeed in  their aim  of  improving  conditions for  freedom 
of movement to reflect the spirit expressed by case-law. The 
latter  is a basic step forward for the European citizen  and the 
Commission will  ensure that discussions in the Council  do 
not lead to the loss  of the headway made by case-law”  (COM 
98/394, explanatory  memorandum: 6). Recital 10 of  the 
Commission’s amended proposal for a  new comprehensive 
directive covering  the free movement rights of Union  citizens 
consequently took up the Court’s ruling in  Martínez Sala, 
stating that “The fundamental  and personal  right of  Union 
citizens to reside in  another Member  State is conferred di-
rectly on Union citizens by the Treaty” (COM 2003/199: 14). 
However, there are clear  limits  to this strategy. Even where a 
series of preliminary references  provided the opportunity  to 
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further expand rights derived from  Union citizenship, the 
Commission did not go beyond the position  it had adopted in 
its legislative proposals. From present evidence it is impossi-
ble to discern  whether the Commission’s position  in these 
cases reflected a genuinely  cautious stance with  regard to a 
possible abuse of rights, or  whether it wished to exercise re-
straint with regard to the pending legislation. Both explana-
tions are consistent with the complete lack of  infringement 
proceedings in  this area. While the Commission  at times 
used the opportunities provided by  litigation  initiated by  in-
dividuals, it did not itself pursue a discernible judicial strat-
egy. 
6.6 Conclusion
Contrary to the findings  of the last chapter, this case study 
finds less  corroboration  for  my hypotheses. While the Com-
mission  employed both legislative proposals and judicial 
proceedings in  order to expand the reach  of free movement 
rights for EU citizens, a concrete link between  the two modes 
of policy-making is largely missing. 
In  parallel  to its  stance regarding  the removal  of  barriers to 
trade in goods, the initial position  of the Commission  was 
conciliatory. The initial  legislative programme was  largely 
successful, with  the framework for the rights of  economically 
active migrants in place within a decade after  the signing  of 
the Treaty  of Rome. Where contentious issues were raised in 
preliminary references, such  as  the definition of the term 
‘worker’, the Commission  advocated member state discre-
tion. At the same time, the Commission established a con-
crete link between  the economic objectives of the free move-
ment of  persons and the Treaties’ social policy  mandate. 
Members of the Commission  expressed the opinion from  the 
outset that free movement rights  for  Community  nationals 
could represent the kernel  of a  more encompassing ‘Euro-
pean  citizenship’ that would not be based on economic activ-
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ity. The Commission, however, only  started acting  on  this 
notion in the early 1970s, when the concept of citizenship 
was debated at the highest political level  of  the member 
states. The concurrent reversal  of  its position  vis-à-vis mem-
ber state discretion was  quite stark. When conflict about the 
extent of free movement rights reached the Court of  Justice, 
the Commission  took a confrontative stance, arguing  that  
exceptions from free movement rights be interpreted nar-
rowly, while the necessity  for economic activity  as a trigger to 
those rights should be treated expansively. 
At the same time, the Commission took the conclusions of 
the Paris Summit in  1974 on  special rights of  Community 
citizens as a  mandate to introduce legislation establishing a 
general  right of movement and residence. The timing  of its 
proposal  coincided with a  series of communications indicat-
ing increased frustration  with  Council’s (lack of) activity  in 
the field of  trade barriers. Whereas legislation  in  both  fields 
– the free movement of goods an  the free movement of per-
sons – met with increasing  reluctance in  the Council, the 
Commission’s response to such  legislative barriers was quite 
different. While it resorted to a  strategy  of increased judicial 
action in the form  of infringement proceedings following  the 
Cassis de Dijon judgement, the Commission  undertook no 
such  action  with  regard to the pending residence directive. It 
did, however, intervene in  preliminary  reference procedures, 
supporting, where the question  arose, an  expansive interpre-
tation of who should be covered by free movement rights. 
Legal  developments  in this field, supported by the Commis-
sion, reduced the connection  of movement rights to eco-
nomic activity to a  minimum, and it is not unthinkable that 
the connection could have been removed altogether by judi-
cial  means. Nonetheless, the Commission  did not  itself initi-
ate ‘test cases’, or apply pressure on  Council negations in any 
other way  through  the infringement procedure. All  the while, 
Council  agreement on the proposed directive seemed elusive. 
A  renewed effort was  taken  in  the context of the single mar-
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ket programme, but the momentum did not lead to a consen-
sus. The Commission’s  attempt to take advantage of qualita-
tive majority  voting following the Single European Act  was 
equally  unsuccessful, as  the Council  insisted on a  restrictive 
legal  basis. Judging from  the positions  expressed in  judicial 
proceedings, there was considerable disagreement within  the 
Council, with  the French  government advocating  an  expan-
sion  of movement rights, and the Danish  and Dutch  govern-
ments opposed. 
This disagreement was only  resolved in  the period preceding 
the Treaty of Maastricht, where member state governments 
agreed on the inclusion  of ‘European citizenship’ in  primary 
law. The subsequently expressed opinion  by  governments 
indicates that this new status  of member  state nationals  was 
not intended to create novel political  rights, but rather to 
summarise existing rights arising  from secondary  legislation. 
The Commission  contested this  view in court, with  some suc-
cess. The Court accepted the Commission’s position  that the 
fundamental  right to move and reside emanated directly 
from  the Treaty, but the Commission  did not pursue the mat-
ter further, forgoing an  opportunity  to support a further  ex-
pansion movement rights in court. Instead, it initiated legis-
lation  with  a  view to consolidate (and moderately expand) 
existing rights  to give greater effect to the application of such 
rights, which was adopted in 2004. 
These conclusions are corroborated by  descriptive statistics 
for  this policy  area (figure 6.1). Like in the previous chapter, 
certain  caveats apply  to this  overview. The timelines do not 
match, since there are no reliable data  on legislative initia-
tives before 1984. Both  legislative initiatives and court cases 
refer to the field of ‘free movement of workers and social  pol-
icy’ as summarised in the ‘directory  of European Union legis-
lation  in  force’. They cover a wider range than the measures 
discussed above, but should be indicative of  general  trends 
that apply to my case at hand.  
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The pattern  with  regard to legislative initiatives is broadly 
similar  to its counterpart for the harmonization of trade laws. 
The bulk of the activity  coincides with the single market  pro-
gramme and recedes significantly after its completion. Again, 
the lack of  data for previous periods does not allow me to 
conclude that the late 1980s and early  1990s account for the 
majority  of initiatives  in this area, but the figure certainly 
shows that this was a period of heightened activity. This is 
broadly  indicative of  the fact that the cooperation  between 
the Commission  and the legislative institutions worked well, 
even  though  this was not the case for  the residence directives 
discussed above. 
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My observations with  regard to the Commission’s judicial 
strategy are consistent with  the data for  court cases. The 
overall  volume of infringement cases in this policy  field is low 
compared to the previous chapter, and there is an  overall  
increase of the use of this procedure over time, albeit very 
uneven. There is no clear  pattern that would connect judicial 
and legislative action. In  the period from  1984 to 1990, both 
the number of legislative initiatives and the number of  in-
fringement proceedings rise. Whereas legislative initiatives 
generally  recede in number thereafter, the judicial  activity 
profile of  the Commission  in  the 1990s is characterised by 
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strong swings. The general  incline towards the end of the 
period for  which  data  is available coincides with  the Com-
mission’s efforts to consolidate existing legislation and clos-
ing “certain loopholes”  (COM 2002/324: 71), but there is no 
evidence connecting the two forms of action. 
There is  generally no concrete evidence that  connects the 
Commission’s use of infringement proceedings with  the ob-
stacles to legislation. The introduction  of majority  voting  for 
some issues concerning  the free movement of  persons with 
the Single European Act  (although not so for  the residence 
directives) coincides with an  increase in  the Commission’s 
legislative activity, but there is no corollary  for its use of en-
forcement action, which remained at a generally low volume. 
The evident existence of conflict in the Council also did not 
lead the Commission to rely on  such  a  judicial  strategy. It is 
speculative to assume that the Commission  intended to limit 
the antagonism  between individual  rights arising out of  EU 
law and historically  negotiated systems of collective solidar-
ity at the member state level. A more fruitful  approach at an 
explanation of the lack of a judicial  strategy  may be based on 
the pattern  of preliminary  references for  this policy  area, 
which  is altogether different from that identified in  the pre-
vious chapter. With  few exceptions, the number  of such  pro-
ceedings exceeds that of both  legislative initiatives and in-
fringement cases referred to the Court of Justice. These high 
rates of litigation since the early  1970s provided a  constant 
opportunity  for  the Commission  to present its policy  prefer-
ences (cast as legal  opinion) before the Court. As I have indi-
cated before, this can be interpreted as making  it  unneces-
sary for the Commission  to initiate proceedings  itself. How-
ever, as in  the previous chapter, there is evidence here that 
the Commission  did not agree with  the expansive stance 
taken  by individual litigants. In particular  with  regard to re-
cent legal developments  regarding  the rights inherent in  Un-
ion citizenship, the Commission has frequently sided with 
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the member  states arguing  for wider national  regulatory 
autonomy. 
The relationship of infringement proceedings and prelimi-
nary references as options for the Commission to influence 
policy-making is evidently in need of greater exploration.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
I have set out in  this study to systematically assess how the 
Commission makes use of its access to legislation  and litiga-
tion  in order to advance its policy  interests. Based on a  de-
tailed overview of the Commission’s relative position  in three 
modes of policy-making, I aimed to advance a  number of 
propositions as to which  factors account for the Commis-
sion’s choice of strategy. I started from the assumption  that 
the Commission prefers legislation  over litigation to advance 
its policy interests, for reasons primarily of legitimacy  and 
legal  certainty. I then proceeded to propose that the Com-
mission  is more likely  to resort to infringement proceedings 
when the likelihood of initiating successful  legislation is low. 
This would be the case where voting rules in the Council 
stipulate unanimity, and where the European Parliament has 
veto powers. Obstacles to legislation  would also rise, the 
larger the ideological  difference between  the Commission 
and the Council  and the Commission and the EP, respec-
tively, and in  situations where there is considerable dis-
agreement within the Council. I also included a control  vari-
able that measured the degree of  ‘market orientation’ of a 
policy area. To test these propositions, I proceeded in two 
steps, corresponding to two forms of  empirics. Focusing ini-
tially on  the Commission’s use of infringement proceedings, I 
tested the relationship between my proposed explanatory 
variables and the outcome (the ratio of  litigation  to legisla-
tion  by policy area over time) statistically. For these pur-
poses, I combined three datasets containing information  on 
legislative processes, infringement proceedings and the po-
litical  positions of  the actors involved for the period from 
1984 to 1998. In a second step, I undertook two longitudinal 
case studies  of Commission policy  initiatives and judicial  
action in two policy areas: the free movement of  goods, in 
particular with  regard to the removal  of barriers to trade in 
goods, and the free movement of persons, in particular  with 
regard to the rights  of  European  Union  nationals to move 
and reside within  the Union.  These case studies expanded 
the period of  observation, starting with  early  Commission 
actions in the 1960s and tracing related processes to (close 
to) the present day. The case studies moreover  expanded the 
focus of  my analysis beyond infringement proceedings to the 
Commission’s use of litigation in general.
The purpose of this  mixed-method approach  was to start 
with  a set of  relatively strict assumptions, and then, based on 
the results of  the statistical  test, use case studies to add com-
plexity  and derive additional “causal process  observations” 
(Collier, Brady  et al. 2010: 184). In  this way, I hoped to un-
cover  ‘causal mechanisms’ that link the proposed explanatory 
factors (legislative obstacles and characteristics  of  the policy 
field) to the outcome (the Commission’s use of litigation  rela-
tive to legislation). These combined results would then allow 
me to propose refinements to the theory. 
My conclusions address  this latter  part of my  objectives. I 
will  start by  reviewing the hypotheses developed in chapter  4, 
taking  account of the results  of  the statistical  test and the two 
longitudinal  case studies  (7.1). I then  outline my findings 
regarding  the importance of the preliminary  reference pro-
cedure for  the Commission’s judicial  strategy  (7.2), and con-
clude with some thoughts on the way ahead (7.3). 
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7.1 Reviewing my hypotheses
In  this following  section, I will  review my initial  hypotheses, 
developed in  chapter  4, in  light of the results of both  the sta-
tistical test and the two case studies.101 
H1: Increasing obstacles to a successful Council vote  (a 
move  from QMV to unanimity) favour the  choice of litiga-
tion over legislation.
My statistical  analysis  in chapter 4 has found no (statisti-
cally) significant effect of the prevalent voting  rule in  the 
Council  on the Commission’s use of the infringement proce-
dure. Overall, my two cases  studies  do not support this 
proposition, either. In the field of goods, member  state gov-
ernments had introduced majority voting  for harmonizing 
legislation  regarding internal  market objectives in the Single 
European Act. This  coincided with an  increase in legislative 
initiatives proposed by the Commission, and the Commission 
commented favourably  on  the effect majority voting  had on 
the speed of adoption  of these proposals. At the same time, 
the number  of infringement proceedings the Commission 
referred to the Court in this sector receded noticeably. While 
this pattern  is consistent with  the hypothesis (in  reverse), 
there are competing explanations for  the success of the legis-
lative programme and the decrease of court cases, drawing in 
particular on  a  general convergence of  preferences regarding 
the removal of barriers to trade.
There is no evidence of  a similar pattern  in  my  case study 
concerning the free movement of  persons. The Single Euro-
pean  Act allowed for majority voting  in some areas regarding 
the free movement of workers and the self-employed, and the 
Commission did indeed propose a  higher  volume of legisla-
tion  at this time. Again, this  coincided with  a greater congru-
ence of preferences between the Commission  and the Council 
regarding  measure to complete the internal  market. De-
creased legislative obstacles, however, did not have an effect 
on the Commission’s use of  infringement procedures. Court 
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100 I will not cover hypothesis H7, as this concerned a control variable. 
referrals remained low throughout the 1980s and even  rose 
slightly towards their end. 
H2: Adding the  European Parliament as  a veto player in 
legislation favours the choice of litigation over legislation.
My statistical  analysis has produced puzzling results  for  this 
hypothesis. In  two of the models (including  the combined 
coding  that I regarded as  more reliable), the effect of  EP veto 
powers on the Commission’s  use of infringement procedures 
was opposite to what I had proposed. The ratio of litigation 
to legislation  decreased in areas where the European  Parlia-
ment had veto powers. I interpreted this as a  spurious rela-
tionship. My  case studies have revealed no evidence of a 
causal  link between  the European Parliament’s involvement 
in  legislative procedures and the Commission’s use of in-
fringement proceedings. The Commission  did not identify 
the EP as  an obstacle to its  harmonization  programme after 
the introduction  of  the cooperation procedure in  the Single 
European Act (although  I did not code this  as ‘veto powers’ in 
my  statistical  analysis), or at any  time thereafter. The EP ex-
plicitly supported the Commission’s position with  regard to 
residence rights for migrant  citizens, and frequently de-
manded more extensive rights for non-economic migrants 
than the Commission. In  its attempt to find a solution  for its 
pending residence rights  proposal  in the late 1980s, moreo-
ver, the Commission proposed a  legal basis for legislation 
that would have involved the Parliament, even where una-
nimity  for  Council  voting  was stipulated regardless. There is 
consequently no evidence that the Commission regarded the 
EP  as  an  obstacle to legislation  that needed to be avoided, or 
circumvented by judicial action. 
H3: Greater political distance  between the  Commission and 
the Council favours the choice of litigation over legislation.
The statistical  analysis has not revealed a systematic rela-
tionship between the political  distance of the two institutions 
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and the Commission’s resort to infringement proceedings. 
The CMP scores I used for  this analysis may  be too blunt to 
use for  individual  policy  areas. As I have described for hy-
pothesis H1, the convergence of  preferences between  mem-
ber state governments and the Commission  with  regard to 
the single market programme coincided with  the introduc-
tion  of majority  voting, and my  case study data  does not al-
low me to discern between  the two factors. CMP scores for 
this time period show a fluctuation that is  not consistent with 
the observed actions. In  any  case, I could only  find evidence 
for  the expected effect of legislative obstacles, which  are par-
tially a  result of greater ideological  distance, with  regard to 
the trade barrier  case, where the expected pattern  was evi-
dent for  the period from the mid-1970s to the early  1990s. I 
could find no such  pattern  in  the field of  free movement for 
persons. 
H4: Greater political distance  between the  Commission and 
the  European Parliament favours the choice of  litigation 
over legislation.
Similar to the results for H2, the statistical analysis sug-
gested (in one model) that greater ideological distance be-
tween the Commission  and the EP had the opposite of the 
expected effect. With  greater  distance in political  positions, 
the Commission’s resort to infringement proceedings de-
creased. I also interpreted this relationship as spurious. The 
material  I used for evidence in  my case studies  does not allow 
me comprehensively  address  this proposition. The only  in-
formation I presented for  the position of the European Par-
liament was regarding the residence directive, where the 
Commission and the EP largely  agreed, with no discernible 
effect on the Commission’s use of the infringement proce-
dure. It therefore appears  that there is  no causal link  be-
tween the positional  difference and the Commission’s choice 
of strategy.
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H5: A greater degree  of conflict in the  Council favours the 
choice of litigation over legislation.
My measure for conflict between member state governments 
in  the Council, the proportion of issues that were discussed 
as B points in Council meetings, was the only  independent 
variable pertaining to my original  proposition  that had a sta-
tistically significant effect on  the outcome in  the expected 
direction. According  to one of the models (m2, admittedly 
based on the coding  which I had demonstrated to be less re-
liable), all  else equal, increased conflict in  the Council  led to 
an increased use of the infringement procedures. My case 
studies only provide limited instances allowing me to thor-
oughly  discern  between  conflict arising out of positional  dif-
ferences between the Commission and the Council  on  the one 
hand and differences among member state governments  in 
the Council on the other. Some court cases, in  particular, hint 
at the conflict lines in  Council  negotiations. These relate to 
the residence directive, where the French  government and 
the Dutch and Danish  governments found themselves  on op-
posing sides of the legal  argument about the extent of such 
rights. As I have pointed out above, the inability  of the Coun-
cil to agree on the Commission’s proposal  for a  residence 
directive throughout the 1980s did not lead the Commission 
to refer  an  increased number of infringement proceedings  to 
the Court of Justice. 
H6: The Commission is more  likely to favour litigation over 
legislation if the  subject matter pertains to a market-
oriented policy field.
A  comparison  between the statistical  test of this hypothesis 
and the evidence from the case studies again yields inconclu-
sive results. The statistical  test indicated that the assumed 
market-bias of EU law does not translate into a  higher ratio 
of infringement proceedings for policy areas that can  be 
characterised as  ‘market-making’ rather than ‘intervention-
ist’. It in fact demonstrated the opposite effect. The case 
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studies, however, conflict with  that finding. I could find evi-
dence for  the expected pattern  of increased enforcement ac-
tions in  the face of legislative obstacles in  the case of  the 
‘market-making’ policy area, but not in the ‘interventionist’ 
policy area. 
Summary
The question  arises if the proper  consequence of  these incon-
clusive results would be to reject my propositions. For most 
of the more specific hypotheses, this is undoubtedly  the case. 
I could not demonstrate Council  voting  rules and EP veto 
powers to have a  systematic and meaningful impact on  the 
Commission’s use of the infringement procedure. The same 
applies for  ideological distance as measured by CMP scores 
relating to a political left-right dimension. Regarding my 
more general  proposition  that the Commission will resort to 
judicial  proceedings in the face of increasing obstacles to leg-
islation, I would plead for a  more lenient conclusion. My  em-
pirical tests have revealed some evidence to support  the 
proposition, and the Commission’s actions in  the field of 
trade barriers, in  particular, follow the expected pattern 
closely  from the late 1970s to the early  1990s. Commission 
documents, moreover, specifically  make reference to the 
connection.
Should this evidence be treated as an  isolated pattern  that is 
not characteristic of  Commission  action as a whole? Evidence 
from  my  case studies points to another explanation: In  con-
centrating solely on the Commission’s  use of the infringe-
ment procedure, the statistical test has most likely omitted 
an important variable. The case studies have demonstrated 
the central importance of the preliminary reference proce-
dure in  bringing about policy change. They have moreover 
shown that the Commission  often successfully  intervenes in 
such  proceedings. As a  result, I will need to adapt my original 
proposition. Taking  account of  the Commission’s interven-
tion  in preliminary  reference procedures turns out to be cru-
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cial  in understanding  the opportunities offered by the legal 
system  and the Commission’s  subsequent choice of strategy. 
Concentrating solely  on infringement proceedings overlooks 
this strategic opportunity and might partially explain  the in-
conclusiveness of the previous statistical  test. I will  outline 
some related thoughts in the following section. 
7.2 Preliminary references and judicial strategy
The preliminary  reference procedure provides the Commis-
sion  with much the same opportunity  to present its legal 
opinion to the Court  as  infringement proceedings. Its success 
rate does not differ  greatly between the two procedures. The 
principal  difference lies in  the Commission’s  ability  to influ-
ence the timing and content of court cases  – it has wide dis-
cretion over which  infringement cases to pursue and when, 
whereas it has no such  control  (or only to a  limited extent, as 
I will  outline below) with  regard to preliminary  references. 
This led me to exclude preliminary references from my  sta-
tistical  test. As  I have shown in my case studies, court cases 
can  come at inopportune moments  or contain  positions the 
Commission does not support, for reasons strategic or  sin-
cere. This disadvantage may  be alleviated by the fact that the 
rates of litigation before national courts being  referred to the 
Court of Justice are generally  high. The frequency  of prelimi-
nary references in  many policy areas provides  the Commis-
sion  with  the constant opportunity to present its legal  posi-
tion  to the Court. Rather  than  invest  limited resource in  pur-
suing infringement proceedings, it can  use these resources to 
pursue policies in other venues. 
The empirical evidence from the case studies, moreover, 
demonstrates that a significant part of  legal  innovation re-
sulted from  Court  rulings in cases arising  out of preliminary 
references. This is so in  virtually all  cases concerning  the 
rights of  Union citizens to move and reside. It equally  applies 
to major cases regarding national barriers  to trade. The ini-
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tial legal  framework, on which the Commission  built its later 
legislative and judicial  strategy, was essentially  laid out in the 
Dassonville  and Cassis de  Dijon rulings. Both  originated 
from  individuals  claiming rights derived from EU law in  na-
tional  courts. This does not mean that the Commission 
merely reacts to the results of preliminary  references. I have 
shown how the Commission  is able to involve itself  in  such 
proceedings and that it has  successfully done so in many 
cases. There is therefore every  reason to assume that inter-
vention in preliminary references forms an  important part of 
the Commission’s judicial  strategy. The Commission’s own 
position supports  this assumption. In fact, it is  quite vocal 
about the value of  the preliminary  reference procedure: “The 
Commission also regards Article 177 of the EEC Treaty [the 
preliminary reference procedure] as a  particularly  important 
means of  redress for  the citizens and a fundamental means of 
creating law” (OJ 1988, No. C 31o/7). 
If preliminary references indeed present  a  viable option for 
the Commission  to pursue its policy preferences, as the evi-
dence suggest, it should follow that Commission’s involve-
ment in  such  proceedings has a  systematic effect on  its  use of 
the infringement procedure, and that an  analysis of the 
Commission’s use of the infringement procedure as a judicial 
strategy should take this  into account. A  future iteration of 
my  statistical  analysis should therefore include Commission 
intervention  in preliminary references. The question  is how 
to design such  a  revised model. The Commission’s interven-
tion  in preliminary  reference procedures is unconditional  – it 
intervenes in  all  such cases. The frequency  of  preliminary 
references (over which  the Commission has  no control) is 
equal to the frequency of Commission  observations in  such 
cases. A  variable measuring such procedures should there-
fore be included not as part of  the outcome, but as a control. 
Using  absolute frequencies of preliminary references seems 
unsuitable, as those numbers are a  result of  characteristics of 
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the subject matter in  question, in  particular individual  access 
to justice and the distribution of legal resources among  pri-
vate litigants. Rights of standing vary  not only from  member 
state to member state, but also from policy  area to policy 
area, and so does the existence of  legal  infrastructure and 
organised interests that favour judicial  proceedings (cf. 
Slepcevic 2009: 391). A  variable concerning preliminary  ref-
erences should therefore be a  relative measure. But relative 
to what? As an independent variable, it cannot be put in  rela-
tion  to factors that make up the outcome, i.e. legislation  or 
litigation. I assume rates  of  legislation and litigation  to be the 
outcome of strategic choices on the part of the Commission, 
which  are, according to the revised model, in  turn partially  a 
factor  of  the incidence of private litigation. One possible so-
lution could be to use the ratio of preliminary references to 
earlier  stages of the infringement procedure, such as letters 
of formal notice or reasoned opinions. These earlier stages 
are more concerned with  implementation  than with  policy, 
and are likely a  good measure of  the degree of legal  conflict 
or obstacles to the exercise of rights in a  policy area. Like-
wise, it  could be possible to use the amount of individual 
complaints  received by the Commission, but these may not 
be independent of the legal remedies available to potential 
litigants across policy areas. 
Taking account of the frequency  of  preliminary reference 
procedures also allows for  a  reevaluation  of the effects of  a 
policy area’s ‘ideological profile’ on litigation. Litigation rates 
on the whole were higher for  the field of movement rights 
than for the removal  of barriers  to trade. The degree of 
market-orientation  of  a  policy  areas is consequently  not a 
good predictor  of judicial  strategies. This insight is  reflected 
in  some of the more recent  discussions  of  this  topic (cf. Ca-
poraso and Tarrow 2009; Höpner  and Schäfer 2012; Scharpf 
2012). As I have mentioned above, James Caporaso and Sid-
ney  Tarrow have argued for  a social embeddedness of  Euro-
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pean  economic rights that, in their account, is increasingly 
recognised by the Court of  Justice (Caporaso and Tarrow 
2009: 615). Martin Höpner and Armin  Schäfer responded 
that while developments  such as the expansion of  movement 
rights for non-economically  active citizens  could indeed not 
be classified as market-making, they  should not be inter-
preted as a form of social  policy, either, as such  measures put 
pressure on  solidaristic communities that continue to be or-
ganised nationally (Höpner  and Schäfer 2012: 448). In  addi-
tion, Fritz Scharpf now concurs that EU law principles  such 
as non-discrimination, non-restriction  and “inter-personal 
equality” do not inherently  favour a  market-making or 
market-correcting trajectory of legal  developments, but they 
allow for individual  rights-based claims against collectively 
reached decisions (Scharpf  2012: 132-133). The existence of 
individual  rights can therefore be seen  as a necessary condi-
tion  for expansive litigation. The degree to which  EU law 
confers such  rights on individuals differs from policy  area  to 
policy area, and may  therefore constitute a crucial  factor in 
explaining a judicial approach to policy-making. 
7.3 Some thoughts on the wider legal environment
It is reasonable to assume that the distribution of rights-
based policies has an impact on the Commission’s  use of the 
judicial  system. Where the existence of individually  enforce-
able rights creates sufficient incentives for individuals to en-
gage the legal  system, the Commission  can  redirect its re-
sources and concentrate on lodging observations and initiat-
ing legislation. There is  evidence that the Commission  ac-
tively  encourages such an approach. From its earliest report 
on the application of Community  law, it  has stressed the im-
portance of  the preliminary  reference procedure for the 
Community’s  legal  system, and insisted that this “additional 
method of control deserves to be made more widely known  to 
the general  public” (COM 1984/181: 4). Over the years, it has 
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encouraged both  greater  access to legal remedies for citizens 
and closer cooperation among  legal  practitioners, and it has 
initiated various programmes in  this regard (cf. OJ 1993, No 
C 233/9). These have become more systematic since the 
‘Citizens First’ initiative, launched in 1996, which  aimed to 
increase awareness about rights and ways to enforce them 
(OJ 1997, No C 160/9). At the same time, the Commission’s 
proposal  for  the ‘Robert Schuman Project’, a project support-
ing common  training  measures for  legal professionals, stated 
as its rationale that: “it seems futile to encourage European 
citizens to make use of  all the rights that they enjoy  by virtue 
of Community  law (which, for instance, is the aim  of  the 
Commission's recent "Citizens First" initiative) if the parties 
responsible for ensuring that those rights are enforced and 
respected in the Member States do not know of their  exis-
tence or are unfamiliar with their  content. [...] Although 
there are qualified specialists  in Community  law in the 
Member States, it is apparent that  legal  practitioners in gen-
eral  do not have a  sufficiently  developed Community  reflex 
causing them  automatically and systematically to check 
whether Community solutions apply  to the cases  they  handle 
on a daily  basis” (COM 1996/560, explanatory memoran-
dum: 2-3). Another of the Commission’s initiatives included 
the extension of legal  aid to individuals and non-profit or-
ganisations, such as  consumer associations, who cannot 
muster the necessary resources to engage in judicial proceed-
ings (COM 2002/13, explanatory memorandum: 8). More 
recently, in 2011, the Commission  launched a new pro-
gramme with  the objective of  enabling  “half of  the legal  prac-
titioners in the European Union  to participate in  European 
judicial training activities by 2020” (COM 2011/551). 
It is  obvious that the Commission  has actively encouraged 
the evolution of the legal  infrastructure Daniel  Kelemen de-
scribes as a  necessary condition  for  the expansion  of  rights-
based litigation (cf. Kelemen 2011: 17). This  indicates that the 
Commission may  be in  the position  to actively encourage 
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private litigation, rather than  just react to preliminary  refer-
ences as they  are referred to the Court of Justice. Its means 
of influence in  this regard are necessarily very indirect. In 
this context, it would be worthwhile investigating  in what 
way the Commission can act  as a  ‘signal’ for  individual liti-
gants by  supporting  some positions over others. Since the 
Commission’s legal  opinion prevails in  court most of the 
time, individual litigants face strong  incentives  to align 
themselves with the Commission’s stand-point. Conversely, a 
consistent legal argument against certain  claims could serve 
to discourage private litigation in those areas. 
These considerations about the Commission’s  involvement in 
private litigation  indicate how the actions of  the Commission 
in  the judicial  sphere of the European Union connect to the 
wider environment of  judicial  politics in Europe. One final 
issue that arises  in  this context  is  the question  of  impact. De-
spite the wide ranging  legal  developments concerning mutual 
recognition, non-discrimination and citizenship rights, the 
general  impression  appears to be that these rights do not 
work all that well  in practice. Rates of litigation  do not only 
reflect the varying  degrees  of  access  to the legal  system, but 
also the incidence of  problems individuals  encounter. The 
Commission seems quite aware of  this: “a gap still  remains 
between the applicable legal  rules and the reality confronting 
citizens in  their  daily  lives, particularly in  cross-border  situa-
tions. The large number of complaints and enquiries the 
Commission receives every year, recent Eurobarometer sur-
veys, discussions with  stakeholders, [...] provide ample evi-
dence of  the many  obstacles standing in the way  of citizens’ 
enjoyment of their  rights”  (COM 2010/603: 3). However, 
many  studies – this one included – focus exclusively on  dis-
putes in  the courtroom  or the legislature, but stop short of 
evaluating  the practical  effect of these actions, beyond mere 
member state implementation. It is  almost a  reflex to cite 
Lisa Conant’s book on the limited impact of EU law (Conant 
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2002), but  much harder to accept the consequences. It is  
unreasonable to believe that concerns for  efficacy  have no 
impact on strategy choice and I would expect that such con-
siderations inform Commission action. Tying this back to the 
vagaries of inter-institutional decision-making would provide 
a much more complete picture of the policy-making  process. 
A  more thorough concern  for  the real  world impact of EU 
policies, legislative or judicial, will go a long  way towards 
determining how important the Commission really is.
Conclusions 260
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